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Ach, hoe snel zijn ze voorbijgegaan, al die bekoorlijke stadia: zitten en schateren, kruipen 
en intoneren, lopen en wijzen. R. heeft nu definitief toegang tot het domein van de taal. 
Nu de ontwikkeling nog te overzien valt - de score is drie woorden - is de tijd van 
geschiedschrijving daar. 
Het eerste woord is R. bijgebracht door mijn vrouw, via een eenvoudig spel. Het heet 
'Waar is pappa?' en wordt gespeeld door drie personen. Mijn vrouw zegt: 'Waar is 
pappa?' (Pappa is aanwezig, maar heeft zich aan het zicht onttrokken). R. kijkt 
verwachtingsvol. De vraag wordt een paar keer herhaald, gevolgd door de smachtende 
roep: 'Pappa! Pappai'. Zoals tot iemand die men zoekt of mist. Daarop ik: 'Hier!', te 
voorschijn tredend. Waarna mijn vrouw, vol blijdschap: "Daar is pappa!'. Algemeen 
enthousiasme bij het weer verenigde gezin. 
Dit moet R. ertoe gebracht hebben op eigen gelegenheid 'pappa' te gaan zeggen. 
Aanvankelijk zonder daarmee iets speciaals te bedoelen, meer bij wijze van welgevormde 
klank. De huidige betekenissen zijn: (1) pappa, althans mijn persoon, (2) mamma, vooral 
indien afwezig; bij sleutel- en deurgeluiden, (3) de afwezige in het algemeen; als gedicht, 
gebed. 
Het tweede woord kwam zonder opzettelijke beïnvloeding. Weliswaar zei ik wel eens 
'hap!', maar ik zeg zo veel; dat deed ik meer om de eetgebeurtenissen wat te articuleren. 
Hiervan heeft R. een werkwoord en/of substantief gemaakt, 'happe', ook wel 'happi'. 
Vastgestelde betekenissen: (1) eten, (2) drinken, (3) een niet nader te benoemen verlangen 
naar iets. Voor mijn gevoel klinkt het soms de hele dag op, als een soort recitatief: happe-
happe-happe... Niet alleen voorafgaand aan, maar ook direct volgend op de maaltijd. Zij 
zegt het zachtjes, en ingehouden, precies, en met kalme aandrang, zonder dat het ook 
maar iets van bevel of eis heeft. Het i's geheimzinnig en helder. 
Het derde woord is er een paar dagen geleden bij gekomen. Misschien is het 't getal 
drie dat tot haast maant. Drie is een reeks, hoe je het ook wendt of keert. De verwerving 
was, alweer, het gevolg van een spel. Een spel voor twee personen en een aapje dat, terwijl 
R. al in bed ligt, opeens vermist wordt. Door een allengs bezorgder, ten slotte bijna 
existentieel uitgesproken vraag, 'Waar is het aapje?', wordt de spanning hoog opgejaagd. 
Dan: 'Dáár is het aapje' (dat gelijktijdig getoond wordt) - gejuich, hereniging voor de duur 
van de nacht van R. en aapje, tevens de gelegenheid voor de dienst doende ouder om 
ertussen uit te knijpen. 
Dat is dan de sinds kort actief gezochte en aangeroepen 'api' geworden, een soort god 
van de slaap in het ledikant. Het middagslaapje valt buiten zijn competentie. Overdag 
doet hij gewoon aan alles mee, maar incognito. 
Pappa, happe, api: een, twee, drie - veel. Nu zal de rest ook wel komen. Maar 
intussen, wat is er gebeurd in dat hoofdje? Of is dat meteen al een verkeerde vraag, en 
moet ik het hebben over strottehoofdje? Ik weet het niet. Af en toe doe ik een poging om 
me onialigheid voor te stellen als een... Als een... Daar heb je het: die neiging heb ik wel, 
maar zij levert niets op dan onzinnige vergelijkingen, waarin lichtexplosies plaatsvinden 
in iets dat aardedonker is. 
Nicolaas Matsier, 'Een taal van drie woorden' * 
Fragment uit 'Een taal van drie woorden', dat oorspronkelijk als Achterpaginastukje in 
NRC Handelsblad verscheen (16 - 1 - 1981) en naderhand werd opgenomen in Een gebreid 
echtpaart je (Querido, Amsterdam, 1985). 
*A translation is provided in the Appendix. 
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hoofdstukken 1 en 8. 
Chris Sinha, voor het corrigeren van vertaal- en stijlfouten in 
deze hoofdstukken. 
Louis des Tombe, voor zijn bespreking van een vroege versie van 
hoofdstuk 2. 
Ger de Haan, voor zijn commentaar op hoofdstuk 5. 
Piet Groeneboom, voor effectieve statistische formuleringen en 
voor stylistische correcties. 
Nicolaas Matsier, voor de toestemming om een fragment uit zijn 
'Een taal van drie woorden' op te nemen als motto. 
Penny Sandford, voor haar vertaling van dit fragment. 
Tobias Baanders, voor het omslagontwerp. 
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Greet Eibers, Tilly de Keyzer en Ina de Vries, elk voor haar 
eigen actieve bijdrage en belangstelling. 
Mevrouw C. Deniers, voor haar trouwe, onverstoorbare hulp en 
bereidheid tot 'inspringen'. 
Team, directie en bestuur van kinderdagverblijf 'Hummeltje' in 
Utrecht-Overvecht, voor de onveranderlijk uitstekende kinderopvang. 
Mijn dank gaat voorts naar alle ouders die mij taalmateriaal van hun 
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naar de kinderen zelf: Nina Doornbos, Susanne van Es, Kim van der 
Horst, Josine van Loon, Hein van Marie, Mathijs Pouw, Sander Rom, 
Hedda Schueler, Jaurieke Ton en Niek Wijnen. Het merendeel van dit 
materiaal is niet direct herkenbaar in het proefschrift en sommige 
onderdelen ervan zijn nog steeds 'in analyse'. In zijn totaliteit 
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taalontwikkeling. 
Tenslotte, mijn kinderen, Thomas en Tim. Hun aandeel In het 
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Loekie Eibers. 
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CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION 
'I suppose that whenever one stares at a 
phenomenon long enough, it can begin to 
take on cosmic importance - the deepest 
workings of the universe unfolding in an 
infant7s smile.' (Bates 1979: 32). 
This dissertation consists of a collection of studies of children's 
language development. At first sight, the papers collected here seem to be 
quite diverse. Two papers are about babbling (i.e., about aspects of 
phonetic/phonological development), one has to do with 'lexical 
representation' and one with 'lexical innovation' (i.e., with aspects of 
lexical/semantic development), and the most recent paper is in large part 
concerned with the emergence of three-word sentences (i.e., with aspects 
of syntactic development). Such heterogeneity of linguistic subject matter 
is unusual in the field of developmental psycholinguistics. However, if 
one considers the studies from a psychological rather than a linguistic 
angle, it becomes clear that they are all the product of 'staring at the 
same phenomenon'. The phenomenon is what in this chapter I will call the 
'cognitive effort' of language acquisition; children's active cognitive 
involvement in their own language learning. 
Since I did not succeed in capturing this unifying 'Leitmotiv' and 
making it sufficiently explicit until after the separate papers were 
completed, the present chapter serves as both an introduction to, and an 
interpretive discussion of the separate studies. The terra 'cognitive 
effort' does not appear in any of the individual texts. In this chapter it 
is introduced and used for creating an over-arching framework within which 
commonalities, that otherwise would remain obscure, can be brought to 
light and be discussed. 
The notion of 'cognitive effort' has many ramifications (for 
instance, the role of awareness, the driving forces of effort, the 
question of individual differences, etc.). Each in itself would be worthy 
of extensive treatment, but I here restrict myself to introducing the 
notion of 'cognitive effort', to discussing its general theoretical 
position within the present field, and to indicating in what ways it is 
investigated in this dissertation. 
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Cognitive effort: a missing llnk.7 
That children play a very active role In their own language learning has 
been recognized In the study of child language almost from the beginning. 
In 1907 for Instance, Clara and William Stern wrote: 'if the child has the 
opportunity to form any material Into symbols of expression and 
communication, he seizes upon this with an intensity, autonomy and 
adroitness that vividly illustrate the internal productivity awaiting 
release' (Clara and William Stern 1907, as translated In Blumenthal 1970). 
This quotation Indicates that, for the Sterns, the creative aspects of the 
child's active role ('internal productivity') were closely intertwined 
with the effort-reflecting aspects ('intensity, autonomy, adroitness'). 
In the child language studies of recent decades one also finds a 
general acknowledgement of the fact that children are active language 
learners. Children are regarded as active and creative since they produce 
novel, rule-governed forms that, as such, they could never have heard in 
their input (for instance 'footses' instead of 'feet', 'goed' instead of 
'went', see Ervin 1964). However, in this conception of 'activeness' the 
aspects of 'creativity' and 'effort' seem to have become curiously 
dissociated. While 'creativity' is highlighted almost routinely, 'effort' 
is often ignored or played down. For instance, McNeill claims that the 
goal of theories of language acquisition is to show how knowledge of 
language develops 'automatically, naturally, effortlessly, and quickly' 
(McNeill 1971: 17), Wexler stresses 'the apparently easy and quick manner 
in which children do the learning' (Wexler 1982: 292), and Chomsky speaks 
of the 'minimal effort' of language acquisition (Chomsky 1981: 305), 
stating even that 'language learning is not something that the child does; 
it is something that happens to the child' (Chomsky 1988: 134). The 
studies collected in this dissertation have been (implicitly) motivated by 
the desire to redress the balance somewhat, and to show that cognitive 
effort plays a significant role in the acquisition of language. 
Observing children, one not only becomes convinced that they can 
creatively apply linguistic rules, but also that they are highly 
'cognitlvely involved' with language in various not specifically 
linguistic ways. Children pay a lot of attention to language; they ask for 
it, try it out, practice it, think about it, in short, they put their 
minds to it. For instance, children may tenaciously search their minds for 
the 'right' word form, even though it would be far less effortful to 
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simply circumscribe the intended meaning (see chapter 4 of this 
dissertation). Alternatively, children may also take the cognitive trouble 
of creating a completely new word, even though they could have used 
established forms instead (see chapter 6 of this dissertation). Therefore, 
it cannot be the whole truth that the growth of language is like the 
growth of the physical body (as is suggested by Chomsky, see Rieber & 
Voyat 1983: 57/58, Chomsky 1988). Has one ever witnessed a child 'putting 
her mind' to making the body grow? Developing a first language, whether 
starting from a specifically linguistic bioprogram or not, is, at least in 
part, a matter of hard work. Children seldom seem to be lazy about it. But 
what is the essence of this 'not being lazy'? How do children 'work' on 
language; in other words, what forms do their exertions typically take? 
Also, why do children's efforts take these forms, i.e., what are their 
specific functions? These are the implicit questions that lie at the heart 
of this dissertation's studies. 
In developmental psycholinguistics, research areas tend to be defined 
in linguistic rather than psychological/behavioral terms. Individual 
researchers generally do not cross the linguistically delineated borders. 
In this dissertation, nearly all major linguistic borders are crossed. It 
is 'cognitive effort' that constitutes the recurring (albeit implicit) 
theme. In the last part of this chapter I will introduce the separate 
papers one by one and I will indicate in what way this central theme is 
embodied in each of them. But before turning to this I will briefly 
discuss how this theme, while remaining on the border of the mainstream of 
developmental psycholinguistic thinking, may nevertheless be seen to make 
sense with respect to that mainstream. 
Since the early sixties, psycholinguistics has developed explosively. 
Within psycholinguistics, the study of language acquisition has ranked 
among the fastest developing areas (Levelt, Mills and Karmiloff-Smith 
1981). Golinkoff and Gordon (1983) present an overview of this turbulent 
period in the history of child language investigation. In the following, I 
make use of the structure of their overview, but I have made some minor 
adaptations as to content. 
Golinkoff and Gordon use the biblical parallel of the 'seven days of 
creation' in structuring their account of major research trends. On the 
first day of creation, they hold, 'the deity created Chomsky' (op. cit. 
2). On the second day Chomsky, in his turn, created transformational 
generative grammar. He distinguished between linguistic 'competence' (the 
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native speaker's abstract knowledge of his language) and linguistic 
'performance' (the actual processes of language behavior in concrete 
situations), and he regarded a grammar as a description of competence. 
Chomsky localized the 'creative' aspect of language, i.e., its power to 
generate an infinite number of sentences, in the syntactic component of 
grammar. As to language acquisition, Chomsky held that the universal 
properties of granmar should be regarded as belonging to the 'innate 
knowledge' of the child. From this innate knowledge the child derives 
'hypotheses' concerning the structure of his mother tongue which he 
'tests' against the linguistic input. 
The third day of creation witnessed the first psycholinguistic 
attempts to study the development of competence in the child. Since syntax 
had been designated as the 'creative' component of competence, researchers 
concentrated on the development of syntax and investigated the syntactic 
rules that seem to underly children's utterances. Eventually, this 
exclusively syntactic approach proved to be too narrow for adequately 
describing children's productions, and on the fourth day, it yielded to 
more semantic approaches. Extra-linguistic context was taken into account. 
Sentence meaning, case roles and, also, word meaning became important 
topics. Concurrently, an interest emerged in the relationships between 
language development and achievements in the development of general 
conceptual knowledge as exemplified in Fiagetian research (such as the 
attainment of the concept of a permanent object). 
Then, on the fifth day, researchers became aware that meanings 
generally are negotiated in interactive contexts. They discovered the 
child as a social being. Theoretical emphasis shifted to the functions of 
language for communication. A tendency towards conflating 'language' and 
'communication' arose, accompanied by a tendency to stress the role of 
environmental/interactional variables, such as the special ways adults 
have of talking to children and the structured character of communicative 
interaction. 
On the sixth day, partly in reaction to the general broadening and 
blurring of research questions, some investigators returned to the study 
of syntax acquisition per se. This was now undertaken in a more 
sophisticated and more formal way than before, though again with a strong 
nativistic starting point. Emphasized were the innate constraints that 
make syntax 'learnable' for a child. 
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Finally, the seventh day - which is the present day - should, 
according to Golinkoff and Cordon, be declared a 'Day of Rest and 
Judgment'. They warn, referring to a lecture by Roger Brown, that the 
'increasingly amorphous' area of language acquisition may become one of 
those research fields that are intensively studied for some time but are 
eventually abandoned. On the day of rest and judgment, researchers should 
reflect on how to retrieve language acquisition from the 'scattered 
directions' in which it has fled. The authors conclude their paper with 
pointing out some research problems that need not directly concern us 
here. 
Of course, this summarized overview is sketchy and not overly subtle. 
But it clearly brings out one general trend: though there has been ample 
interest in the role of language-external variables in acquisition, these 
variables have mainly been located in either the environment (specific 
input characteristics), or in the child's general knowledge (general 
conceptual competence, communicative competence), not in the active, 
'learning-oriented' aspects of the child's language behavior. There were 
two moments when the field could have turned towards studying these active 
properties of language behavior, but did not. The first moment was when, 
on the 'second day of creation', Chomsky advanced the notion of the child 
as a 'tester of hypotheses'. But Chomsky himself did not elaborate this 
notion. Rather, he concentrated on the idea of (effortless) innate 
knowledge. Braine (1971) concluded against the notion of 'hypotheses 
testing', but Slobin (1973) came close to elaborating it when he used 
cross-cultural data on the linguistic structure of child utterances for 
inferring a small number of 'operating principles'. Operating principles 
are general heuristics or 'self-instructions', which children are supposed 
to use in attending to language. This work has inspired an impressive 
amount of cross-linguistic research (see Slobin 1985 a), and the number of 
proposed operating principles has grown considerably. However, being 
primarily based on data of linguistic structure, this approach seems to be 
too indirect for really getting at children's cognitive effort. The 
operating principles recently suggested (Slobin 1985 b) tend to read as 
'operationally phrased' linguistic rules rather than as general cognitive 
principles. 
The second moment was when, on the 'fourth day of creation', 
researchers turned towards the constructivist Piagetian theory of general 
cognitive development (see for instance Bates 1979, Beilin 1975, Corrigan 
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1978). But by this time the field had already become so heavily 
competence-oriented, that they mainly attended to Plaget's 
characterizations of the child's conceptual knowledge ('cognitive' 
competence), not to his (somewhat less prominent) accounts of how this 
knowledge Is 'constructed' by the child, nor to his method of detailed 
behavioral observation and analysis. Consequently, there was, and still 
is, a tendency to acknowledge only two interacting forces: linguistic 
'nature' and linguistic 'nurture'. For instance, in 1971 McNeill held that 
'the acquisition of language can be understood as an interaction between a 
child's linguistic experience and his innate linguistic capacities' 
(McNeill 1971: 17), and in 1983 Bloom still speaks of 'successive 
adjustments' between the 'native endowment, talents, and faculties for 
language that are already in place in the first few months of life' and 
the 'language displays provided by the parent' (Bloom 1983: 90). 
The eventual achievement of integration probably presupposes the 
realization that linguistic nature and nurture do not interact in a vacuum 
(or mysteriously 'adjust' to each other), but in an active child that is 
continually engaged in language behavior. In this behavior, the child is 
not only 'communicating' or 'expressing herself' but is also continually 
working on integrating input and endowment. Therefore, this behavior 
should be investigated, not merely in so far as it reflects the child's 
current linguistic competence, but also in respect of those aspects 
(linguistic and non-linguistic) that seem to be conducive to the child's 
future knowledge. In other words, linguistic competence should be seen as 
(at least In part) the developmental result of linguistic performance. 
Golinkoff and Gordon seem to hint at a comparable view when they 
present the following analogy: 'It is patently false that the mere 
existence of oxygen, combustible material and a matchbook necessarily 
implies that there must be a fire. Combustion will not occur unless a 
causal agent (or a bolt of lightning) lights a match to the combustible 
material' (Golinkoff and Gordon 1983: 15). What seems to be needed in 
developmental psycholinguistics is a proper view on the child as a 'causal 
agent', as a creature that uses and produces language for learning 
language. This amounts to saying that there is a need for research and 
theorizing on those aspects of performance that reflect 'cognitive 
effort'. 
In thus proclaiming 'cognitive effort' the missing link in 
developmental psycholinguistics, I may be accused of having stared at a 
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phenomenon too long and of consequently attaching 'cosmic importance' to 
an 'infant's smile' (see this chapter's motto). But maybe attaching 
importance to infant's smiles is not the worst thing to do on a day of 
rest and judgment. Also, the literature is, in fact, quite rich in studies 
that are in one way or another relevant to the approach suggested here. 
But these studies have not yet come together in a common paradigm, purpose 
or terminology. Firstly, studies by Karmiloff-Smith (1979 a, 1979 b, 1986) 
and Bowerman (1982, 1983, 1985 a) are remarkable for their convincing 
demonstrations that children do indeed 'put their minds' to language. 
Karmiloff-Smith forcefully argues that children treat language as a 
'problem-space' in its own right, to be worked on for its own sake. 
Bowerman shows that children keep reorganizing their language knowledge 
even after correct performance and communicative success have been 
attained. An illuminating example of active learning in a rather unusual 
setting is presented by Sbderbergh (1977), in a case study of a two year 
old's learning to read. 
Secondly, there is relevant research and theorizing on children's 
performance strategies (Peters 1983, 1986, Ruth Clark 1980, 1982, 
MacWhinney 1982, Snow 1983, Slobin 1985 b) and on children's revisions of 
their own productions (Eve Clark 1978, 1982, Kaserraann 1980, 
Karmiloff-Smith 1986). Also, there is research testifying to the intimate 
relationship between the acquisition of language and the developmental 
processes of speech production (Camareta and Leonard 1986, Wijnen 1988 a, 
b), and there is some important theorizing on the cognitive aspects of 
speech development (Macken and Ferguson 1983, Menn 1983). These studies 
often highlight aspects of language behavior that are direct reflections 
neither of linguistic rules nor of environmental modeling. Ruth Clark 
should be especially mentioned for going delightfully against the general 
direction of mainstream thinking. She likes to speak of 'talking to learn' 
instead of 'learning to talk', (see also chapter 5 of this dissertation), 
of 'production preceding comprehension' instead of 'comprehension 
preceding production', and of 'performing without competence' (Ruth Clark 
1974, 1982). 
Finally, several investigators have independently formulated 
conclusions that are similar to mine, though each uses somewhat different 
terms and seems to avoid a direct reference to behavior or performance 
(Cromer 1981, Shatz 1982, Gelman 1983, Peters 1986). The gist of their 
discussions appears to be that, though we now know a lot about the many 
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different variables involved in language acquistion, we are still very far 
from answering the 'how' question of acquisition itself. Shatz' 
concluding remark is worth quoting: 'it seems reasonable not to try to 
explain one kind of knowledge in terms of another, but rather to 
investigate the principles by which children generally acquire various 
systems of complex knowledge' (Shatz 1982: 126). In chapter 5 of this 
dissertation some general (performance) principles of this kind will be 
explicitly proposed. 
Like the studies referred to above, the papers of which this 
dissertation consists also do not, by themselves, constitute a consistent 
and systematic attempt to implement a 'cognitive effort' approach to 
language development. They cannot, since they preceded rather than 
followed its proposal. Nevertheless, I think they may contribute to what, 
I hope, will eventually become a fully explicit, coherent, integrative, 
and acknowledged area of investigation. 
In the next part of this chapter, the question is considered of how 
to recognize those aspects of performance (in production) that are 
indicative of 'cognitive effort', and the separate studies of this 
dissertation are introduced successively. 
Cognitive effort: the studies 
In the preceding section I described 'cognitive effort' rather loosely by 
using characterizations such as 'putting one's mind to language', 'paying 
attention to language', 'working on language' and 'using language for 
learning language'. This may have been sufficient for a first evocation 
of what I mean by the term, but now it will have to be specified in 
greater detail. 
Children's active cognitive involvement with language may manifest 
itself in three different kinds of ways. 
The first kind is the most obvious: it is metalinguistic awareness. 
When children talk about language and produce explicit comments on 
language itself, they are clearly putting their (conscious) mind to it. 
Interesting papers on this subject can be found in Sinclair, Jarvella and 
Levelt (1978), and Tunmer, Pratt and Herrlman (1984). Though research on 
metalinguistic awareness is accumulating (see also Hakes 1980, 1982), very 
little can as yet be concluded about its function for language acquisition 
proper. As Levelt puts it, 'nothing would have to be changed in current 
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theories of language acquisition if children were to show no linguistic 
awareness at all' (Levelt 1981: 191). 
The second kind of cognitive involvement with language is also rather 
transparent: it is language play. When children playfully substitute words 
in frames while waiting to fall asleep (bed time monologues, see Weir 
1962, Schaerlaekens Ь Gillis 1987), or when they engage in spontaneous 
rhyming, or intentionally produce 'nonsense', they often seem to be 
actively exploring and exercising language in order to learn (something 
about) language. Research interest in language play also seems to be 
growing (see for instance Ferguson and Macken 1983, Kuczaj 1983). Still, 
Levelt's observation holds for this area as well; little would have to be 
changed in current theories of language acquisition if children were not 
to play with language at all. 
The third kind of cognitive effort Is the least obvious. At the same 
time it is the most common, since it can, in principle, be found in any 
form of linguistic performance. In particular in the ordinary, interactive 
language behavior of every day. Traditionally, 'performance' is divided in 
two major components: comprehension and production. Since all papers 
collected in this dissertation concern production, I here restrict myself 
to discussing production performance. Language production reflects at 
least the following two aspects of mental functioning: a. knowledge of the 
language (the speaker's mental representation of linguistic structure, 
i.e., 'competence'), b. ability to actually produce language (the 
speaker's ability to plan, program and execute utterances). Knowledge and 
ability do neither develop independently, nor are they the same. A child 
may have knowledge of a certain linguistic structure without yet being 
able to produce it in an utterance (Bloom, Miller and Hood 1975), and, 
conversely, may be able to produce an apparently complex utterance without 
yet having knowledge of its linguistic structure (Ruth Clark 1974, Peters 
1983). As indicated in the preceding section, most research has 
concentrated on the development of knowledge. The development of ability 
has also received some attention, though generally not for its own sake 
but because ability is a variable that has to be dealt with when studying 
knowledge. What parts of a child's ordinary language production might be 
regarded as having to do with 'working' on the development of knowledge 
and/or ability? 
Researchers sometimes reflect on the question of why development 
occurs at all. For instance, Brown (1973) notes that children apparently 
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experience little 'selection pressure' towards Improving their speech. 
Parents generally Interpret their children's utterances correctly, whether 
these utterances are incomplete or not. 'Why say more if what is being 
said works quite well?', Brown wonders (op.cit. 464). Similarly, Cromer 
(1978: 316) asks: 'Why do children. Initially using a simple form to 
convey a meaning, begin to elaborate more complex forms to express the 
same concept?', and Snow (1988: 351) speaks of 'the still-puzzling 
question of why children bother to learn words when their pre-linguistic 
communicative behaviors are so effective in meeting their needs'. These 
remarks highlight the fact that much of what a child learns seems, at the 
time of acquisition, to be 'communicatively superfluous' (see also 
Bowerman's and Karmiloff-Smith's studies, mentioned above). However, this 
knowledge need not be 'cognitively superfluous' as well. Children might 
strive towards acquiring a maximally coherent system of knowledge, or they 
might simply be born with a strong drive to learn for the sake of learning 
itself. Anyway, it seems reasonable to assume that some sort of 'general 
cognitive orientedness on learning' plays a role in development. Taking 
this for a starting point, we should not look for 'cognitive effort' (as 
the manifestation of such a general learning-orientedness in language 
production) in communication, but instead should concentrate on those 
instances/aspects of production performance (and their development) that 
seem to be communicatively superfluous. These might provide the clearest 
view on the child's intrinsic ways of paying attention to language. 
I here propose that cognitive effort will reflect itself most clearly 
in a. utterances that seem to be communicatively unnecessary, and in b. 
utterances that, considering the child's current level of functioning, 
seem to be unnecessarily complex. As for a., we can turn to children's 
non-interactive speech (for instance, their soliloquies during play), or 
to those child productions which, though occurring within interaction, do 
not seem to be communicatively motivated (for instance, uninformative 
self-repetitions, imitations, self-paraphrases, paraphrases of the input, 
and so on). As for b. , we can concentrate on those instances where the 
child might apparently have produced a communicatively successful 
utterance of 'average' complexity ('average' with respect to the child's 
current level of functioning), but nevertheless chooses to strain ability 
and produce a linguistically more advanced and/or psychologically more 
complex utterance. In this case, it is not the utterance itself but its 
complexity which seems to be superfluous. An instance would be the 
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utterance 'want more cookie', when produced by a child whose sentences 
seldom contain more than two words, and who might also have reached her 
goal by simply saying 'more cookie' (a defensible research strategy in 
studying this kind of cognitive effort may be to concentrate on young 
children's 'peak performances' per se, given Brown's observations on the 
general absence of 'selection pressures'). 
Taken together, the notions of 'communicative superfluity' and 
'unnecessary complexity' make for three possible kinds of productions in 
which learning-oriented effort may reflect itself: two 'weak' kinds and 
one 'strong' kind. The weaker kinds are: productions that are 
communicatively superfluous but not unnecessarily complex on the one hand, 
and productions that are unnecessarily complex but not communicatively 
superfluous on the other. The stronger kind is represented by those child 
productions that are both communicatively superfluous and unnecessarily 
complex at the same time. The following may serve as an example of how 
instances of the stronger kind can be recognized in sentence production, 
and of the ways in which its development in that area can be studied. 
Suppose a child, in the two-word utterance stage, produces the 
following answer(s) to the question 'Where is your father?': Daddy 
kitchen/ Daddy in kitchen/. Such a sequence of utterances is called a 
'replacement sequence' (Braine 1971, 1973). The second utterance in the 
sequence 'replaces' the first one, is an expansion of it, and is 
apparently equivalent to it in meaning. This second utterance is a strong 
instance of cognitive effort; it is communicatively superfluous (the first 
utterance would have sufficed for adequate communication), as well as 
unnecessarily complex (in addition to being communicatively superfluous 
the utterance is a 'peak performance'). In a competence approach, 
replacement sequences are regarded as revealing certain aspects of 
linguistic knowledge. For instance, 'if we find that on some occasions 
'man car' is replaced by 'man in car', and on other occasions by 'man's 
car', we have distributional evidence for a constructional homonym, and, 
therefore, evidence that the grammar should provide at least two different 
structural descriptions for some noun + noun combinations' (Braine 1973: 
422). In such an approach replacement sequences are useful but essentially 
marginal phenomena; they represent aspects of performance that sometimes 
may 'help' in linguistic interpretation, but that can, in principle, be 
overlooked. In contrast to this, replacement sequences turn into central 
rather than marginal phenomena if one is primarily interested in getting 
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at the child's cognitive effort. In that case, one will concentrate on the 
developmental characteristics of the replacement sequences themselves. 
This means that one will use the linguistic characteristics of utterances 
for deriving insights about the development of replacement behavior, 
rather than vice versa. Questions asked might be: does expansion typically 
occur by putting a third word before, within or after a two-word 
utterance? What kinds of words are added in what positions? Are there 
developmental changes in this respect; in other words, does the focus of 
cognitive effort change over time? (see chapter 5 of this dissertation). 
What kinds of two-word sentences are typically not expanded? Does this 
also change over time? In short, when studying competence we look at what 
replacement behavior can tell us about linguistic structure; when studying 
cognitive effort we look at what linguistic structure can tell us about 
replacement behavior. These are two essentially different ways of 
approaching the same data, but both would seem to be necessary for 
arriving at an integrated picture of sentence development. 
In the subsequent collection of papers aspects of all three kinds of 
cognitive involvement with language (metalinguistic awareness, language 
play, cognitive effort in language production) come to the fore, but the 
focus is on the third kind, i.e., on cognitive effort in language 
production (in its weaker as well as in its stronger manifestations). A 
frequently used technique in the reported studies is that of the 
longitudinal case study. This technique seems to be especially suitable 
within a cognitive effort approach. Since cognitive effort has to do with 
producing communicatively superfluous and unnecessarily complex 
utterances, and since there may be large Individual differences between 
children as to when and how they are Inclined to do this, longitudinal 
rather than cross-sectional data collection is indicated. Also, if one 
does not know beforehand whether instances of such effort will occur often 
or seldom, behavior has to be sampled rather intensively. 
The first paper (Operating principles in repetitive babbling: a 
cognitive continuity approach'. Eibers 1982) presents an Intensive, 
longitudinal case study of prelinguistic babbling. It reports on the 
babbling development of my elder son, Thomas, between the ages of 6 and 12 
months. For someone interested in cognitive effort, prelinguistic babbling 
is an especially fascinating kind of behavior. In its linguistic 
meaninglessness, it seems so arbitrary and superfluous. At the same time, 
it is also so remarkably repetitive and regular. It is the onset of 
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repetitiveness especially, that suggests some sort of cognitive 
involvement on the part of the child. Moreover, babbling keeps being 
meaningless and regular for months on end, but during this time it also 
becomes increasingly complex. This suggests that infants spend some 
spontaneous cognitive effort on it (why otherwise change from simple 
babble to complex babble, when both are equally meaningless?). At the 
2) time , there were two dominant theories of babbling; learning theory 
('nurture') and maturational theory ('nature'). Learning theory emphasized 
that babbling is 'shaped' by environmental input, maturational theory 
emphasized an innate predisposition for 'random' babbling. Both theories 
failed to satisfactorily explain the characteristic combination of 
meanlnglessness and regularity in babbling (see page 29). My aim in 
performing the case study was to show that babbling is an active process 
of acquiring knowledge about the sound pattern of language. Stated in the 
present terminology; my aim was to demonstrate the cognitive effort of 
babbling, to elucidate its function, and to uncover its developmental 
mechanisms. The conclusions of the study were that the growing complexity 
of prelinguistic babbling seems to be brought about by two general 
mechanisms of cognitive effort: the chaining, i.e. combining of simple 
babbles that previously were exercised on their own, and the changing, 
i.e. varying of existing babbles on some phonological (or 
metaphonological) parameter. The child in this case study apparently 
focussed his cognitive effort on certain global distinctions in manner of 
articulation (continuant sounds versus non-continuant sounds) and in place 
of articulation (back, front and centre of the mouth). Conceivably, other 
children might focus on other distinctions, but one would expect the 
general mechanisms of effort (combining and varying) to remain the same 
across children (see page A4). In the paper, I refer to these mechanisms 
as Operating principles', since at the time I saw a connection with 
Slobin's work (Slobin 1973, see discussion above). Since then, Slobin's 
operating principles have greatly proliferated and have become less 
'basic' in the process (see discussion on page 7, see also Bowerman 1985 
b). Therefore, I now prefer to refer to these mechanisms as 'principles of 
cognitive effort' rather than as Operating principles'. 
The second study was performed in collaboration with Josi Ton ('Play 
pen monologues: the interplay of words and babbles in the first words 
period', Eibers and Ton 1985). This paper reports, again, a case study of 
Thomas' babbling. This second case study concentrates on the babbling 
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monologues that were produced during the six weeks following production of 
the first word. So we might say that it is concerned with 
'(post-Hinguistic' rather than with 'pre-linguistic' babbling. In several 
ways this second case study is prototypical for an approach addressing 
'cognitive effort'. 
Firstly, in order to trace the child's cognitive effort in this phase 
of babbling, it seemed essential to collect a very substantial corpus of 
babbles; more than 5000 babbles produced in the course of only six weeks 
are analyzed. When words are just beginning to be acquired we may assume 
that, generally, it will be more difficult for the child to produce a 
particular word than to produce some babble. Babbling is more or less 
arbitrary compared to word production, since the latter implies realizing 
very specific target forms. Therefore, when, during solitary babbling (a 
form of language play), the child produces word-related forms, this may be 
taken as an indication of cognitive effort. However, since one does not 
know beforehand how often a child will do this (if at all), behavior 
should be sampled intensively. 
Secondly, all babbles were collected while the child was playing 
alone and no one was present to 'stimulate' him in some way or other 
(except possibly the cat, see page 51). Although such a 'non-interactive' 
procedure seems quite natural within a cognitive effort approach, at the 
time of publication journal editors thought we ought to defend this 
procedure explicitly, because it clearly clashed with the then prominent 
'social context' paradigm (see the 'fifth day of creation' discussed 
above). This defense can be found in the last paragraph of the paper's 
Introductory section (see page 49). 
Thirdly, the study concentrates on a short period In which one might 
expect the direction of cognitive effort to be dramatically changed; it 
concentrates on the start of the transition from predominantly 
'meaningless' to predominantly 'meaningful' speech. We investigate this 
change in the focus of effort by studying the relationship between word 
acquisition (as noted down in the mother's diary) and concurrent changes 
in the forms of solitary babbling. We conclude that babbling in the first 
words period may be used for practising the forms of newly acquired words 
and also for practising certain salient form characteristics that 
differentiate between these newly acquired words ('differentiating 
features', see page 56). In this way, new patterns in babbles arise which 
may, in their turn, predispose the child towards preferring particular 
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types of word forms in later word acquisition. Thus, there seems to be a 
continuous, bidirectional interplay between words and babbles. In this 
interplay, effort spent on babbles may 'repay' itself by making some kinds 
of words easier to acquire. 
The third paper ('A tip-of-the-tongue experience at age two?'. Eibers 
1985) does not report on a planned investigation, but presents the 
analysis of an incident. The incident consists of a word-finding problem, 
manifested by Thomas at age 2 years and 9 months. During a particular 
conversation with me, he repeatedly attempted to retrieve and produce a 
specific, recently acquired word (of which he knew the meaning), but again 
and again ended up producing another, previously learned word (the 
referential meaning of which was not yet clear to him). I analyze the 
child's lexical search processes and I argue that they have many 
characteristics in common with those of adult 'tip-of-the-tongue 
experiences' (TOT). It is obviously an effortful process to consciously 
search for a specific word form. This is an almost 'metalinguistic' 
activity, and it is interesting that a very young child can already engage 
in it. However, this is not, I think, the main significance of the paper. 
Its main significance lies in the indirect demonstration that children 
take note of, and actually store, linguistic forms that are referentially 
meaningless for them. Children can be pictured as 'travelling around' with 
a bag containing 'empty' forms that they try to fill with meaning as soon 
as the opportunity presents itself. Apparently, this tendency to 'fill 
empty forms' may sometimes interfere with correct word retrieval during 
lexical search. In the previous paper (Play pen monologues) it was shown 
that children may spend effort on word forms, apart from their meanings. 
In the TOT paper, it is shown that children may even operate on forms that 
do not as yet have a clear meaning for them. This point has also been made 
by several other authors, in different contexts (see the references on 
page 76), but the phenomenon of 'paying attention to empty forms' (a 
communicatively superfluous activity that seems to be related to 
imitation) has not yet been systematically described or investigated. This 
might be an important area for future research and theorizing within a 
cognitive effort approach. 
The fourth paper ('How children actively create their own language 
development; a basic cycle of cognitive operations', Eibers 1988 a) is an 
edited and expanded version of a plenary lecture given at the Fourth 
International Congress for the Study of Child Language, Lund, Sweden, 
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1987. In this paper I return to the question of the mechanisms of 
cognitive effort, which question was already introduced in the first paper 
on prelinguistic babbling. There I argued that the growing complexity of 
babbling is a result of 'combining' and 'varying'. Now I argue that there 
appears to be a quite general and age-independent three-phase cycle of 
cognitive operations (termed 'the basic cycle'), which is used by children 
for making progress in their language development as well as in their 
general cognitive development. The three phases of this basic cycle 
consist of, respectively: repeating the same action, chaining (combining) 
different actions, and varying (chainings of) actions. As to cognitive 
development, it is argued that this basic cycle can be recognized in the 
behavioral characteristics of the Piagetian sensorimotor stages and in the 
developmental processes of spontaneous object classification. As to 
language development, it is argued that the basic cycle can be recognized 
in the development of prelinguistic babbling and in the way in which 
three-word sentences emerge in sentence development. It is also suggested 
that aspects of the basic cycle can be identified in several other areas 
of language development as well. In discussing the three-word sentences, I 
make use of a diary study of the utterances produced by my younger son, 
Tim. Since I performed this diary study from a 'cognitive effort' point of 
view, I not only noted down each of the child's three-word sentences, but 
also, if there had been one, his immediately preceding utterance. This 
enabled me to check whether, for instance, a three-word sentence was 
produced as part of a 'replacement sequence' (see above) or not (this 
illustrates how research methods in a cognitive effort approach may differ 
from customary methods, for usually isolated sentences rather than pairs 
of sentences are collected and/or analyzed in diary studies). In the 
analysis, the main categories of three-word sentences are not defined in 
linguistic terms, but in terms of the cognitive operations of the 'basic 
cycle'. Within these primary, operational categories, I look at the 
linguistic regularities between sentences. In this way, it is possible to 
relate developments in cognitive effort to apparent acquisitions in 
linguistic competence. I argue that the child develops a certain syntactic 
notion ('Person-names in sentence-initial position should refer to 
Agents/Experiencers') in twice applying the basic cycle of cognitive 
operations to his own output-repertoire. This adds support to the 
contention that 'analyzing one's own output' may be no less important for 
syntax acquisition than is 'analyzing the input'. In the concluding 
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section of the paper I argue that the concept of the basic cycle may be a 
useful intermediary for relating the 'nature' and 'nurture' aspects of 
language acquisition to each other. 
The fifth and longest paper is called 'New names from old words: 
related aspects of children's metaphors and word compounds' (Eibers 1988 
b). Whereas in the previous papers cognitive effort was studied in the 
development of language forms (phonological, lexical and syntactic), this 
fifth paper concentrates on cognitive effort in the development of 
(lexical) meanings. It focusses on the question of why children create 
certain novel word meanings, and it analyses the developmental 
relationships between two quite different forms of lexical-semantic 
innovation: word compounding and metaphoric word use. Traditionally, word 
compounds (for instance, 'sun-shine') and metaphors (for instance, 'Juliet 
is the sun' ) are investigated independently, and at first sight one may 
indeed wonder why they should at all be considered together. However, if 
one realizes that the 'basic cycle' (see above) distinguishes between two 
different kinds of 'potentially innovative' cognitive operations, i.e., 
'combining' and 'varying', then it is not so difficult to see that word 
compounds are clear cases of 'combining lexical meanings', while 
metaphorically used words are clear cases of 'varying lexical meanings'. 
Thus, what unites word compounds and metaphors is the fact that they both 
are, in a general way, related to categories of cognitive effort. 
In the paper's introductory section a cognitive, categorial framework 
for relating compounds and metaphors is presented. It is argued that word 
compounds can be interpreted as subcategorizations of existing 
superordinate categories, while metaphors can be interpreted as 
subcategorizations of new (nameless) superordinate categories. In the rest 
of the paper the development of the capacities for producing compounds, 
respectively metaphors, is described, and their functions for children are 
analyzed. This analysis is based on observations of spontaneously produced 
child utterances and on data from schoolchildren's language. 
As to the development of capacity, I argue that compounding and 
metaphorizing seem to develop independently at first but to become 
gradually integrated until, at elementary school age, children should be 
considered capable of producing metaphoric compounds (such as 'moon-nuts' 
for referring to cashew-nuts), in which compounding and metaphorizing are 
fully integrated. 
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In the analysis of function, I concentrate on those Instances of 
children's novel compounds and metaphors that seem to be the result of 
spontaneous cognitive effort. These are instances In which the child might 
have used 'old', established forms, but did not. Such novel compounds and 
metaphors are termed 'preferred'. I argue that preferred compounds tend to 
serve the speaker-oriented function of 'being conceptually precise', 
whereas preferred metaphors generally seem to serve a listener-oriented, 
'suggestive' function. Metaphoric compounds may integrate the two kinds of 
functions, especially when they have a 'definitional' character, that is, 
when they not only express a similarity but also a difference (for 
instance; 'water-shadow' for referring to a reflection in a pond). This 
might stimulate older children to start making use of their capacity for 
integrating compounding and metaphorizing. It is shown that children of 
elementary school age do in fact produce metaphoric compounds. Also, it is 
shown that in this period metaphors may acquire an additional, new 
function; the language-learning function of 're-creating adult idioms'. In 
the literature, there has been a persistent conviction that schoolchildren 
pass through a 'literal' stage, during which they avoid producing 
metaphors. This idea is challenged in the paper. It is argued that 
metaphors do not disappear during middle childhood but change in their 
forms and functions. In the concluding section of the paper some 
suggestions for future research are presented. 
This concludes the introduction and interpretative discussion of the 
five main studies collected in this dissertation. In summary: though the 
separate studies differ considerably in their (linguistic) content, they 
all address essentially the same phenomenon. This phenomenon is the 
'cognitive effort' of language acquisition; children's active cognitive 
involvement in their own language learning. Cognitive effort is 
investigated as it manifests itself in children's language and speech 
production, and is taken to be reflected in their communicatively 
superfluous and/or unnecessarily complex utterances. The studies are 
concerned with demonstrating and illustrating 'cognitive effort', with 
uncovering its developmental mechanisms, and with identifying some of its 
specific functions. These three aspects can be found in almost each paper, 
but their relative prominence is variable. The paper on 
'tip-of-the-tongue' (chapter 4) is mainly demonstrative, the papers on 
development of prellngulstlc babbling (chapter 2) and on the 'basic 
operational cycle' (chapter 5) both concentrate on developmental 
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mechanisms, and the studies on the relations between babbling and first 
words (chapter 3) and between child metaphors and word compounds (chapter 
6) focus predominantly on function. 
The dissertation ends with a short note (chapter 7). This note ('Sex 
roles and phonetic factors in parent reference'. Eibers 1986) is not about 
children's efforts at all. Rather, it is about the efforts of mothers. I 
nevertheless include it since, somehow, it seems to be symbolic for what I 
have been doing myself. The five papers reviewed above can be regarded as 
the work of a mother, trying to make (scientific) sense of what her 
children are doing. In the note I argue that the (almost universal) word 
'mama' also is mothers' work in that it was created by mothers who imputed 
meaning to the 'sad' babbles of their babies. 
Notes. 
1) See for a notable exception Karmiloff-Smith 1979 a, 1986. 
2) But since then times have changed considerably, see for instance Locke 
1983, Macken and Ferguson 1983, Smith and Locke 1988. 
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CHAPTER 2. OPERATING PRINCIPLES IN REPETITIVE BABBLING: A 
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Operating principles in repetitive babbling: 
A cognitive continuity approach 
LOEKIE ELBERS* 
Rijks Universiteit Utrecht 
Abstract 
A case study of the period of repetitive babbling in one child (Dutch) is re-
ported. A cçgnitive continuity theory is presented, which views repetitive 
babbling as a systematic, continuous and largely self-directed process of ex-
ploration, during which the child uses certain operating principles in the con-
struction of his own 'springboard' to speech. 
Two operating principles identified are: a combination principle, consist-
ing of the combining of articulatory acts which previously have been exer-
cised separately, and a variation principle, consisting of the trying out of the 
same type of articulatory act in different articulatory contexts. 
Four stages are distinguished in the development of repetitive babbling. In 
the first stage no combinations occur, in the second stage combination main-
ly takes the form of repetition and in the third stage it takes the form of 
concatenating different babbling types as well. In the fourth stage the con-
catenations grow more varied and less repetitive in character. The subsequent 
stages of jargon babbling and first words are discussed shortly and their con-
tinuity with repetitive babbling is pointed out. 
1. Introduction 
If one lives with an infant who is babbling repetitively (i.e., is producing 
CVCV clusters like 'bababa' etc.), the question suggests itself 'what exactly 
is the child doing?'. Upon consulting the literature on babbling however, one 
notices that the suggested answers either seem to be beside the point or too 
unspecific to be of much interest. Summarized, the existing babbling theories 
run as follows. 
'Thanks go to Josi Ton - ter Beek for transcribing part of the tapes. Reprint requests should be sent 
to Loekie Eibers, Rijks Universiteit Utrecht, Psychologisch Laboratorium, Varkenmarkt 2, 3511 BZ 
Utrecht, The Netherlands. 
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Learning theory (Mowrer, 1960, Winitz, 1966) holds that the child is try-
ing to select a repertoire of sounds which resemble those of his caregivers, 
since the sounds produced by these important persons have a reinforcing 
value. Maturational theory on the other hand (Lenneberg, 1967) views 
babbling primarily as the result of biological maturation. Infants do not 
babble because they want to resemble their parents but because they are 
biologically determined to babble. Babbling is a side effect of maturation 
and serves no specific purpose in speech development. The period may be 
skipped without detrimental effect for future speech acquisition. Learning 
theory and maturational theory not only give different answers to the ques-
tion why do infants babble, but also to the question how does the babbling 
process proceed. Learning theory holds that infants select speech sounds 
from an initially very large set of randomly produced vocalizations. Babbling 
in this way gradually merges into early speech. This view is termed the 'con-
tinuity approach' by Clark and Clark (1977). Maturational theory empha-
sizes the random character of the babbling sounds throughout the whole 
period of babbling (see Lenneberg, op. cit., p. 276-280). If developmental 
trends occur they are essentially irrelevant to the subsequent acquisition of 
speech sounds during early speech. Clark and Clark (op. cit.) call this view 
the 'discontinuity approach'. Lenneberg, one of the best known proponents 
of this approach, does not accord a special status to repetitiveness in bab-
bling. In fact he hardly mentions this characteristic aspect. Jakobson, another 
well known proponent of the idea of discontinuity, seems to regard repeti-
tiveness primarily as a characteristic of early speech, but not of babbling, 
when he says that reduplication is 'a compulsory process signaling that the 
uttered sounds do not represent a babble, but a senseful, semantic entity' 
(Jakobson, 1971, p. 25). 
The naïve observer of a babbling infant is somewhat baffled by the theo-
ries described above. The child's endless repetitions of the same sound cluster 
certainly do not suggest randomness of articulatory movements. Also, these 
sound clusters certainly do not seem to have some specific meaning, nor do 
they seem to be a simple imitation of adult speech sounds. 
However, it is not only on intuitive grounds that the existing theories ap-
pear to be unsatisfactory. Clark and Clark (op. cit.), in their discussion of the 
continuity and the discontinuity approach, conclude that neither approach 
can successfully accommodate all the known facts of babbUng. The conti-
nuity approach cannot explain why children in the early stages of language 
acquisition often appear to be unable to produce certain sounds which they 
used frequently in babbling. The discontinuity approach cannot explain the 
phenomenon of babbling drift (Brown, 1958), i.e., the fact that babbling 
gradually begins to sound like the mother tongue, and the fact that similarities 
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appear to exist between the sound clusters produced in babbling and those 
produced in early speech (Cruttenden, 1970;Oller, et al, 1976). 
In this article I will approach babbling from a cognitive point of view. A 
cognitive approach does not deny that biological determination exists, nor 
that behavior may be reinforced by external rewards; it simply emphasizes 
another aspect of human development, which is that growing up implies 
acquiring knowledge. Of course, the cognitive approach is not new at all and 
has been used in several areas of language development research. One may 
look at the grammars that have been written for early language (Bloom, 
1970; Brown, 1973; McNeill, 1970; Schlesinger, 1971), at the literature on 
bed-time monologues (Weir, 1962), or at the steadily growing body of re-
search into the development of concepts of communicative interaction 
(Schaffer, 1977; Snow and Ferguson, 1977; Waterson and Snow, 1978). 
However, a cognitive analysis of babbling has never been thoroughly under-
taken (but see Gruber [1973] for a preamble). 
If one considers babbling as a process of acquiring knowledge, then the 
question becomes one of characterizing this knowledge and of describing 
the way in which it develops. In that case (a) regularities in babbles and in 
their way of following one another must be shown to exist, and (b) these 
regularities must be shown to be plausibly interpretable within a cognitive 
framework. I intend to do both things. 
The cognitive framework I will use is comparable to that of Slobin (1973) 
and Bruner (1972, 1973). Slobin argues that 'the child brings certain oper-
ating principles to bear on the task of learning to speak, regardless of the 
peculiarities of the particular language he is exposed to' (Slobin, op. cit., p. 
176). These operating principles are to be regarded as 'self-instructions' or 
'general heuristics' for organizing and storing language (op. cit., p. 191). 
They 'guide the child in developing strategies for the production and inter-
pretation of speech and for the construction of linguistic rule systems' (op. 
cit., p. 194). Slobin identifies several operating principles which he considers 
to be cognitive prerequisites for the development of grammar. One principle 
for instance appears to be: 'Pay attention to the ends of words'. He bases his 
argument mainly on regularities observed when comparing the performance 
of children from different language communities. I will concentrate on the 
question of whether operating principles may be identified in the prelinguistic 
period of babbling as well, and I will base my argument mainly on regularities 
observed when comparing the performance of one child at different points 
of time. 
Bruner's studies on the development of skilled action contain suggestions 
as to the possible nature of such operating principles. Bruner considers 
mastery of a complex skill to be 'a complex process of mastering features of 
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the task—a non-mimicking approach—and then combining the mastered 
features', while the function of repetition is 'familiar routinization that per­
mits an act to be combined with other acts'. He also points out that a crucial 
feature of skill development is 'the trying out of variants of the new skill in 
different contexts' (Bruner, 1972, p. 694). 
In the following I will argue that 'feature combination' and 'variant explo­
ration' also appear to be underlying principles in the development of the 
complex skill of speaking, and so may be regarded as prelinguistic operating 
principles for the development of speech. 
2. Method 
Given a cognitive approach, we may suppose that as soon as the infant starts 
to repeat himself he is beginning to explore his articulatory apparatus more 
or less consciously and intentionally. So the case study to be reported speci­
fically concerns the period of repetitive babbling. 
The subject of the case study was my son Thomas1. His period of repeti­
tive babbling began at about 6 months and lasted until he was about 12 
months old, at which time jargon babbling began to appear. Jargon babbling 
may be described as 'long strings of sounds that sound something like sen­
tences without words' (Sachs, 1976, p. 149). His first words appeared when 
he was ISVi months old. 
I tape-recorded Thomas's babbling occasionally on two different days of 
the week, but usually on three different days. At first, recording was done 
mainly in the context of diaper changing, but later mainly when he was play­
ing in his play pen or sitting in a baby chair. Twice, once during the 8th and 
once during the 9th month, the child went through a prolonged period of 
illness during which he did not babble. Over the whole period 11V2 hours of 
Thomas grew up in a monolingual Dutch environment. Until now, little is known about the relative 
frequencies of phonetic segments and clusters in spoken Dutch, not to mention Dutch baby-talk. For 
the reader who is interested in the phonological properties of the Dutch language I will present some 
information on Dutch consonants and consonant clusters (vowels are disregarded since they do not 
figure in the categorization system used). The Dutch consonants are: [b], [p], [d], [t], [k], [1], [m], 
[n]. [til· [v], [f], [w], [z], [s], [j], [x], [h], [r].The[g] sound, which is so frequent in babbling, 
does not function as a phoneme but is a variant of [k] in certain articulatory contexts. There are no 
affricate and no dental phonemes. At the beginning of a monomorphematic word the following con­
sonant clusters may occur: [Ы], [br], [dr], [dw], [xl], [xr], [xn], [vl], [vr], [wr], [zj], [zw], [fi], 
[fn], [Π], [kl], [kn], [kr], [kw], [pi], [рг], [ps], [sx], [sf]. [si], [sm], [sn], [sp], [st], [sj], [tr], 
[tw], (xl], [xr], [sxr], [spr], [str]. At the end of a monomorphematic word the following consonant 
clusters may occur: [ft], [xt], [kt], [ks], [if], [lx], [1k], [1m], [lp], [Is], [It], [mp], [ms], [nt], 
[ns], [Эк], [rf], [rx], [rk], [rm], [rn], [rp], [rs], [rt], [sp], [st], [ts], [ps], [pt], [rst], [kst], 
[1st], [fst], [nst], [5st], [mst], [wst], [rfst], [rkst], [rmst], [mst] (van den Berg, 1967). 
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tape were collected, containing 52 recordings. From now on I will refer to 
the separate recordings as babbling episodes. 
In transcribing the tapes I defined a babble as a speech-like sound or 
sequence of sounds produced in one stretch. I concentrated on the segmental 
features of babbles and also noted distribution of stress. Other aspects of 
intonation were disregarded. Also disregarded were a variety of non-speech 
sounds best described as groaning, screaming, belching, yawning, hiccoughing, 
coughing, etc. 
In developing a categorization system for discriminating different types 
of babbles the main problem was to define categories which would be neither 
too general nor too specific for the purposes of the analysis. The categoriza-
tion system was based partly on impressions from a preliminary analysis of 
the data (reported in Eibers, 1980) and partly on data from the literature on 
babbling. The preliminary analysis suggested that two types of manner of 
consonantal production and three types of babble composition should be 
distinguished. The two types of consonantal production were 'affricative', in 
which a change in the feature ofcontinuancy could be noted, and 'non-affrica-
tive' in which no such change occurred. 'Affricative' here is used in a broader 
sense than 'affricate'; it does not only apply to the transition from a stop to 
a fricative, but also to the transition from a stop to another type of continuant 
at the same place of articulation, such as a bilabial trill or a lateral or a semi-
vowel2. The three types of babble composition were: single babbles, con-
sisting of a single consonantal production (either affricative or non-affrica-
tive) with or without a vowel; repeated babbles, consisting of the repetition 
of single babbles; and concatenated babbles, consisting of the concatenation 
of different babbling categories within the same babble3. 
'The term 'affricative is used in the sense of 'affricate-like' and is preferred over other possible 
terms because of its emphasis on the aspect of feature change, in our case the changing of the feature 
of continuancy during a consonantal production. The preliminary analysis suggested that this aspect 
should be accorded a special status in the categorization system, because of its pervasiveness and fre-
quency. Note also that in using the term 'affricative' to cover not only true affricates but also trills 
(which are such a well-documented babbling phenomenon, see fox instance Stark, 1980) and other 
stop/continuant transitions, we are hinting at a unifying interpretation for these different 'consonan-
tal' productions. The suggestion is implied that the stop/continuant distinction (which involves both 
the dimensions of closure and duration) may be one of the first distinctions explored by the infant 
(see also the remarks on page 57 about the interpretation of the 'manner concatenations' and the re-
marks on page 58 about the exploration of the dimensions of 'duration' and 'closure'). 
'Note that a 'single non-affricative' contains a single consonant (according to adult phonology), 
whereas a 'single affricative' contains a consonant cluster of a certain type. However, not ail consonan-
tal productions that we would regard as 'consonant clusters' are covered by this last category. The 
(rare) instances of clusters like [mw] or [Ij] were scored as 'repeated front non-affricative' and 're-
peated center non-affricative' respectively, and a cluster like [bx] was regarded as a 'concatenation' 
oftypeF/B. 
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Table 1. Codes and definitions of babbling categories. In the categories 16. to 22. no 
specific order of concatenation is implied. In the analysis of the data the cate­
gories 14. and 17. are taken together into the category CAR/CCA, referring 
to a babble which may either be categorized as CAR or as CCA. 
intranscribable babble 
single vowel 
Vowel stammer'; series of vowels separated by glottal stops 
single non-affricative front consonantal production 
single non-affricative center consonantal production 
single non-affricative back consonantal production 
single affricative front consonantal production 
single affricative center consonantal production 
single affricative back consonantal production 
repetition of 4. 
repetition of 5. 
repetition of 6. 
repetition of 7. 
repetition of 8. 
repetition of 9. 
concatenation of (4. or 10.) and (7. or 13.) 
concatenation of (5. or 11.) and (8. or 14) 
concatenation of (6. or 12.) and (9. or 15.) 
concatenation of (4. or 7. or 10. or 13. or 16.) and (6. or 9. or 12. or 15. or 18.) 
concatenation of (4. or 7. or 10. or 13. or 16.) and (5. or 8. or 11. or 14. or 17.) 
concatenation of (6. or 9. or 12. or 15. or 18.) and (5. or 8. or 11. or 14. or 17.) 
concatenation of (4. or 7. or 10. or 13. or 16.) and (5. or 8. or 11. or 14. or 17.) 
and (6. or 9. or 12. or 15. or 18.) 
Literature on babbling often mentions that velar and glottal productions 
tend to precede labial and palatal productions (Koopmans-van Beinum and 
Van der Stelt; Ferguson, 1978). This suggested a global categorization of 
babbles according to place of articulation of consonants: Front (bilabial and 
labiodental), Center (alveolar, dental, palatal) and Back (velar and glottal) 
consonants. 
Finally, it seemed advisable to distinguish the following three categories: 
intranscribable babbles, single vowels and Vowel stammer' (a babble con­
sisting of a series of vowels separated by glottal stops). 
All in all 22 babbling categories were distinguished. An overview of their 
codes and definitions is presented in Table 1. 
Transcription reliability was assessed by computing percentages of agree­
ment between the transcriptions of myself and those of an independent 
judge (a native speaker of Dutch and a graduate student in phonetics) for 
six half hours of tape, selected at regular intervals throughout the whole 
1. 
2. 
3. 
4. 
5. 
6. 
7. 
8. 
9. 
10. 
11. 
12. 
13. 
14. 
15. 
16. 
17. 
18. 
19. 
20. 
21. 
22. 
I 
V 
vs 
F 
С 
в 
FA 
CA 
BA 
FR 
CR 
BR 
FAR 
CAR 
BAR 
F.FA 
C.CA 
B.BA 
F/B 
F/C 
B/C 
F/C/B 
-
-
-
-
— 
-
-
-
-
— 
— 
-
-
-
-
— 
-
-
-
-
-
-
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period covered. The criterion for agreement was set at 90%. By this criterion 
the categories CAR and CCA turned out to be confusable, so these categories 
were put into one category: CAR/CCA. Very short vowels appeared to be 
difficult to distinguish from non speech sounds, so the V category was re­
stricted to vowels of relatively long duration. Isolated fricatives could not be 
reliably categorized either and were not counted as babbles. Other aspects 
not reliably discriminable, and therefore disregarded, were distribution of 
stress and aspiratedness of vowels. 
In the following I will refer to the differences in manner of production 
and in composition of babbles (affricative, non-affricative, single, repeated, 
concatenated) as differences in babbling processes. 
3. Data and interpretation 
For each babbling episode the frequencies of occurrence of the babbling 
categories were counted. The results are shown in the tables 2 to 7. Each 
table presents the data for one month of repetitive babbling. Babbling epi­
sodes are numbered consecutively. In the rightmost column of the tables the 
duration (D) of each babbUng episode in minutes is given. A babbling cate­
gory was considered to have made its appearance when six or more mstances 
of that category had occurred during one babbling episode. Table 8 shows 
Table 2. Frequencies of occurrence of babbling categories during the first month of 
repetitive babbling (6- 7 months of age) 
ι ν r m г« гдя г.гд с ев сд EET us в вн BA SAR as* r/z г/в в/с ÇÇÎTOT 
9 
e 
7 
2β 
14 
7 
7 
11 
г 
9] 
58 
9 
2 
11 
В 
А 
IB 
7 
117 
2 
« 
1 
7 
2 
20 
11 
21 
Π 
it 
г 
1 
I 
1 
1 
1 
1 
г 
2 
« 
1 
в 
11 
24 
IS 
4 
2 
3 
14 
7 
45 
2 
1 
1 
5 
7 
23 
39 
71 
7 
S 
3 
BS 
1 
4 
s 
3 
2 
3 
s 
13 
1 
1 
1 
1 
3 
s 
1 
1 
1 
1 S34 
*Nr. ep. = serial number of babbUng episode 
**D » duration in minutes 
See Table 1 for an explication of the other symbols. 
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Table 3. Frequencies of occurrence of babbling categories during the second month of 
repetitive babbling (7-8 months of age) 
I M Г ГИ ГД FAD FFA С CR CA ΓΕΑ VS θ 9Я ΒΑ BAR aBA F/C F/B B/C tfö TOT 
2C 
7 
18 
30 
4 
3 
125 
10 
3 
2 
3 
18 
16 
1 
2 
20 
10 
3 
13 
1 
3 
1 
1 
2 
10 
1 
13 
4 
9 
1 
1 
15 
2 
1 
12 
4 
6 
25 
1 
14 
15 
16 
16 
1 
1 
1 
1 
7 
64 
48 
117 
24 
14 
267 
Table 4. Frequencies of occurrence of babbling categories during the third month of 
repetitive babbling (8-9 months of age) 
CAR 
I U F FR FA FAR FFA С CR CA CTS VS В BR ОД BAR ftBAF/C Г/В В/С ^ ё Т О Т 
6 
3 
В 
β 
25 
1 
IB 
6 
55 
8C 
14 
121 
3 
22 
160 
21 
31 
г 
20 
5 
9 
36 
10 
1 
3 
14 
1 
2 
2 
5 
12 
10 
22 
14 
7 
21 
7 
7 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
10 
11 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
2 
4 
2 
1 
3 
2 
2 
31 
182 
53 
159 
Í25 
Table 5. Frequencies of occurrence of babbling categories during the fourth month of 
repetitive babbling (9-10 months of age) 
CAR 
I V F FR FA FAR FFA С CR CA OTT VS В BR BA BAR ОВД F/C F/β B/C F/ÇÉ TOT 
14 
27 
16 
io 
45 
E 
14 
7 
11 
5 
157 
6 
31 
4з 
11 
23 
2 
6 
10 
15 
15 
171 
45 
40 
11 
25 
42 
24 
7 
17 
32 
243 
12 
14 
61 
В 
53 
1 
4 
16 
43 
5 
3 
4 
137 
6 
2 
4 
9 
3 
3 
27 
1 
5 
2 
Ζ 
1 
24 
9 
2 
5 
52 
5 
9 
74 
2 
7 
26 
e 
8 
6 
35 
160 
3 
1 
14 
2 
7 
19 
5 
9 
5 
18 
83 
6 
3 
6 
1 
6 
5 
4 
2 
33 
1 
5 
11 
16 
1 
34 
4 
31 
5 
6 
46 
106 
134 
5 
1 
1 
26 
5 
5 
4 
49 
1 
17 
28 
8 
1 
6 
1 
62 
2 
1 
3 
2 
6 
1 
21 
1 
3 
1 
35 
1 
1 
1 
3 13 
s 
2 
2 
9 
109 
211 
176 
69 
376 
75 
170 
67 
117 
140 
1532 
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Table 6. Frequencies of occurrence of babbling categories during the fifth month of 
repetitive babbling (10-11 months of age) 
nt. ·Ρ· 
30 
ZI 
32 
33 
It 
3S 
36 
37 
38 
39 
40 
il 
TOI 
I U F 
12 
16 
15 
11 
2 
18 
33 
3 
11 
1С 
2 
11 
202 
15 
зь 
36 
21 
11 
9 
6 
3 
1¿ 
26 
4 
15 
19: 
22 
6Θ 
52 
52 
5 
69 
17 
42 
26 
26 
3 
26 
410 
Гй 
6 
21 
27 
19 
1 
3 
21 
12 
2 
3 
7 
125 
F« FAD FFA 
109 
414 31 
25 
21 
7 
9 
5 
3 
3 
72 
16 
21 
10 
22 
15 
19 
135 
CR 
2 
10 
3 
2 
2 
6 
10 
2 
2 
14 
12 
20 
B5 
Ш 
С« СЕД V5 β 
6 
20 
12 
56 
3 
7 
2 
1 
1 
1 
3 
2 
1 
6 
27 
5 
16 
52 
ВЯ 
15 
12 
46 
ΒΑ 
11 
li 
io 
85 
вдч авА F/C F/a 
2 
3 
2 
7 
2 
21 
2 
1 
3 
2 
2 
1 
34 
1 
2 
1 
1 
6 
11 
12 
9 
15 
8 
2 
5 
20 
28 
1 
100 
в/с 
1 
1 
1 
1 
7 
2 
2 
IS 
* ΐ тот 
106 
325 
214 
182 
Jl53 
1 
1 
1 
207 
126 
200 
164 
221 
61 
125 
φ 104 
0 
14 
28 
27 
IO 
18 
13 
16 
6 
15 
23 
5 
12 
Table 7. Frequencies of occurrence of babbling categories during the sixth month of 
repetitive babbling (11-12 months of age) 
nr. ep. 
TOT 
I « F 
12 
10 
65 
4 
6 
10 
15 
33 
21 
5 
4 
18! 
92 
44 
23 
21 
и 
28 
16 
26 
3 
lo 
275 
1 
46 
В 
33 
27 
54 
28 
22 
7 
3 
25 
253 
FU 
7 
1 
15 
11 
30 
18 
ί 
1 
6 
93 
ΓΑ 
1 
22 
30 
11 
3 
1 
2 
6 
5 
81 
FAB 
2 
2 
1 
1 
5 
ΓΓΑ 
1 
2 
2 
1 
4 
10 
•• CAÁ 
с ся с« Ц Т »s в вя 
16 
12 
16 
19 
13 
93 
2 
1 
9 
2 
4 
8 
1 
4 
1 
32 
1 
1 
1 
1 
4 
3 
2 
5 
11 
12 
61 
2 
2 
3 
2 
1 
1 
1 
1 
4 
17 
BA едя ав> 
s 
s 
9 
s 
9 
9 
7 
3 
52 
1 
1 
5 
e 
1 
1 
1 
16 
F/C F/S 
1 
3 
3 
1 
1 
4 
3 
3 
19 
24 
37 
7 
e 
2 
20 
4 
13 
5 
120 
β/C ft* TOT 
11 
2 
5 
1 
2 
1 
1 
4 
S 
( 
ú 
1 
1 
4 
1 
32| 17 
ISO 
181 
227 
132 
56 
152 
152 
129 
78 
20 
94 
1371 
0 
s 
17 
19 
33 
21 
23 
30 
12 
18 
8 
30 
for each babbling category the serial number of the babbling episode during 
which this category reached criterion for the first time. The interpretation of 
the data will be based primarily on this order of appearance of the babbling 
categories. 
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Table 8. Order of appearance of babbling categories, indicated by the serial number of 
the babbling episode in which a category appeared for the first time. 
Stage 1: BA(1) 
vocalizing FA (3) 
В (4) 
Stage 2: 
repeating 
F (12) 
С (18) 
CA (19) 
£ ^ ( 2 7 ) F . F A ( 2 7 ) , ^ ( 2 7 ) 
B/F (30) 
В/С (39) 
F/C (41) 
Stage 4: F/B/C (44) 
mixing 
Two important regularities in the order of appearance may be noted. In 
the first place, for each of the three places of articulation, single babbles pre­
cede or co-occur with repetitions, but never follow them. Also, repetitions 
precede or cooccur with concatenations, but never follow them. This may 
be regarded as evidence for the existence of an operating principle of combi­
nation; complex babbles seem to consist of a combination of single babbles 
which have first been exercised separately. In the second place, each bab­
bling process appears in the order Back/Front/Center. Affricatives, non-af-
fricatives, repeated affricatives, repeated non-affricatives and concatenations 
of affricatives and non-affricatives all are first tried as Back articulations, 
then as Front articulations while Center articulations come last. As regards 
the concatenations of different places of articulation; the Front/Back con­
catenations came first, followed by the Back/Center concatenations, while 
Front/Center concatenations come last. Concatenations consisting of all 
three places of articulation are the very last to appear. These observations 
may be regarded as evidence for the existence of an operating principle of 
variation. Each new babbling process is applied in different articulatory con­
texts and the order in which this is done appears to be quite fixed. 
Several stages in repetitive babbling may tentatively be distinguished, de­
pending on the moment of first occurrence of a certain babbling process. 
VS(6) 
BR (9) 
FR(12) 
BAR (13) 
FAR (17) 
CR (18) 
Stage 3: 
concatenating 
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Table 9. Transcriptions of parts of babbling episodes, illustrating several categories of 
Front babbles. 
a. FA (from episode 3) 
.... bvw, bvw bvwwv, (intranscribable), bvw bvvwvwà ... 
bvw abwv bvw bwvww abvwv... (intranscr.) 
b*. FR (from episode 12) 
... màbababswsbotbabà babe ba:ba babà ba:ba:ba:bà: 
ba:ba:ba:b3ba:ba:mba: awà: ...ba:ba:ba:ba:ba:ba:ba:ba:ba:ba:b .... 
с**. FAR (from episode 17) 
... pfpfpfff pffpff ... a:a:a:, a:a;a:a:, a:a:a:a:a:, a:a:a:a:ba .... 
.. ЬаЬэЬзЬэЬэЬэЬэ ... ba... ρ, ρ .... aba, pffpffpffff 
d' F. FA (from episode 32) 
... pepotpapvw, popf ha, ha, ha, ha hapapapapfff, papv, bsprrr (bi­
labial trill), Ьэрвргтг (bilabial trill), bapfuff, bapfuf, papapapvw, 
bapapapapapa,a:a:a:,ha:a:a:,ha:a;a:a: 
e^. F/B (from episode 39) 
... bagabagabagabak bakambbkambbkambm, brrbbkamabàkabìkabrnk, 
birbàkambàkambin, brrbfriwa, bifgaa:gabn, wa, www (coughing) 
ajà: (intranscr.) bakambakambakbak, bàkambakambri, 
bàkamabàkambì, bàkambàkambitkbrik, α, α, α 
fttt. F/B (from episode 44) 
.. gajgwaiTgab, ^этзкэ, ψ), (intranscr.), àwbabùmaka, (intranscr.), (yodel-
ing), (groaning), bapff, babakà (laughter) эрЪ, nima, 
awàÌwama^àx, e max, ni3gamagà:x, (intranscr.), (intranscr.). agagax 
gagagbuk,эЬэкох 
*b. also contains an instance of category F ([awà). 
**c. also contains instances of category V ([a:a:a: ] ), instances of F ([a:a:a:a:ba], [ba], 
[p], [aba]), and one instance of FR ([bàbabababàbaba] ). 
fd. abo contains instances of V ([ha], [а:а:]) and one instance of FR 
([bapapapapapa] ). 
tfe- also contains instances of F ([wa], [www]), one instance of F.FA ([bfrbrrrwa]), 
one instance of С ([ajà:]) and instances of V ([a]). 
tttf · also contains one instance of В ([55] ). one instance of F.FA ([bapff] ), instances 
of F ([эра], [rnma] ) and one instance of B.BA ([agagax] ). 
Episode 6 then marks the beginning of a stage of repetitions. During this 
episode the first repetitive category, i.e., vowel stammer, reaches criterion. 
Episode 21 marks the beginning of a stage of concatenations. During this 
episode the category B.BA reaches criterion. As table 8 shows, episode 44 is 
considered to mark the beginning of another stage, which is called the mix­
ing stage. During episode 44 concatenations consisting of all three places of 
articulation reach criterion. The evidence for distinguishing this last stage 
however, is mainly qualitative in kind since it is based on impressions con-
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Table 10. Percentages of intranscribable babbles (I), single vowels (V), single consonan-
tal productions (S), repetitions (R), manner concatenations (MC), and place 
concatenations (PC), for each stage of repetitive babbling 
Stage 1 : vocalizing 
Stage 2: repeating 
Stage 3 : concatenating 
3a: MC 
3b: MC 
Stage 4: mixing 
I 
0.19 
0.09 
0.10 
0.09 
0.16 
V 
0.29 
0.23 
0.11 
0.14 
0.13 
S 
0.46 
0.43 
0.51 
0.52 
0.42 
R 
0.04 
0.21 
0.19 
0.13 
0.13 
MC 
0.01 
0.02 
0.07 
0.05 
0.02 
PC 
0.01 
0.02 
0.02 
0.07 
0.14 
N 
275 
1080 
1423 
2435 
1040 
ceming the character of the concatenations rather than on quantitative data. 
Generally, the concatenations of the concatenating stage have a rather stereo-
typical form and tend to contain many repetitions, whereas the concatenations 
of the mixing stage are less stereotypical and less repetitive. They impress 
one as being more varied, more 'mixed' in character. Table 9, which for the 
Front productions presents examples of illustrative parts of babbling epi-
sodes, may illustrate this observation. The Front/Back babbles from episode 
39 are much more repetitive and stereotypical than the Front/Back babbles 
from episode 44. 
So the 52 babbling episodes may be classified in the following way: a pre-
repetitive (vocalizing) period (stage 1: episodes 1 to 5), a repetitive stage 
(stage 2: episodes 6 to 20), a concatenating stage (stage 3: episodes 21 to 43) 
and a mixing stage (stage 4: episodes 44 to 52). The concatenating stage 
seems to consist of two substages; concatenation of babbles which share the 
same place of articulation but differ in manner of production (stage 3a: epi-
sodes 21 to 29) and concatenations of babbles with different places of artic-
ulation (stage 3b: episodes 30 to 43). 
For these stages and substages the relative frequencies of certain classes 
of babbling categories are given in the Tables 10 and 11. In Table 10 the 
classes are: I, V, single babbles, repeated babbles, manner concatenations 
and place concatenations. In Table 11 the classes are Front babbles, Center 
babbles and Back babbles (I, V, and place concatenations were excluded in 
this case and Vowel stammer' was counted as a Back babble). Table 10 shows 
that the percentages of intranscribable babbles are highest in the prerepeti-
tive stage (vocalizing) and in the mixing stage. These two stages also show 
the lowest percentages of repetitions. The highest percentage of vowels 
occurs in the prerepetitive stage and the highest percentage of repetitions is 
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Table 11. Percentages of Front, Center and Back babbles for each stage of repetitive 
babbling 
Stage 1 : vocalizing 
Stage 2: repeating 
Stage 3 : concatenating 
3a: MC 
3b: PC 
Stage 4 : mixing 
Front 
0.27 
0.60 
0.42 
0.66 
0.62 
Center 
0.00 
0.10 
0.29 
0.19 
0.19 
Back 
0.73 
0.30 
0.29 
0.15 
0.19 
N 
136 
717 
1090 
1714 
588 
to be found in the repetitive stage. The percentage of manner concatenations 
is highest in the substage of manner concatenations. Place concatenations 
have their lowest percentage in the prerepetitive stage. This percentage in-
creases, reaching its highest point in the mixing stage. 
The division of babbling stages was based on order of appearance of bab-
bling categories (Table 8). The frequency data from Table 10 support this 
division. We may conclude that repetitive babbling proper seems to be con-
centrated in the stages 2 and 3, while stage 1 represents the transition from 
cooing and vocalizing to repetitive babbling and stage 4 represents the transi-
tion from repetitive to jargon babbling. 
Table 11 shows that in all stages but the first, Front babbles are much 
more frequent than Center and Back babbles, so there seems to be a general 
preference for labials. Nevertheless, in interpreting this preference we must 
take into account that the preferred place of articulation appears to be Back 
whenever a new babbling process is introduced. So two different kinds of 
'preference' seem to be operative. Possibly the preference for Back as a start-
ing point indicates that it is easier to perform a new operation within a de-
velopmentally more 'primitive' articulatory context (Back babbles predomi-
nate in the vocalizing stage), while the general preference for Front might be 
explained on the basis of a 'least effort' principle. Whatever the correct ex-
planation may be, it is quite clear that in the development of babbling fre-
quency of occurrence and order of appearance do not coincide and may re-
flect different mechanisms. 
We may wonder whether the concatenations of stage 3 must simply be 
regarded as signs of a growing articulatory adroitness, or whether a more far-
reaching interpretation is justified. The fact that manner concatenations pre-
cede place concatenations suggests that this is so. Within a cognitive ap-
proach an attractive interpretation would be that the child successively 
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'grasps' two articulatory contrasts; first a contrast of manner and later a con-
trast of place. Concatenations then reflect the systematic varying of an artic-
ulatory dimension during the production of a babble. So the variation prin-
ciple may not only be expressed in the order of appearance of certain bab-
bling categories, but also in their very structure. 
Additional evidence that a variation principle plays a role in repetitive 
babbUng consists of a collection of more or less incidental observations. 
First, certain babbling episodes distinctly convey the impression of being a 
theme with variations. Episode 11 mainly consists of series of long, strongly 
aspirated vowels, alternated with bursts of 'panting', a non speech activity. 
This suggests a systematic variation of the dimension of voice, since the only 
difference between the two activities is the presence or absence of phonation. 
Episode 17 contains very short vowels and very long vowels, as well as very 
short front stop consonants and 'prolonged' (affricative) ones. The theme in 
this episode seems to be the varying of the dimension of duration. 
Secondly, incidental observations of the non speech activities of the child 
also suggest an active investigation by the child of variants in articulatory 
dimensions. During the first month of repetitive babbling, i.e., during the 
appearance of back productions like vowel stammering, the child was often 
seen to be holding his breath, for no apparent physiological reason. Breath 
holding imphes a prolonged closure of the glottis. Glottal stops, also slightly 
prolonged, were used in vowel stammering. This suggests that the child may 
have been investigating variants of glottal closure. Other non-speech activities, 
displayed in the following months, were: 'vocalizing while repeatedly hitting 
the mouth with the back of one hand' and Vocalizing while holding the 
fingers in the mouth'. These activities may be interpreted as variants in bring-
ing about closure (and repetition) and constriction. 
4. Jargon babbling and first words 
At about 12 months jargon babbling began to appear and I stopped record-
ing. However, a few observations of what happened during the next months 
are in order. 
At first, two types of babbling were to be observed: repetitive babbling 
and jargon. When the first words appeared there were three types of 'bab-
bling'; meaningful babbles, jargon and repetitions. Repetitive babbling seem-
ed to be developing further along its own lines. For instance, in the first 
words period the new babbles [bubabubo] and [kukakuka] were produced 
frequently. This suggests that repetitive babbling continued to be used for 
the exploration of new articulatory dimensions (i.e., the distinction between 
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the vowels [u] and [a]), and must not be regarded as a 'relic' from the pre-
verbal period. It is not surprising then that the first words tended to fit the 
existing babbling patterns remarkably well. One such word was [ap] (or 
[арэ], [abo], [hap], [hopa]), said when the child wanted food, or was 
looking at food or at people eating, which word I took to be an imitation of. 
the dutch word [hap] (bite). Another word was [brr] (the bilabial trill), 
which the child used when playing with toy cars, when pointing at cars in 
the street or when looking at pictures of cars. Although the dutch word for 
'car', [auto], was frequently said to him in these contexts, he at first pre­
ferred the onomatopoeic bilabial trill (which I was in the habit of producing 
when making his toy car ride). This word simply is an existing babble having 
acquired meaning. A similar tendency could be observed in his word for 
[pus] (pussycat). At first he said [Ьэх], which had occurred often during the 
babbling period, then he said [bux] and finally [bus] or [pus]. This last 
observation suggests that the child may use babbles as a 'spring-board' for 
gradually approximating adult word forms. 
5. Summary and discussion 
In the Introduction the identification of regularities in babbling development 
was considered as an important prerequisite for a cognitive interpretation of 
babbling. The analysis presented in the preceding chapters makes clear that, 
if babbling categories are defined in a sufficiently broad way, two general 
regularities of development may be noted. 
1. For each of the three places of articulation (Front, Center and Back) bab­
bling processes appeared in a fixed order; single babbles, repetitions, man­
ner concatenations, place concatenations. 
2. For each babbling process, places of articulation were tackled in a fixed 
order: Back, Front, Center. Front babbles were the most frequent, but 
nevertheless each babbling process started as a Back babble. 
The mere existence of these regularities cannot be accounted for by a 
maturational approach to babbling, since this approach tends to regard bab­
bling as a random activity. The very character of these regularities cannot be 
explained by learning theory, since they seem to have nothing to do with 
imitation of or reinforcement by the environment. 
Within a cognitive framework however, the two regularities may receive a 
plausible interpretation. The first may be interpreted as the result of an 
operating principle of combination. Complex babbles grow out of the com-
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bination of single forms which have first been exercised separately. The 
second may be interpreted as the result of an operating principle of varia-
tion. Each new step in the development of more complex babbles is 'cycled' 
through the same succession of articulation places. Additional evidence for 
a variation principle was found in the structure of concatenations and in the 
build-up of certain babbling episodes, which suggested the systematic vary-
ing of articulatory dimensions. The exploratory character of certain non-
speech activities pointed in the same direction. 
These operating principles appear to have analogues in the general process 
of early skill development. Bruner (1973) describes how early grasping be-
havior progresses by the combining of skilled routines that have first devel-
oped separately (cf., combination principle) and how the infant may apply 
different acts to the same object or subject different objects to the same act 
(cf., variation principle). 
Four stages in the development of repetitive babbling may be tentatively 
distinguished. In the first stage only single babbles are produced. In the 
second stage combination mainly takes the form of repetition. In the third 
stage it takes the form of concatenation as well, while in the fourth stage the 
character of the concatenations tends to become less stereotyped. For this 
reason the fourth stage may be called the 'mixing' stage, and may be regard-
ed as a transitional phase to jargon babbling. 
Repetitive babbling not only seemed to be the starting point for jargon 
babbling but for the first words as well. Babbles from the repetitive babbling 
repertoire could be used as words (i.e., they could acquire meaning) or as a 
spring-board towards the gradual approximation of adult word forms. Also, 
repetitive babbling did not disappear when the jargon babbling and the first 
words were introduced, but seemed to be developing further according to its 
own principles. 
This summary of observations strongly argues for continuity of develop-
ment within babbling as well as between babbling and subsequent stages. A 
frequent objection against a continuity approach has been the observation 
that children may babble sounds which in early speech they seem to avoid. 
However, continuity is not the same thing as linear progression. Literature 
on language development contains many examples of an apparent 'changing 
for the worse', for instance the overregularizations of verb forms. If a child 
first produces 'went', but later switches to 'goed', the disappearance of the 
'correct' form will hardly be taken to mean that there is no significant re-
lationship between these two stages in expressing past tense (see also Bower, 
1976 and Fergusson, 1978 for a discussion of analogous processes of 'ap-
parent reversal' in phonological development and general development, 
respectively). 
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Another frequently cited objection is the famous case of a tracheotomized 
child who, after the tube had been removed from his throat, 'produced the 
babbling sounds typical of the age' (Lenneberg, 1967, p. 140). This suggests 
that babbling cannot be regarded as a practice stage for learning to talk. 
However, if successive developmental stages and/or cycles may be shown to 
be present in babbling, then observations like 'typical of the age' are far too 
unspecific to be conclusive. In that case babbling cannot be regarded as a 
unitary phenomenon, and we will have to look at 'stage' instead of 'age'. We 
will have to know in which stage the child stopped babbling and in which 
stage he took it up again. We will have to know whether the child was able 
to perform certain silent articulatory activities in the meantime. All this, we 
do not as yet know. 
We may conclude that a continuity theory is supported by many observa-
tions and as yet is refuted by none. Our present continuity theory however, 
differs from the traditional continuity approach (learning theory) in that the 
concept of reinforcement does not play a leading role. Leading roles are 
played by the two operating principles of variation and combination—gen-
eral heuristics which have not been learned. Parental speech may have the 
important function of motivating the infant ('triggering' babbling) and of 
setting the goal (providing the infant with a general model of how speech 
should sound), but parents do not selectively reinforce the strategies for 
attaining this goal. So, finally, we arrive at a cognitive continuity theory, 
which views repetitive babbling as a continuous and largely self-directed 
process of exploration, during which the infant uses certain operating prin-
ciples for constructing his own spring-board to speech. 
Since the theory proposed is based on the study of just one child, it stands 
in need of confirmation. For all we know, individual variation in babbling 
may be considerable. Nevertheless, if repetitive babbling indeed is as sys-
tematically and autonomously developing as is argued, then we should 
expect the general operating principles to be universal. Recently, Stark 
(1980) and Oiler (1980) have presented data and discussions (including the 
designation of stages in babbling), which are in certain respects quite similar 
to those of the present paper4. Oiler's theoretical position comes nearest to 
the present one, in that he asserts that infant sounds represent systematic 
explorations of the 'metaphonological' parameters of speech (such as pitch, 
timing, voice register, amplitude etc.) The babbling categories distinguished 
in the present paper, though based on 'phonological' rather than on 'meta-
* However, neither of these authors distinguishes between a 'concatenating' stage and a 'mixing' 
stage. Both these stages seem to be covered by Stark's stage of 'nonreduplicated babbling' and Oiler's 
stage of Variegated babbling'. 
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phonological' parameters, (i.e., place and manner of articulation), also have a 
metaphonological flavor in that the subcategorization of these parameters is 
very global and differs from the subdivisions of adult phonology. Further­
more, Oiler sees the infant as actively trying to 'approximate' adult speech, 
and he makes the interesting suggestion that 'we might interpret the general 
similarity of infant babbling across various cultures simply to mean that 
when infants try to approximate speech, they produce predominantly the 
universal core elements, no matter what their linguistic environment' (Oiler 
1980, p. 109). This clearly agrees with cognitive continuity theory, even 
though the last theory would emphasize the universality of principles rather 
than 'elements'. However, cognitive continuity theory goes beyond Oiler's 
metaphonological theory in not only asserting 'variation' but 'combination' 
as well, in explicitly treating these two modes of operating as complemen­
tary principles which together are responsible for the growing complexity of 
babbling, and in tying these principles to those of skill development in gen­
eral. 
References 
Berg van den, B. (1967 Foniek van het Nederlands, van Goor Zonen, Den Haag Brussel. 
Bloom, L. (1970) Language Development; Form and Function in Emerging Grammars. Cambridge, 
Mass., MIT Press. 
Bower, T. G. R. (1976) Repetitive processes in child development, ici. Amer., 235, 5, 38. 
Brown, R. (1958) Words and Things. Glencoe, 111., Free Press. 
Bruner, J. S. (1973) A First Language, the Early Stages. Cambridge, Mass., Harvard University Press. 
Bruner, J. S. (1972) Nature and uses of immaturity. Amer. Psychol, 27 (8), 1-22. 
Bruner, J. S. (1973) Organisation of early skilled action. Child Devel, 44, 1-11. 
Clark, H. H., and Clark, E. V. (1977) Psychology and Language. New York, Harcourt Brace Jova-
novich. 
Cruttenden, A. (1970) A phonetic study of babbling. Brit. J.Disord. Comm., 5, 110-117. 
Eibers, L. (1980) Cognitive Principles of Babbling, a Case Study, Report no. 21. Psychological Labo­
ratory, University of Utrecht. 
Ferguson, С A. (1978) Learning to pronounce: the earliest stages of phonological development in the 
child. In Minifie, F. D. and Uoyd, L. L. (eds.). Communicative and Cognitive Abilities—Early 
Behavioral Assessment. Baltimore, University Park Press. 
Gruber, J. S. (1973) Playing with distinctive features in the babbling of infants. In Ferguson, С A. and 
Slobin, D. I. (eds.), Studies of Child Language Development. New York, Holt, Rinehait and 
Winston. 
Jakobson, R. (1971) Studies on Child Language and Aphasia. The Hague, Mouton. 
Koopm ans-Van Beinum, F. J., and Van der Stelt, J.M. (not dated) Early Stages in Infant Speech De­
velopment. Institute of Phonetic Sciences, University of Amsterdam. 
Lenneberg, E. (1967) Biological Foundations of Language. New York, John Wiley. 
McNeill, D. (1970) ТЪе Acquisition of Language; the Study of Developmental Psycholinguistics. New 
York, Harper and Row. 
46 Operating principles in repetitive babbling 
Mowrer, O. H. (1960) Learning Theory and Symbolic Processes. New York, John Wiley. 
Oiler, D. K. (1980) The emergence of the sounds of speech in infancy. In G. H. Yeni-Komshian, J. F. 
Kavanagh and C. A. Ferguson (eds.), Child Phonology, Vol. 1: Production. New York, Acade­
mic Press. 
OUer, D. K., Wieman, L. Α., Doyle, W. J., and Ross, С (1976) Infant babbling and speech, /. Child 
Lang.,3, 1-11. 
Sachs, J. (1976) The development of speech. In С. С. Carterette and M. P. Friedman (eds.), Handbook 
of Perception, Vol. VII. New York, Academic Press. 
Schaffer, H. R. (ed.) (1977) Studies in Mother-infant Interaction. New York, Academic Press. 
Schlesinger, I. (1971) Production of utterances and language acquisition. In D. I. Slobin (ed.). The 
Ontogenesis of Grammar. New York, Academic Press. 
Slobin, D. I. (1973) Cognitive prerequisites for the development of grammar. In С A. Ferguson and 
D. I. Slobin (eds.), Studies of Child Language Development. New York, Holt, Rinehart and 
Winston. 
Snow, С and Ferguson, С (eds.) (1977) Talking to Olildren; Language Input and Acquisition. Lon­
don, Cambridge University Press. 
Stark, R. E. (1980) Stages of speech development in the first year of life. In G. H. Yeni-Komshian, 
J. F. Kavanagh and С A. Ferguson (eds.). Child Phonology, Vol. 1: Production. New York, 
Academic Press. 
Waterson, N., and Snow, С (eds.) (1978) 77ie Development of Communication. Chichester, Wiley. 
Weir, R. (1962) Language in the Crib. The Hague, Mouton. 
Winitz, H. (1966) The development of speech and language in the normal child. In R. Rieber and R. 
Brubaker (eds.). Speech Pathology. Amsterdam, North-Holland. 
Résumé 
On présente l'étude d'un enfant Hollandais pendant la période de babillage répétitif. Une théorie cog-
nitive est proposée qui présente le babillage répétitif comme un processus d'explorations systématique, 
continue et essentiellement dirigé par lui-même. Durant ce processus l'enfant utilise certains principes 
opérants dans la construction de son propre 'tremplin' à la parole. 
Deux principes opérants sont identifiés: un principe consistant à combiner les actes articulatoires 
qui ont été exercés séparément auparavant et un principe de variation consistant à essayer le même 
type d'acte articulatoixe dans des contextes articulatoires différents. 
On distingue quatre stades dans le développement du babillage répétitif. Au premier stade on ne 
trouve pas de combinaison. Au second stade, les combinaisons prennent la forme de répétition et au 
troisième elles prennent la forme de concaténation de différents types de babillage. Au quatrième 
stade les concaténations deviennent plus variées et moins répétitives. On discute rapidement des stades 
suivants du jargon et des premiers mots en montrant leurs continuité avec le babillage répétitif. 
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ABSTRACT 
A case study is presented of the babbling monologues produced by a 
Dutch child in the six weeks following acquisition of the first word. The 
relationship between word and babbling development is investigated. 
There appears to be a continuous interplay between both aspects of 
speech development: new words may influence the character and the 
course of babbling, whereas babbling in turn may give rise to phonological 
preferences for selecting other new words. It is concluded that the 
analysis of concurrent babbling may provide clues for explaining the 
highly variable phenomena of early word production. 
INTRODUCTION 
The fact that infants typically do not stop babbling when they begin 
producing words has by now become well established (see Locke 1983). Also, 
recent investigations into the relationship between ' prelinguistic ' babbling 
and later speech development leave little doubt that early babbling is a 
speech-related behaviour (Oiler 1980, 1981, Stark 1980, Stoel-Gammon & 
Cooper 1981, Eibers 1982, de Boysson-Bardies, Sagart & Durand 1984). 
Taken together, these two facts suggest that ' posthnguistic ' or, in other 
words, 'speech-concurrent' babbling (i.e. the babbling produced in the first 
words period) should also be a speech-related behaviour. As yet, this 
hypothesis has received little explicit attention. On the contrary, most studies 
of early phonological development have concentrated on developmental 
changes in word forms (e.g. Ferguson & Farwell 1975, Leonard, Newhoff & 
Mesalam 1980, Menn 1983), while ignoring possible changes in concurrent 
forms of babble (but for a recent reorientation in this respect, see Vihman, 
Macken, Miller, Simmons & Miller, no date). These studies, however, have 
made one thing about early word forms abundantly clear: early word forms 
[·] Thanks go to let van Bekkum, Truus Quadvlieg and Eduard Bol for their careful 
reading of an earlier version of this paper. Address for correspondence. Psychologisch 
Laboratorium, Varkenmarkt г, 3511 BZ Utrecht, The Netherlands. 
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tend to be highly idiosyncratic and/or variable, within as well as across 
children (Oiler & Warren 1976, Ingram 1979, Leonard et al. 1980, Schwartz, 
Leonard, Wilcox & Folger 1980). This observation allows us to further 
specify the global hypothesis introduced above: we would expect the 
variability and idiosyncrasy of early word forms to be related to differential 
characteristics of children's speech-concurrent babbling. 
Leonard et al. (1980) have investigated the source(s) of a certain kind of 
early word form idiosyncrasy; i.e. the variable 'phonological preferences' 
that children may show for producing words with a particular kind of syllable 
or sound structure. They show that differences in preferences cannot be 
explained by differences in linguistic input. Their conclusion is that the source 
of phonological preferences must reside within the child, but they do not offer 
suggestions about the nature of this source. According to the hypothesis 
specified above, this source might be found in the child's speech-concurrent 
babbling. 
In the present paper we analyse the babbling monologues produced by a 
Dutch child during the period of the 'very first' words. Our purpose is to 
show that this child's word production and his concurrent babbling are very 
much related. Babbling and talking cannot be considered as separate 
developmental processes that do not interact, nor even as related processes 
of which one is subordinate to the other. Instead, there appears to be a 
continuous interplay between word production and babbling. A new word 
may influence and change the character of babbling, whereas babbling in turn 
may 'prepare the ground' for the production of other new words, i.e. for 
developing 'phonological preferences'. 
In studying the child's babbling we concentrate on his non-interactive 
language behaviour. In so doing, we deviate from the current trend to 
emphasize the social context of language acquisition. However, children do 
engage in a great deal of non-interactive language behaviour. This should 
remind us of the fact that, in addition to the interactive aspect, there is an 
important problem-solving aspect to language acquisition as well. With the 
exception of Weir (1962), non-interactive language behaviour has received 
regrettably little systematic attention. Recently, there is a growing recognition 
that, for children, language may function as a problem space in its own right, 
to be worked on for its own sake and not just for the sake of successful 
communication (Karmiloff-Smith 1978, 1979). Hopefully, this will also 
revive interest in what children do with language and speech when they are 
NOT communicating, and, more generally, in all those aspects of their 
language use which do not seem to be directly related to interaction. 
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METHOD 
Procedure 
The method of data collection was similar to that of Weir (1962), who 
recorded the bed time monologues of her 2-year-old son Anthony. We 
recorded the 'play-pen monologues' of 1-year-old Thomas, son of the first 
author. These soliloquies were produced when the child was playing in his 
play-pen with no one else present in the room. After breakfast, the child was 
put into his play-pen and a cassette recorder was turned on. The mother left 
the room and returned some 20-30 minutes later. In this way 28 recordings 
were collected over a period of six weeks (5, 3, 5, 6, 4, and 5 in each week 
respectively). The child's age was 1 ;з . і8 when recording started, and 1:4.29 
when it stopped. 
The mother kept a diary in which she noted the appearance of new words, 
i.e. speech forms which appeared to be approximations of words from the 
Dutch language, and which were used spontaneously for interactive purposes. 
Before recording started, the child had two word-like speech forms and one 
word, as follows. 
(1) A vocable [ka], which was accompanied by a broad gesture of the arm, 
and was used when 'something remarkable' appeared/occurred. This form 
had almost disappeared when recording started. 
(2) An onomatopoeic form [brr] (a bilabial trill), which was used for 
referring to cars, occurring frequently from the moment of its appearance. 
(3) A word [ар(э)] (or [аЬ(э)], [Ьар(э)], [ЬаЬ(э)]), which was used for 
denoting food and drink, and which was considered to be an imitation of the 
Dutch word [hap] (or [hapja], [hapi]), meaning 'a bite'. For the moment of 
its first appearance, this word was used frequently during interactive speech. 
In the course of the six weeks investigated three more words were noted. 
(4) A word [at(3)] (or [aut(o:)], [o:t(o:)], [o:t(3)]) appeared during the third 
week of recording. This word was used for referring to cars. The Dutch word 
for 'car' is [auto:] or [o:to:]. From the moment of its appearance, this word 
was used frequently during interactive speech. 
(s) A word [pa:t(a)] (or [Ьа:і(э)]) was noted to be spontaneously produced 
during the fourth week of recording. It was used for referring to four-legged 
animals, and seemed to be based on the Dutch word [pa:rt] (or [pairtja]), 
meaning 'horse'. This word too was used frequently during interactive 
speech. 
(6) A word [Ьэх] (or [рэх], [bux], [pux]) appeared in the sixth week of 
recording. It was used for referring to cats, and seemed to be an attempt at 
imitating the Dutch word [pus] (or [pusja]), meaning 'cat'. It was not used 
frequently during interactive speech until after the period investigated, when 
it was generalized to small furry animals (rabbits) and animals with whiskers 
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(seals). There is some doubt as to whether the sixth week indeed is the correct 
date of ' acquisition ' (i.e. first spontaneous production), for on one of the tapes 
of the fourth week we hear a cat mewing, to which the child responds by saying 
loud and clear ' [pusj] ' . 
Of the the six speech forms described above, three are both (a) considered 
as approximations of Dutch words, and (ft) reported to have been produced 
frequently in interactive speech, during the period investigated. These words 
are: [ар(э)], [аі(э)], [ра:і(э)] (and their variant forms). In our analysis of 
babbling we will concentrate on these three words (though some data 
concerning [Ьэх] will also be presented). 
T A B L E i. The first eight combination words 
Child form 
pa:t(a), b; 
Ьэх, bux, 
Ьа:і(э) 
apata 
bat(a) 
ха:рэ 
bo:t(a) 
ЬасЩэ) 
л(э) 
рэх, pux 
Adult form 
pa: rt, pa:rtja 
pus, pusja 
bceyta(n) 
apal, apaltja 
bat, batja 
5Іа:рэ(п) 
bo:t, bo:tJ3 
bal, Ьаіэф 
Meaning 
horse, little horse 
cat, little cat 
outside 
apple, small apple 
bath, small bath 
to sleep 
boat, small boat 
ball, small ball 
The third word, [pa: 1(э)], is remarkable because it combines two consonants 
with different places of articulation (labial and alveolar). Children generally 
seem to avoid using more than one place of articulation in their early words 
(see Kiparsky & Menn 1977: 58). However, in our subject this word even 
appeared to be the starting point of a phonological preference for words of 
the same general structure. Among the child's first twenty words, there were 
eight in which more than one place of articulation was used. These are 
presented in Table 1. One may note that of these eight words, no less than 
six consist of a labial first consonant and an alveolar second consonant. In the 
Dutch language however, there does not seem to be a preference for this 
particular combination of articulation places.1 
[1] Bakker (1971) presents information on the phonotactic structure of Dutch monosyllabic 
words. As in German and English, the patterns CVC, CVCC and CCVC together are 
responsible for 78 % of all monosyllabic words (Bakker 197: : zç). The patterns VC, CV 
and CVC however, make the broadest use of the combinatory possibilities offered by the 
Dutch language. Taken together, these data indicate that CVC is the 'best used' 
monosyllabic pattern in Dutch. Comparable information on polysyllabic words has, to our 
knowledge, not yet been assembled. Relevant for the present investigation is the fact that 
Dutch baby-talk shows a strong preference for adding diminutive suffixes to nouns. For 
example: [pus] ('cat') will become [pusja] ('little cat') in baby-talk. This has the effect 
of transforming monosyllabic CVC words into bisyllabic CVCCV words. 
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Transcription and scoring 
One of the authors transcribed all the tapes. The other independently 
transcribed the first recording of each week. For these six recordings, 
interjudge reliability was assessed by computing percentages of agreement on 
segmentation of babbles, as well as for the consonant parameters which played 
a role in the scoring system used for categorizing babbles. Vowel 
characteristics were not considered, since the child's word forms could be 
sufficiently well differentiated by considering only the characteristics of 
consonants and the phonotactic structure (see the criteria below), and judges 
tended to disagree more on vowel characteristics than on consonant parameters 
and phonotactic structure (the earlier study of the child's repetitive babbling 
(Eibers 1982) also concentrated on the consonantal and structural aspects of 
babbles). The consonant parameters were: 
(a) Place of articulation. Three places of articulation were distinguished : 
front (labial and labiodental), centre (dental, alveolar, palatal) and back (velar 
and glottal). In Eibers (1982) it was shown that for each of these three places 
the child's earlier babbling developed quite systematically and in a similar 
way (though at different times). 
(b) Manner of articulation. Two types were distinguished; + S t o p and 
— Stop. A consonantal production which could not be regarded as one of the 
six ' p u r e ' stop consonants [b], [p], [t], [d], [g] and [k] was scored as —Stop. 
Affricates, trills and other transitions from + Stop to — Stop at the same place 
of articulation were considered to be —Stop consonants also. So, consonantal 
productions like [bw], [tj], [dl], [dz], [ts], [pf], [kx], etc. (the so-called 
'affricatives' in Eibers (1982)) were scored as single, —Stop consonants. 
All percentages of agreement exceeded 9 0 % , with the exception of the 
Back, —Stop category. This was caused by the fact that aspiratedness of 
vowels (i.e. the question of whether a vowel was preceded by the consonant 
[h] or not) could not be reliably discriminated. Aspiratedness therefore was 
disregarded in the scoring. 
As in Eibers (1982), five main categories of babbles are distinguished: 
untranscribable babbles ; single vowels (babbles without a consonant) ; single 
consonants (babbles containing one consonant, e.g. [ata], [pa:], [bwa], [ax]); 
repetitions (babbles containing more than one consonant at the same place 
of articulation, e.g. [tatatatata], [wabu], [ba:ma:], [J3Ji:ti:ja]); and combina-
tions (babbles containing more than one consonant and at least two different 
places of articulation, e.g. [ba:to], [kwekabakikE], [kodla], [bataka:out]). 
In the present categorization, certain babbles are also characterized as 
'word babbles ' , i.e. babbled word forms. In our investigation, information 
about words and their order of appearance derives from the mother's diary, 
whereas information about word babbles (and non-word babbles) derives 
from the tapes. Four types of word babbles are discriminated, depending on 
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their global structural and segmental similarity to the four words [ар(э)], 
[ а ф ) ] , [ра:і(э)] and [Ьэх]. 
( ι ) Babbles meeting the following criteria were considered to represent the 
word-babble [ар(э)], related to the word [ар(э)] and its variants. 
Structure: VC(V) 
Place: Front 
Manner: + S t o p 
(2) Babbles meeting the following criteria were considered to represent the 
word babble [аі(э)], related to the word [аі(э)] and its variants. 
Structure: VC(V) 
Place: Centre 
Manner: + S t o p 2 
(3) Babbles meeting the following criteria were considered to represent the 
word babble [ра:і(э)], related to the word [ра:і(э)] and its variants. 
Structure: (V)CVC(V) 
Place: First consonant Front, second consonant Centre 
Manner: both consonants + S t o p 
(4) Babbles meeting the following criteria were considered to represent the 
word babble [Ьэх], related to the [Ьэх] word and its variants: 
Structure: (V)CVC(V) 
Place : first consonant Front, second consonant Back 
Manner: first consonant +Stop, second consonant —Stop 
The six weeks investigated were subdivided into four periods. Period 1 
consists of the first two weeks, during which the child only had the word 
[ар(э)] (and its variants) in his repertoire ([ka] had disappeared, and [brrr] 
is not regarded as a 'true' word approximation). Period 2 consists of the third 
week, during which [аі(э)] (and its variants) appeared. Period 3 consists of 
the fourth week, during which [ра:і(э)] (and its variants) emerged. Period 4 
consists of the remaining fifth and sixth weeks. As we have seen, the word 
[Ьэх] (and its variants) was noted to appear in the sixth week. The reason for 
taking together the fifth and sixth week, instead of the fourth and fifth, was 
that in this way a better distribution of the number of babbles was obtained 
over the four periods. 
RESULTS AND INTERPRETATION 
For each of the four periods, Table 2 shows the absolute and relative 
frequencies of occurrence for the main babbling categories (untranscnbable 
babbles, single vowels, single consonants, repetitions, combinations), as well 
as for their subcategorizations as to places of articulation (F = Front, 
[2] Note that a Centre +Stop consonant must be either [d] or [t], since affricates etc are 
regarded as — Stop consonants. 
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TABLE 2. Absolute and relative frequencies of main babbling categories, and 
subcategories of places and word babbles, for each of the four periods* 
Period ι Period 2 Period 3 Period 4 
Untranscnbable 
Single vowel 
Single consonant 
Front word babbles 
Front non-word babbles 
Centre word babbles 
Centre non-word babbles 
Back 
Repetitions 
Front 
Centre 
Back 
Combinations 
FC word babbles 
FC non-word babbles 
FB word babbles 
FB non-word babbles 
ВС 
FBC 
27 ( 0 0 2 
266 (0-23 
457 (°-4° 
88 (0-08 
208 (0-18 
8 (001 
29 (003 
1 2 4 ( 0 1 1 
248 (o-2I 
145 ( 0 1 3 
45 ( 0 0 4 
58 (005 
Í5« (013 
1 (000 
20 (002 
13 (001 
88 (008 
16 (001 
20 (002 
10 ( Ο Ό Ι 
138 ( o n 
476 (0-39 
24 ( 0 0 2 
220 ( 0 1 8 
87 (0-07 
108 ( 0 0 9 
37 ( 0 0 3 
395 (0-32 
94 ( 0 0 8 
252 (0-20 
49 ( 0 0 4 
216 (o-iy 
5 ( 0 0 0 
75 ( 0 0 6 
II (0-01 
55 ( 0 0 4 
40 ( 0 0 3 
30 (ΟΌ2 
) 29 (ΟΌ2 
) 1 4 2 ( 0 1 1 
) 445 (°-35 
20 ( 0 0 2 
232 (ο·ι8 
) 43 ( 0 0 3 
80 ( 0 0 6 
) 70 ( 0 0 5 
) 307 {024 
118 (0-09 
93 ( 0 0 7 
96 (0-08 
333 (0-27 
49 (o-04 
64 ( o e s 
22 (0Ό2 
84 (o-o? 
б? (ΟΌ5 
47 (ΟΌ4 
28 ( 0 0 2 ) 
195 ( ο ι 2 ) 
521 (0-31) 
ι ο ί ( Ο Ό 6 ) 
1 5 4 ( 0 0 9 ) 
8? ( e o s ) 
8? ( o e s ) 
92 ( O O S ) 
397 {ο·24) 
168 ( ο ί ο ) 
і б з (ο·ιο) 
66 (ΟΌ4) 
533 (ο-32) 
117 (ΟΌ7) 
177 ( ο ι ι) 
34 (0Ό2) 
88 ( o o s ) 
34 (ΟΌ2) 
83 ( o o s ) 
a
 Due to rounding off, the sum of the proportions per period may not be exactly 100. 
С = Centre, В = Back) and word babbles (F word babble = [ар(э)] etc., С 
word babble = [аі(э)] etc., FC word babble = [pa: і(э)] etc., FB word 
babble = [Ьэх] etc.). All results are based on the data of Table z. 
Word babbles 
Table 3 shows, for each of the four periods, the development of the child's 
word repertoire according to the mother's diary, and the absolute and relative 
frequencies of the word babbles. As far as the word babbles [аі(э)], [ра:і(э)] 
and [Ьэх] are concerned, we may note that they are already present in babbling 
BEFORE their corresponding words are first reported to be produced (this is 
most notable in the case of [Ьэх]).3 We may conclude, at the very least, that 
the word forms are not 'strange' to the child's babbling. 
Diary data are notoriously unreliable in pinpointing the exact moment of 
first spontaneous word production, since children's first attempts may go 
unnoticed by the environment (Bullowa, Jones & Duckert 1964). Never-
[3] The babble [Ьэх] had also been noted during the earlier period of repetitive babbling (see 
Eibers 1982' «λ). 
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TABLE 3. Absolute and relative frequencies of word babbles, and development 
of the word repertoire* 
Word repertoire 
Word babble [ар(э)] 
Word babble [аф)] 
Word babble [pa:t(3)] 
Word babble [Ьэх] 
Total 
Period 1 
[•P<»)] 
8 8 ( 0 0 8 ) 
8 ( 0 0 1 ) 
1 ( 0 0 0 ) 
13 ( 0 0 1 ) 
1 1 0 ( 0 10) 
P e r i o d 2 
[•P<9>] 
[«(э)] 
2 4 ( 0 0 2 ) 
8 7 ( 0 0 7 ) 
S ( 0 0 0 ) 
11 ( o o i ) 
127 ( 0 i o ) 
Period 3 
[•Pi»)] 
[pa:t(3)] 
2 0 ( 0 0 2 ) 
4 3 ( 0 0 3 ) 
4 9 ( 0 0 4 ) 
2 2 ( θ 0 2 ) 
1 3 4 ( 0 1 l ) 
Period 4 
[ар(э)] •
—
•S 
101 ( о о б ) 
8? (о os) 
1 1 7 ( 0 0 7 ) 
3 4 ( 0 o z ) 
3 3 9 ( 0 2 0 ) 
" Relative frequencies are obtained by dividing by total number of babbles per period (see 
Table 2) 
TABLE 4 Two babbling sequences from Period 4* 
(1) pa t3, ра.із, pupatia, (laughs), э titapwi:, эра, a:pa, a.b, а.рз, a p (sighs), brrrr, 
¡tutu, 0. tu, japti, hepi, hapt, hebt, ¡εν/ι, ja: be:, jabe:, jabe., bi.jawrjo, (untranscr ), 
kch-арэ 
(2) рэх, рзх x i x , pwa, з-ре, ba t, pfx, pce:t3, ba:U, ba.tt, pa:tt, pa-te, ba ta, 
fpwix-pwix auw, pux, pi-auw, pux, pux, pwi, pi, рэ , ρ, WE, pi-auw, apa ta 
a
 Word babbles are in italics 
theless, we observe that the development of the word babbles corresponds 
closely to the supposed order of word appearance. During Period 1 the word 
babble [ар(э)] dominates The word babble [аі(э)] gains in frequency during 
Period 2 The value of χ2 for the difference between the proportions of this 
word babble in Periods 1 and 2 is 63-15, which is significant at the ΟΌΟΙ level. 
The word babble [pa:t(3)] becomes frequent in Period 3. Here the relevant 
χ
2
 value is 35 89, which is also significant at ΟΌΟΙ For the word babble [Ьэх] 
the results are not as clear-cut. This word babble is the least frequent one, 
and shows but a slight increase in Periods 3 and 4 я 2 is 3 53 when comparing 
Periods 2 and 3 This value does not exceed the 3 84 required by the 0-05 
probability level, though it comes near So, in the case of [Ьэх], we can only 
speak of a tendency towards greater frequency of the word babble around the 
time that the word is reported to be produced 
Particularly striking in Table 3 is the fact that, whereas the overall 
proportion of word babbles remains about the same in the first three periods 
(o 10 to ο I I ) , it nearly doubles in Period 4 (0-20). χ2 for the difference between 
Periods 4 and 3 is 48 67, which is significant at o ooi . 
Two babbling sequences from Period 4 are shown in Table 4. In the first 
56 PLAY PEN MONOLOGUES 
T A B L E 5. Absolute and relative frequencies of use of the Front and Centre 
places in babbling* 
11 th month 12th month Periodi Period 2 Period 3 Period 4 
Number of babbles 1167(0-55) 598(044) 583(0-50) 514(0-42) 636(0-51) 922(055) 
containing Front 
Number of babbles ЗЗЗ(о-іб) 202(0-15) 139(012) 597(0-48) 443(0-35) 748(0-44) 
containing Centre 
Total 2104 — 1371 — 1156 — 1235 — 1256 — 1674 — 
a
 Proportions do not add up to i-oo, since the Back category is not included and FC 
combinations are counted twice, once in the Front and once in the Centre category. 
sequence, [pa:t(a)], [at(a)] and [ар(э)] and their variants are produced in close 
succession and/or alternation. In the second sequence the same occurs for 
[ра:і(э)] and [Ьэх].4 
Differentiating features 
We have seen that the words [ар(э)], [аі(э)] and [ра:і(э)] appear to be the ones 
the child was ' working on ' most intensively during the period investigated, 
we therefore concentrate on these here. Two things are noticeable in the 
succession of these words: (a) the main difference between the second and 
the first word is that in the second the Centre place is used instead of the Front 
place; (¿>) the main difference between the third word and the two previous 
ones is that in the third both Front and Centre are used. Such differences 
may be called DIFFERENTIATING FEATURES; they distinguish critically between 
subsequent words. The first differentiating feature may be called CENTRE, the 
second FRONT AND CENTRE. We now look at the general distribution of the 
places Front and Centre in all of the child's babbling (word babbles 
included). Table 5 shows their absolute and relative frequencies of occurrence 
in babbles. The data in Table 5 are the result of summing all categories in 
Table 2 which contain the relevant place of articulation (i.e. combinations 
containing both F and С are counted twice). Table 5 also presents the same 
data for the n t h and 12th month of repetitive babbling (reconstructed from 
Eibers 1982). 
We may note that period 1 is continuous with the earlier periods of 
'prelinguistic' babbling (4-5 months earlier!), in that there is a clear 
preference for the Front place over the Centre place of articulation. In the 
last two months of prelinguistic babbling, Front is used about three times as 
[4] Note that in the second babbling sequence the child also produces babbles which seem 
to mimiek the mewing of a cat ([pi - auw]). In the mother's diary this was not noted to 
occur until a full month later. 
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often as Centre; in Period ι it is even used four times as often. However, from 
Period 2 onward, this preference for Front over Centre is considerably 
reduced. This reduction is not caused by a 'discarding' of the Front place 
(in all periods it is used in more than 40 % of the babbles), but by a dramatic 
increase in the use of the Centre place (from around 15 % in earlier babbling 
and Period 1 to around 40 % in the last three periods). This increase coincides 
with developments in the child's word production: in Period 2 the child starts 
using the Centre place in his words. This means that the differentiating 
feature CENTRE becomes prominent in babbling at the same time that the first 
Centre word is introduced in speech. Table 2 makes clear that the increase 
of CENTRE in Period 2 is quite general. In this table, seven subcategories of 
babbling are discriminated in which the Centre place is used (C word babble, 
С non-word babble, С repetition, FC word babble, FC non-word babble, ВС, 
FBC). Five subcategories show an increase in Period 2 (C word babble, С 
non-word babble, С repetition, FC non-word babble, ВС), whereas the 
remaining two show neither increase nor decrease. Among the five subcat­
egories that increase in Period 2 is FC non-word babble, i.e. the non-word 
combination of Front and Centre. # 2 analysis for this increase yields a value 
of 29-51, which is significant at 0-001. In Period 3, FC word babble (i.e. 
[ра:і(э)]) appears (see above). In Period 4, FC non-word babble increases 
significantly a second time (# 2 is 28-52, which is significant at ΟΌΟΙ). So the 
FC non-word babbles increase twice: once concurrent with the production 
of [at(3)] and before the production of [ра:і(э)], and once after the appearance 
of [ра:і(э)]. This suggests that the FC non-word babbles are first associated 
with the practising of CENTRE, but are later associated with the practising of 
the FRONT AND CENTRE. If this interpretation is correct, then we should expect 
the FC non-word babbles of Periods 2 and 4 to be qualitatively different. 
Inspection of the relevant babbles shows that such qualitative differences do 
indeed exist. Table 6 presents some typical FC non-word babbles for each 
period. 
The FC non-word babbles of Period 4 strike us as being ' variations ' on 
the ' theme ' [pa: t(a)]. They may either be considered as repetitions of this word 
babble, or as concatenations that contain this word babble as a combining 
form.5 This is not the case with the FC non-word babbles of Period 2. 
Preparatory forms 
What makes a child attempt to produce one particular word and not another ? 
Probably several factors play a role in this décision, such as the perceptual 
saliency or general 'significance' of the object, event or experience to which 
the word refers, and the frequency with which the word is produced by the 
[5} See Eibers (in prep.) for a more detailed analysis of the emergence of [ра:і(э)] and related 
babbles. 
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TABLE 6. Some typical FC non-word babbles from Period 2 (preceding the 
appearance of the word [pa: t(a)]) and Period 4 {following the appearance of the 
word [ра:і(э)]). 
Period 2 
[brrtststs], [tutupr], [wa:ja:j3], [awa.jsbu], [wa. tat], [babsjsja], [totawewe], [udadalub], 
[jsbubrrbrr], [tatststspfrr], [bl-ds], [autidawup], [awdadawa] 
Period 4 
[beba:t], [bujbait], [bomba.t], [dapata], [paitsdatspaita], [ba.tapatatpat], [wetspajt], 
[partapa.tspaui], [patapat], [bortsba.jt], [ba.taba.tuda], [bsj-ba.t], [beitjabu], [tata-o.pa:t] 
environment. Another factor might be the presence or absence of patterns in 
the child's speech (i.e. words AND babbles) that are 'adaptable' to the new 
word form. 
In the present investigation we concentrate on the last factor. If it is true 
that existing speech patterns influence future word selection, then we should 
find that the production of a new word may be PRECEDED by the establishment 
of relevant new speech patterns in babbling, i.e. by the emergence of 
'preparatory forms'. We have already noticed that the FC word babble 
[ра:і(э)], which appears in Period (3), is preceded in Period 2 by a significant 
increase of FC non-word babbles (which increase we interpreted to be 
associated with the practising of the differentiating feature CENTRE). This 
suggests that babbling may have 'prepared for' the selection and production 
of [pa:t(3)] to an important extent. A similar kind of 'preparation' may be 
noted in Period (4). Here, within the main category of combinations (see 
Table 2) there is a clear preference for FC combinations (ο·ι8 altogether) 
over FB combinations (o 07 altogether) and ВС combinations (0-02) This 
preference may be interpreted as a preparation for the later phonological 
preference for selecting combination words that combine the Front and 
Centre places of articulation. 
D I S C U S S I O N 
The data presented in Tables 2 and 3 suggest that word acquisition and 
concurrent babbling are related, at least as far as the production of word 
babbles is concerned. One of the functions of babbling in the first words 
period seems to be the practising of the word forms that are beginning to be 
used in interactive speech (Periods 1, 2 and 3) and the consolidating of the 
word repertoire (Period 4). 
In Table 5 we saw another aspect of the relationship between early words 
and concurrent babbling Starting with Period 2, there is an abrupt increase 
in the use of the Centre place of articulation in babbling. This increase 
coincides with developments in the child's word production; starting with 
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Period 2, the child uses the Centre place of articulation in his words. 
Similarly, in Period 4 there is a significant further increase of FC non-word 
babbles (Table 2), and a qualitative change in the character of these babbles 
as well (Table 6). They then seem to be 'modelled ' after the FC word babble 
[ра:і(э)], whereas earlier (in Period 2) this had not been the case. These 
observations suggest that word production is not only accompanied by the 
establishment of new speech patterns (the practising of word babbles), but 
also by an increase of certain general tendencies (the practising of word 
features) in babbling. 
On the other hand, we also noted (Table 2) that the production of a new 
word, and the emergence of a phonological preference, may be preceded by 
the establishment of relevant new speech patterns in babbling. This suggests 
that babbling may not only 'adapt to ' but also 'prepare for' the selection 
and/or production of new words. 
The general picture which arises is that of a continuous interplay between 
word acquisition/production and concurrent babbling: word production 
influences the course of babbling and vice versa. We summarize what appears 
to happen over Periods 1 to 4. During Period 1 the child has one word in 
his repertoire, [ар(э)], which he practises in his babbling. Then he selects a 
second word [аі(э)], which, like [ар(э)]( has the general structure VC(V) and 
contains a single stop consonant. An important difference with [ар(э)] 
however, is the Centre place of articulation. In Period 2 the child practises 
this new word and also practises its differentiating feature, the Centre place 
of articulation, in his babbling. This results in an increase of most of the 
Centre babbling categories, including the category of Front and Centre 
combinations. The child then produces a new word, [pa:t(3)], which can be 
easily fitted onto this last category. He practises this new word during Period 
3. During Period 4 the child consolidates his word repertoire and further 
extends his practising of [pa:t(a)]. At the same time he also extends his 
practising of this word's differentiating feature, i.e. the combining of Front 
and Centre places. This results in a clear preference for Front/Centre 
combinations over other types of combination. In its turn, this babbling 
preference seems to be the starting point for a later phonological preference 
for selecting words that combine the Front and Centre places of articulation. 
In the first words period, the child produces two kinds of speech: 'talking', 
which consists mainly of producing meaningful forms (i.e. words) directed 
at a listener, and 'babbling', which consists of producing both meaningful 
and meaningless forms that are not directed at a listener. We credit the child 
with two speech ' systems ' : an already developed and further developing 
'babbling system' and a budding 'talking system'. The data and interpre­
tations presented in the previous sections suggest that there is an interplay 
between both systems : words acquired by the talking system may influence 
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and shift the course of babbling, whereas babbling in its turn may predispose 
the talking system towards selecting words of a certain form (i.e. towards 
developing 'phonological preferences'). In Piagetian terms: the babbling 
system may accommodate to forms selected by the talking system, whereas 
the talking system may assimilate forms developed by the babbling system. 
In this continuous interplay it is difficult, if not impossible, to pinpoint a single 
'cause' for a particular speech phenomenon, such as in our case, the 
phonological preference for words that combine the Front and Centre places 
of articulation. We cannot say that this phonological preference is 'caused' 
by the previous practising of the word [ра:1(э)], since [ра:і(э)] itself may be 
interpreted as 'caused' by a particular babbling tendency, which, in its turn, 
may have been 'caused' by the acquisition and practising of the word [at(a)], 
and so on. We can, however, demonstrate a relationship between the specific 
form of this particular phonological preference and specific developments in 
the child's babbling, showing how this preference appears to grow quite 
naturally out of the child's entire set of speech behaviours and their interplay. 
In the child we investigated, the babbling of the first words period appeared 
to serve at least the following functions : 
( ι ) the function of practising newly acquired word forms and consolidating 
the word repertoire; 
(2) the function of practising differentiating features of newly acquired 
words ; 
(3) the function of providing the talking system with ' preparatory ' forms, 
suitable for ' fitting ' new word forms without too much effort. 
Theories of child phonology seem to be moving away from a predominantly 
linguistic orientation towards a more psychological point of view (Macken & 
Ferguson 1983, Menn 1983). Ferguson has repeatedly suggested that the 
earliest stage in phonological development is a period of acquiring and 
contrasting whole words rather than phonemes (Ferguson & Farwell 1975, 
Ferguson 1978). Recently, Mann (1983) has elaborated on this view by 
proposing that an early word form is represented in the child's lexicon as a 
' canonical form ' (i.e. a global pattern which the word shares with other words 
in the lexicon) plus a specification of some differentiating features (which she 
calls 'variable parameters'). This model, though not explicitly process-
oriented, can easily accommodate the processes we described. For example, 
we saw that 'variable parameters' appeared to be practised and explored in 
babbling. This practice in its turn appeared to play a role in the construction 
of a new 'canonical form'. Menn concludes her stimulating paper with 
stating: 'We used to ask: What linguistic theory will explain the order in 
which the various language behaviors develop ? This question assumed that 
there is such an order, and that it should be explainable by linguistic theory. 
The new question is roughly: What behavioural predispositions and abilities 
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does the child bring to the task of learning to communicate with language, 
and how does the individual go about solving the articulatory and phonological 
problems posed by the language to be learned?' (1983: 45). 
Our data suggest that speech-concurrent babbling is such a 'behavioural 
ability ', which may play a crucial role in the way the child goes about solving 
the 'articulatory and phonological problems' posed by his mother tongue. 
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ABSTRACT 
Some word-finding problems (recorded on tape) of a Dutch two-year-old 
are reported. The child's attempts at retrieving a certain target form 
show many characteristics which are typical for 'tip-of-the-tongue' 
experiences. During his lexical search the child produces malapropisms 
and a blend. The speech errors are analysed, and implications for the 
character of early lexical organization and the order of lexical form/ 
meaning acquisition are discussed. 
INTRODUCTION 
When my son was about 2% years old, I used to record our conversations 
regularly. During one of these conversations the child seemed to experience 
what is known as the 'tip-of-the-tongue' phenomenon (TOT). Since this 
supposed T O T experience was recorded on tape, it is possible to trace its 
origin in the conversation and to describe its course and resolution. 
A speaker is said to be in a T O T state when she is searching her lexicon 
for a specific item, knows its meaning, knows also that she ' somewhere ' has 
its form, but is (temporarily) unable to retrieve this form. While in a T O T 
state, the speaker may come up with target-related words and with generic 
information about the target, such as its first letter, its syllable structure, etc. 
(Bolinger 1961, Brown & McNeill 1966, Rubin 1975). 
In the next section the relevant conversation segments are presented and 
interpreted. In the subsequent discussion a summary and evaluation is 
presented of the evidence for claiming that the child had a T O T experience, 
and some implications of the data are discussed for the interrelationships of 
form and meaning representation (and acquisition) within the developing 
lexicon. 
[ ·] Address for correspondence: Psychologisch Laboratorium, Varkenmarkt ζ, 35ίι BZ 
Utrecht, The Netherlands. 
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DATA A N D I N T E R P R E T A T I O N 
The material consists of three conversations, all taped on the same day, when 
the child's age was 2:9.26. In presenting the material I refer to myself as ' the 
mother' and to my son as 'the child'. Before presenting the relevant 
segments of the three conversations, two remarks about their context should 
be made: 
(a) On the preceding day, mother and child had been visiting a marine show, 
where dolphins had been performing. This was the first time the child had 
ever seen a dolphin. 
(¿>) At the time, much attention was paid at home to nursery songs. Records 
of nursery songs used to be played frequently. Mother and child often sang 
these songs together and the child also quite often sang them by himself. In 
one of these songs the word [solda-.tjas] (soldiers) occurred.1 The child had 
never met soldiers, and soldiers also did not figure in his picture books. So, 
whereas he had a thorough knowledge of this word's form, he had, at the most, 
but a vague inkling as to its referential meaning. 
The following six segments of the recorded conversations show how the 
child struggles to find the word dolphins, but mostly comes up with the word 
soldiers, and also, less persistently, with the word orange. I will analyse the 
segments successively. A phonetic transcription (word for word) of the Dutch 
utterances is presented, and English translational equivalents are added (with 
a few untranslatable parts presented between square brackets in IPA). For 
an adequate understanding of what is happening, it is sufficient to know that 
the Dutch form for raisins is [ro:zèintJ3s], for dolphins it is [dolfeinsn], for 
orange it is [oiranjs] and for soldiers it is [solda.-tjas]. 
At the beginning of the first conversation, mother and child are talking 
about the marine show of the preceding day. During this conversation 
the mother introduces the word dolphins and produces it seven times in a 
sentence context. The child produces it twice. Then the child starts asking 
for a banana and the mother tries to talk him out of it. This goes on for some 
time. Then segment 1 begins: 
[1] Transcription and translation of this song are: 
het re:x3nt, het re:xant 
it's raining, tt's raining 
аз panstjas wordan nat 
the tiles are growing wet 
da:r kwaiman twe: soldaitjas a:n 
two soldiers came 
di v ibn op ham xat 
who fell on their behinds. 
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Segment ι (from conversation i) 
Mother Child 
( i ) max ík nox эп bana:n? 
can I have another banana? 
we:t ja; ne:m ma:r Н эг 
you know what, take a 
эп do:sJ3 ro:zeintJ3S 
small box of raisins 
(2) [ataua χ щэ] 2 
(giggle) (2 χ )3 
(3) [adaua nini noimoma:] 
he? oil ja nit.. .ik zal 
what ? don't you want... Γ11 
}э эп do:sJ3 ro:zeintJ3s хе: эп 
give you a small box of raisins 
(4) solda:tjas a:η 
soldiers [a:n] 
(5) solda:tJ3s 
soldiers 
vat soldaitjas ? 
what soldiers? 
(6) soldaitjas a:n 
soldiers [a:n] 
(7) so l . . . daitjas 
sol.. .diers 
(8) soldaitjas 
soldiers 
uat is da:rme: ? 
what's the matter with that ? 
(9) э, da.. .jei, jei, jei kan het uel 
eh, the.. .you, you, you can do 
it 
ja:, ma:r uat kan ík uel ? 
yes, but what can I do ? 
(10) uasein dit? 
what are this* 
[2] Utterances (2) and (3) are 'articulated nonsense', 1 e the phonetic form of these utterances 
can be clearly identified, but the utterances have no meaning in Dutch. 
[3] Whenever an utterance (or a non-speech act, such as in this case 'giggling') is repeated 
in full, the number of productions is presented between brackets. 
[4] The child's Dutch utterance may either be interpreted as a tvAaf-question or as a 
where-question. The following utterance (12) makes clear that a uiAof-question was 
intended, but the mother at first takes utterance (10) to be a niAere-question. 
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( i l ) uasein d a . . . visa ? 
what are the.. .fishes ? 
ua:r da visa nou zein ? 
where the fishes are now ? 
di zein in het zuembat, 
they are in the swimming pool, 
in het xro:t3 zuembat, 
in the big swimming pool, 
da:r zita za alteit in, he ? 
that's where they always are, hm ? 
(12) va.. .Dat sein dat vo:r. . . 
who... what kind of 
uat sein dat vo:r visa ? 
what kind of fishes? 
di xro:t3 visa ? 
those big fishes ? 
(13) J»: 
yes 
dat uairan dolfeinan 
those were dolphins 
(14) dolfeinan 
dolphins 
ja: 
yes 
(15) ík oil h e . . . ík o i l . . . bana:n 
heba 
I wanna ha... I wanna... have 
banana 
Segment (1) starts with the child asking once more for a banana (utterance 
(1)). The mother responds by offering him raisins ([ro:zèmtjas]). The child 
then produces some nonsense utterances (utterances (2) and (3)), and then, 
seemingly out of the blue,6 starts talking about soldiers ([soldà:tjas]) in 
utterances (4) to (8). The origin of this form in a nursery song can be clearly 
seen in utterances (4) and (6), in which the child also produces the word [a:n], 
which follows [solda:tjas] in the song (see fn. 1). Since this topic is completely 
[5] We might, however, speculate that raisins [ro:zèintj3s] by sound association reactivates 
(parts of) the representation of dolphins [dolfeinan], which word was used in the previous 
conversation topic The child tries to produce this form again, but is sidetracked by the 
form soldiers [soldaitjas], which has elements in common with both [ro:zèintj3s] and 
[dolfeinan]. This supposed sequence of sound associations would adequately fit into the 
interpretation developed here. 
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alien to the ongoing conversation, the mother asks for a clarification of its 
introduction. The reaction of the child consists of an attempt to make clear 
that he is looking for the form dolphins ([dolfeinan]). First, in utterance (9), 
he points out that mother can do something which he cannot.' Utterances 
( io) - ( i4) indicate that this something refers to producing the form dolphins. 
Assuming that the child is adhering to the principle that conversations should 
be coherent, we may conjecture that utterances (4)-(8) and utterances (9)—(14) 
are related. The most plausible relationship would be that in utterances (4)-(8) 
the child is attempting to retrieve the same word form as in utterances 
(9)-(i4), i.e. the form dolphins. As we will see, this assumption is supported 
by the later course of the conversation. As for the present, the implication 
is twofold: (a) for the child, the word forms [soldà.-tjas] and [dolfeinan] are 
related (note that they have the same number of syllables, the same stress 
pattern, and, as far as the first syllable is concerned, the same rhyme) and (b) 
the child is aware of the fact that [soldà:tJ3s] is NOT the correct form, but feels 
himself incapable of finding the correct one. Thus, utterances (4)-(8) are 
reminiscent of that phase of an adult T O T experience during which the 
experiencer retrieves target-similar word forms, which, however, she knows 
to be incorrect. 
In Segment (1) the child is satisfied when the mother finally produces 
[dolfeinan]. He once repeats the word (utterance (14)), but then immediately 
drops the subject and returns to his request for a banana (utterance (15)). In 
Segment (2) however, he spontaneously starts searching his lexicon again: 
Segment 2 (from conversation 1) 
Mother Child 
(16) uasein di nou? 
what are those? 
(17) solda:tJ3S fi (3 χ ) 
soldiers [fi] (3 χ ) 
ui.. .Dat is dat, soldaitjas fi? 
who.. .what is that, soldiers [fi]? 
(18) soldabas zein uex (2 χ ) 
soldiers are gone (2 χ ) 
After Segment (2) the child's attention is caught by noises in the street, 
and the subject of soldiers/dolphins is dropped. The mother, however, has 
now become alerted to what is going on, and later on the same day 
(conversation 2) it is she who starts probing the child's memory: 
[6] The untranslatable Dutch form [uel] is used when the speaker wants to indicate a 
positive/negative opposition. For instance: an utterance like the apples are [uel] red would 
only be produced in a situation in which there are also apples which are not red. 
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Segment J (from conversation 2) 
Mother Child 
hu he.-tsn di ізэп? to:mas? 
what is the name of those fishes? 
Thomas ? 
(19) o: ranja 
orange 
hu he:t3n di visan ? 
what is the name of those fishes? 
(20) o:ranJ9 
orange 
n e : . . .za zein nit o:ranje, 
no... they are not orange, 
za zein xreis, en za zweman zo: 
(gesture) 
they are grey, and they swim like 
that (gesture) 
za spriqan n?yt het ua:tar 
they jump out of the water 
en dan spnqan za do:r da hupal 
and then they jump through a big 
ring 
en dan, plons, valan za ue:r in het 
uaitar 
and then, splash, they fall into the 
water again 
en hu he:tan za nou ? 
and now, what's their name ? 
(21) solda:tjas 
soldiers 
ne: (laughing), za he:tan nit 
solda:tjas 
no (laughing), they're not called 
soldiers 
hu he:tan za dan ? 
how are they called? 
(22) solda:tjas 
soldiers 
(23) ne: (laughing) 
no (laughing) 
(24) bœyt sein nox solda:tja. . . s 
outside are still soldier.. .s 
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(25) o:ranJ3 
orange 
(26) о : ranja 
orange 
(27) xe:l? 
yellow ? 
At first the child comes up with [o:ranja] (orange) in utterances (19) and 
(20). This word (which in Dutch refers only to the colour, not the fruit) has 
the same number of syllables and the same stress pattern as the target word 
[dolfèinan]. Like soldiers, it still lacks a clear referential meaning for the child 
(at the time he was not yet able to reliably name colours). 
After the first two instances of orange, the mother decides to present the 
child with a few semantic cues. She describes the way in which dolphins 
perform. As we would expect in a true T O T experience, this semantic cueing 
is of no avail. The child again comes up with soldiers (utterances (21) and (22)) 
and orange (utterances (25) and (26)). The production of yellow (utterance 
(27)) probably must be explained as a semantic association to orange. 
After Segment (3) the conversation moves again to the marine show. 
Mother and child talk about seals and their performance. The word dolphins 
is not used. Then (Segment (4)) the mother tries the effect of presenting 
phonological cues: 
Segment 4 (from conversation 2) 
Mother Child 
en hu he:tan da visan ? 
and what is the name of 
the fishes ? 
(28) solda:tj3s 
soldiers 
(29) ne: (laughing) 
no (laughing) 
ne:, za he:tan.. . 
no, their name is... 
za he:tan nit solda:tjas 
they are not called soldiers 
ma:r hu he:tan za oei ? 
but how are they called? 
he? 
hm? 
o:ranja, kom nou! 
orange, come on ! 
da. . . da . . . 
da...da... 
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(30) da 
da. . . 
da... 
(giggling) 
d o . . . d o . . . 
do... do... 
(31) feina! 
phins ! 
(32) dolfeina! 
dolphins ! 
dolfeinan, ja: 
dolphins, yes 
(33) sein nit solda:tjas 
are not soldiers 
ne:, nit solda:tj:s, ne: 
no, not soldiers, no 
(34) dolfeina 
dolphins 
Segment (4) shows that the mother first presents the initial consonant [d]. 
When this does not help, she presents the first vowel as well ([do]). The child 
is then able to retrieve the target word (utterances (31), (32), (34)). This 
however does not make its phonological representation strong enough to 
withstand further interference, as is evident from Segments (5) and (6), which 
were recorded still later on the same day (conversation 3). 
Segment 5 (from conversation 3) 
Mother Child 
en hu he:tan di visan ? 
and what's the name of the fishes? 
(35) solda:tjas 
soldiers 
(36) ja: 
yes 
(37) ne: (laughing) 
no (laughing) 
ne: (laughing) 
no (laughing) 
hu he:tan za dan ? 
what's their name? 
(38) keikas 
look 
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(39) voír J o u (offers M. a toy) 
/or you (offers M. a toy) 
(40) d o . . . van 
do... эп 
(41) dol. . . doltal... tata 
Segment (5) shows the child retrieving parts of the target word and 
engaging in sound play. He does not retrieve the complete form (utterances 
(40) and (41)). Then, in Segment (6), the mother tries phonological cueing 
again. 
Segment 6 (from conversation 3) 
Mother 
he:tan za to:mas ? 
are they called ' Thomas ' ? 
he:tan za solda:tjas ? 
are they called ' soldiers ' ? 
hu he:tan za dan ? 
how are they called then ? 
ma:r hu he:tan di visan dan? 
but what name do the fishes have ? 
za he:tan... do . . . 
their name is.. .do. 
ja:, dol. . . 
yes, dol... 
nou, hu heitan di visan ? 
well, what's the name of those fishes? 
Child 
(42) ne: 
no 
(43) ne: 
no 
(44) visa! ( 2 X ) 
fishes (2 x ) 
(45) solda:tjas 
soldiers 
(46) fei... na 
phins 
(47) feinana 
phins 
(48) uas.. .uasein visa? 
whata.. .what are fishes? 
(49) ja:? 
yes? 
(50) soldeina! (3 χ ) 
soldins ! (3 χ ) 
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(51) soldeina (3 x ) 
soldins (3 x ) 
(52) soldeins 
soldins 
(53) solda:. . . salaitjas... 
soldie... ssliers... 
sola:tJ3s... he ? 
soliers... hm ? 
(54) [hu-ta:la:], etc. (sings) 
[hu-ta:laz]y etc. (sings) 
Segment (6) shows the child finally producing a fully-fledged 'blend' of 
target and interfering word (utterances (5o)-(52)). At first this blend is 
produced with great assurance. Then, when no confirming response from the 
mother comes forth, there is a gradual ' taking over ' again by the interfering 
form (utterance (53)). After this the child switches to producing singsong 
nonsense (54). 
DISCUSSION 
TOT or not? 
In the previous section we witnessed a series of difficulties, experienced by 
a child during repeated attempts at retrieving the same word form. The 
question now is whether these difficulties deserve the name of T O T or 
whether they do not. The answer of course depends in part upon what 
definition of T O T experience is preferred. Generally, the ' feeling-of-knowing 
the target form' seems tc be considered as the most important defining 
characteristic of a T O T state. Yarmey (1973: 287) for instance states: 
'Whenever S was unable to think of the target's name but felt sure that he 
knew it and that it was on the verge of coming back, he was considered to 
be in the T O T state'. Young children hardly ever venture such detailed 
introspective information, and our 2-year-old subject is no exception in this 
respect. So, by the introspective criterion, which tends to exclude children 
as potential T O T experiencers, we may not speak of T O T in the present case. 
On the other hand, the child's lexical search processes do manifest many 
characteristics typical for T O T states. In summary, these are as follows : 
{a) The child knows the intended referent and is ACTIVELY SEARCHING for 
its SPECIFIC NAME, and not for a conversationally adequate paraphrase. The 
active character of the search is indicated by utterances (<?)-( 12), ( 16) and (48), 
soldeina ? 
soldins ? 
o:! 
oh! 
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in which the child directly and tenaciously asks for the specific target form. 
These utterances are not prompted by the mother's questions, nor do they 
constitute a request for completely new information (prior to Segment ( i ) the 
child had already spontaneously produced the target form). 
(6) Though we cannot conclude with certainty that the child experienced 
a 'feeling-of-knowing the target form', we may at least infer from his 
utterance (9) that he experienced a 'feeling-of-knowing the target form's 
EXISTENCE'. In combination with the fact that he had already spontaneously 
produced the target form earlier in the conversation, this SUGGESTS he may 
very well have had a 'feeling-of-knowing the target form' as well. 
(c) During a T O T state, an adult may retrieve forms that are similar to the 
target form, while knowing they are not correct. The child also retrieves a 
similar form (utterances (4)-(8), ( 1 у)-( 18), (21 )-(22), (28), (35)1 (45)), knowing 
it is incorrect (utterances (9), (23), (33), (37), (43)). 
(d) In adults, lengthy semantic descriptions may intensify the T O T 
experience (Koriat & Lieblich 1977), whereas phonological cues may lead to 
retrieval of the target form. In our subject, semantic cues also did not trigger 
the target form (utterances (21 ) and (25)), but phonological cues did (utterances 
( 3 i H 3 2 ) a n d ( 4 6 H 4 7 ) ) · 
(e) During a T O T state an adult may, if asked to do so, produce some 
generic information about the target form, such as its first letter, its number 
of syllables, etc. Our subject, when asked to produce the target form, also once 
came up with generic information (utterances (4o)-{4i)), without producing 
the complete target form. 
Taken together, these five observations do not quite seem to fit an 
interpretation which sees the child as simply being somewhat confused about 
how to express himself. The child just seems to know too well what he is and 
what he is not looking for (see also the abrupt ending of the questioning 
sequence after utterance (14) and the almost metalinguistic observation made 
in utterance (33)). So I favour a T O T interpretation in the present case, 
though ultimately such an interpretation must remain a matter of definitional 
taste. For the present, a more interesting question is what the data suggest 
about early lexical representation and acquisition. 
Form and meaning in early lexical representation and acquisition 
In the adult lexicon, the form and meaning of a lexical item are represented 
somewhat independently. The same holds for the different aspects of the 
phonological representation itself, such as syllable structure, stress pattern 
and phonetic segments (Brown & McNeill 1966). The observations presented 
above suggest that this independent storage may already be effective before 
age three. However, they also confirm some recent theorizing about the 
difference between child and adult lexicon. In their study of 200 child 
malapropisms (up to age 12) Aitchison & Straf ( 1982) conclude that child and 
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adult lexicon differ m the relative weight assigned to the several phonological 
word features that make up a word's phonological representation. Adult 
malapropisms appear to be more strongly based on identity of initial 
consonant, whereas child malapropisms are more strongly based on identity 
of number of syllables and stress pattern (see also Vihman ( 1981 )). The T O T 
experience reported above confirms this conclusion. We saw that during the 
search for the form [dolfeinsn] the child came up with two malapropisms 
([soldàitjas] and [oirànja]) which both resemble the target form in number of 
syllables and stress pattern, but not in initial consonant Also, presentation 
of the initial consonant by the mother had no effect (though presentation of 
the initial consonant/vowel combination had). 
Another interesting aspect of the two malapropisms [soldà:tj3s] and [oiranja] 
is the fact that both words seemed, at the time, to be still incomplete as to 
the representation of their referential meaning [soldà:tps] was a form 
encountered almost exclusively in a certain nursery song, and the specific 
reference of the colour word [oirànja] was not yet known to the child. This 
suggests that, during the search for a weakly represented word form, similar 
forms which are not yet tied to a ' strong ' referential meaning are among the 
first to present themselves The implication would be that during lexical 
search a kind of ' difference score ' is computed between the target word and 
a candidate item. Should the candidate item have little specific meaning, the 
difference score will tend to be lower, and the item in question will have a 
greater chance of being retrieved. 
Stated somewhat differently it seems that a child's lexicon may contain 
'forms searching for meaning' as well as 'meanings searching for form', and 
both kinds of item appear only too eager to meet each other. Another striking 
instance of such a 'meet ing ' is the following malapropism which occurred 
in the same month as the reported T O T experience. When we were visiting 
friends, the child noticed a microscope. This new object fascinated him and 
he was allowed to explore it for some time. During the following days he often 
referred to this experience, telling me that he wanted to play with the 
[vle:sta:xutkò:p] again At first I did not understand Then it dawned on me 
that this ' w o r d ' came from [en het vle:s uas da:r xutkò:p] (translation· 'and 
the meat was cheap there ') , a phrase from, again, a nursery song. Apparently, 
the fact that [mikroskò:p] (microscope) and [vle:sta:xutkò:p] share the same 
final (and stressed) syllable had been a sufficient reason for this meeting of 
an 'old ' , referentially empty, form and a ' new ' , phonologically untrained, 
meaning to result in lexical marriage.7 
[7] Note that this malapropism is also a particularly clear example of a child's tendency to 
pay more attention to word endings than to word beginnings (Slobin 1973, Aitchison & 
Straf 1982) 
7 6 T I P - O F - T H E - T O N G U E AT T W O ? 
Nursery songs of course are an excellent source for the acquisition of ' forms 
in search of a meaning'. But probably other sources exist as well. One might 
think of recurrent expressions in overheard adult conversations, or in stories 
which are repeatedly told. Until now, the literature has emphasized the fact 
that meaning acquisition may precede the acquisition of form. The obser­
vations presented above add to the growing body of research which indicates 
that the reverse order may also occur (Clark 1974, Leonard, Newhoff & Fey 
1980, Vihman 1981, Peters 1983, Snow 1983). 
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HOW CHILDREN ACTIVELY CREATE THEIR OWN 
LANGUAGE DEVELOPMENT: 
A Basic Cycle of Cognitive Operations 
Loekie Eibers, Rijksuniversiteit Utrecht 
'In a nontrivial way the child herself is teacher and creator of learning materials' (Gelman 
1983:278). 
'Concepts are not learned in any conventional sense. Nor are they innate. Rather, they are the 
product of a powerful set of cognitive operations (..)' (Nelson 1983:146) 
Introduction: Babbling and the Basic Operational Cycle 
In this paper I will discuss several seemingly disparate topics in children's de-
velopment. The main topics are babbling, Piaget's sensorimotor stages, spon-
taneous object classification and, in most detail, the emergence of three-word 
sentences, but several other topics relating to language development will also be 
briefly touched upon. 
All areas concern the development of some kind of spontaneous behavior, and 
the emphasis will be on the development of spontaneous linguistic behavior. 
My purpose in bringing these areas together is to argue that they share a similar 
pattern of development. This pattern becomes visible if one realizes that children 
not only leam from the input they receive, but may also learn from their own 
output-repertoire. In other words, children analyze what they themselves are 
doing. Söderbergh (1986) has pointed out that children not only talk for 
communicative, 'intersubjective' purposes but also, and simultaneously, for 
certain self-oriented 'subjective' purposes. Ruth Clark (1982) has emphasized 
this self-oriented aspect of development in stating that children are 'talking to 
leam' rather than 'learning to talk'. Children treat their own utterances as objects 
to operate on, and in doing so they actively create their own linguistic 
development. 
My aim is to delineate and illustrate the major phases of this active and largely 
self-directed process of manipulating one's own output. I will argue that in all 
four areas mentioned above — babbling, sensorimotor development, 
spontaneous object classification, and three-word sentences — a general three-
phase cycle of cognitive operations can be discerned. I will call this cycle the 
'Basic Operational Cycle'. 
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I will not outline this Basic Operational Cycle in advance. Rather, I will first 
'evoke' it in describing how I myself saw it emerging when, some years ago, I 
started rereading my first paper on the development of babbling. This paper 
(Eibers 1982) reports a case-study of the babbling development of my eldest son, 
between 6 and 12 months of age. In this paper, I claimed that the child actively 
created his own babbling development by applying two basic operating 
principles: a combination principle and a variation principle. The combination 
principle consists of the chaining of articulatory actions that have previously 
been exercised separately. The variation principle consists of trying out the same 
type of articulatory action in different articulatory contexts. I interpreted both 
principles as complementary modes of operating which together were responsib-
le for the ever-growing complexity of babbling. 
However, at the time I failed to note that in certain babbling categories a very 
particular order of the two operating principles could be discerned. I noticed 
this only later. The order I am referring to is shown in Table 1, which presents 
part of the data from my 1982 paper. 
I distinguished between three global places-of-articulation: Back of the mouth 
(velar and glottal sounds). Front of the mouth (bilabial and labiodental sounds) 
and Centre of the mouth (alveolar, dental, palatal sounds). In Table 1 some of the 
developments are presented in the Back-babbles and the Front-babbles. One may 
note that the Back-babbles appeared first: initially as productions containing a 
single consonant during recording 4, later as repetitions of these consonants 
during recording 9. Front babbles appeared later: both single and repeated 
consonants during recording 12. In this period, the child did not yet combine 
different places of articulation in one and the same babble. At the time of the 30th 
recording however, the Front and Back places of articulation were combined for 
the first time. These babbles may be seen to consist of repetitive chainings of 
stereotypical Front and Back consonants. Later, during the 44th recording, the 
child again produced strings of Front/Back combinations, but now in quite a 
different way. Table 1 shows that each individual babble now is quite different, 
in structure as well as manner, from the one produced before. Still in all babbles 
the two places of articulation involved are continually the same. They all are 
Front/Back combinations. Apparently, the child is now actively experimenting 
with the Front/Back contrast, as opposed to merely producing it (as he seemed to 
do before). Probably, such active experimentation may result in decontextua-
lization of the contrast, and in the acquisition of a more or less abstract notion of 
'articulation-place'. This might help the child in achieving flexible control over 
his speech production apparatus when he starts attempting to imitate adult input. 
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Table 1 Babbling from ±6 to ±12 months 
Based on: Eibers, L. (1982) 
Back Front 
Phase 1: 
Isolated productions 
and repetitions 
(±6 to ±9 months) 
recording 4: 9ga, 
a:g3 , кэ , ax 
recording 9: 3g3ga, 
aga:ga, 8ga:gag8k 
recording 12: aba, Ьэ, 
awa:, mababdwabababa, 
ba:ba:ba:b3ba:ba:mba: 
Phase 2: 
Chainings 
(±9 to ±11 months) 
recording 30: 
bdgebagbagabak 
ЬэкэтЬэк тЬэк тЬпт, 
ЬэкЭтЬэкэЬэкэЬэк 
Phase 3: 
Variations 
(±11 to ±12 months) 
recording 44: 
gaflgwaQgeb, ewbabumeka, 
ЬэЬака, 8wa:w9mar)ax, 
magam8ga:x 
gagaflbuk, ebakax 
In this account, the child seems to move through three subsequent phases: first, 
a phase of independently producing certain actions and repeating them (phase 1 
in Table 1); second, a phase of chaining different actions (phase 2 in Table 1); 
third, a phase of varying certain aspects of these chainings while keeping some 
other aspect constant (phase 3 in Table 1). This three-phase sequence represents, 
in essence, what I call the Basic Operational Cycle. In Table 2. the cycle is 
formulated in general terms and some assumptions are formulated about the 
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function of each of its phases. 
Table 2 Basic Operational Cycle 
Three phases 
1. repeatedly performing a certain action 
2. chaining this action with another one from phase 1 
3. varying the chainings from phase 2 (or the actions from phase 1) 
Phase 1: 'attention' focussed on performance-aspects, until perfor-
mance has become automatic, and the action itself can be looked upon as 
an 'object'. 
Phase 2: 'attention' focussed on actions as objects. 'Comparing' these 
objects by chaining them. 
Phase 3: 'attention' focussed on the relationship between performance 
and 'action-as-object'. How does changing performance affect the 
resulting 'object'? 
In the first phase of repeatedly performing a certain action, the child focusses 
on motor and performance aspects. When performance has become automatic, in 
other words, when a behavioral 'Gestalt' has been formed, the child may proceed 
to treating the action itself as an 'object-of-attention'. In the second phase of 
chaining different actions, the child starts to manipulate actions 'as if they were 
objects. Chaining may be interpreted as the beginning of a process of comparing 
these objects. In the third phase of varying the chainings from phase 2, the child 
further pursues this process of comparing, in a still more active and rigorous 
way. The child now focusses on the relationship between changing performance-
aspects and the resulting changes in the 'action-as-object'. The result of the cycle 
then is that certain more abstract properties of the actions performed are 
decontextualized and mentally represented. 
The basic cycle in cognitive development: Piaget's sensorimotor 
stages and the development of spontaneous object classification. 
The Basic Operational Cycle, which from now on I will simply call the "basic 
cycle', definitely rings a familiar bell. One immediately thinks 'Where have I 
seen this before?'. At least, that's what I thought when I saw these phases emerge 
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in prelinguistic babbling. Still, it took me quite some time before I realized that 
what in fact I seemed to have rediscovered were the stages of Piaget's sen-
sorimotor period, only this time in babbling development and not in the 
development of the object concept. The reason it took me so long to discover the 
similarity is probably that Piaget's stages are often presented with a strong 
emphasis on the child's apparent intentions. Therefore, one is not inclined to 
focus on the behavioral characteristics of each of his stages. However, if one 
does so the analogy with the basic cycle becomes quite clear. 
I think the basic cycle can be recognized in Piaget's stages 3,4 and 5 (see Table 
3, which is based on Piaget 1952). Stage 3 is the stage of the so-called 'secondary 
circular reactions'. These are repetitions of actions on the environment. Often 
the child seems to produce them in order to 'preserve interesting sights' or 
'prolong interesting experiences'. However, whether the child has some definite 
external goal or not, what one sees her doing in this stage is repeating the same 
action again and again. 
Stage 4 is the stage in which the child starts to combine and co-ordinate the 
secondary circular reactions. If one carefully reads Piaget's observational 
examples on this stage, one may note that this co-ordination of secondary 
schemes mainly takes the behavioral form of successively chaining these 
schemes. The child may do this while exploring a new object, as, for instance, 
when she 'runs through' all her existing schemes in applying them to the object 
successively (as in shaking, rubbing, throwing, etc. a cigarette-case). It may also 
be done in order to solve some external problem, for instance while chaining the 
'lifting-an-object'scheme and the 'reaching-for-an-object' scheme, when lifting a 
cushion in order to reach for a hidden toy. Stage 5 is the stage of the so-called 
'tertiary circular reactions'. These are repetitions of schemes or of co-ordinated 
schemes, with intentional variation. As in the preceding stage, this may be done 
either to explore and experiment, or to solve a problem. An example of the first 
kind of behavior is when the child lets go of a series of objects while varying the 
conditions of their fall. An example of the second kind is when the child 
substitutes 'using a stick' for 'merely using the hand' in the 'reaching for an 
object' scheme. 
Thus, comparing the sensorimotor stages to the apparent developments in 
babbling, we might conclude that in babbling, at last, we see Piagetian 
mechanisms at work within language development itself, instead of outside of 
it.1) We might also conclude that the basic cycle is merely a reflection of these 
Piagetian mechanisms and therefore need not be evoked as a separate construct. 
This last conclusion, however, might not be correct. It might be the other way 
around. The possibility exists that both the babbling-stages and the Piagetian 
stages simply are manifestations of the basic cycle in the sensorimotor period. 
The basic cycle itself might capture the general phases of initial cognitive 
learning, rather than age-specific stages. If so, the cycle should still operate 
when the child has moved beyond the sensorimotor period space.In other words, 
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the basic cycle must be shown to represent an age-independent phase-model and 
not an age-dependent stage-model. In order to answer this question I will now 
offer some examples of the cognitive development and the language development 
of somewhat older children. 
Table 3 Piaget 's sensorimotor stages 
Stage 1: Reflexes (until ±6 weeks). 
Stage 2: Primary circular reactions. Repetitions of action-schemes in-
volving the child's own body, as when bringing the hand before the face 
repeatedly (from ±6 weeks to ±4months). 
Stage 3: Secondary circular reactions. Repetitions of action-schemes on 
the environment. This often seems to be done in order to 'preserve 
interesting sights and experiences', for instance, shaking the feet in order 
to make a puppet move (from ±4 months to ±9 months). 
Stage 4: Combining secondary circular reactions. This combining typi-
cally takes the form of chaining schemes, either in order to explore a 
new object (successively applying all one's schemes to the new object), or 
in order to achieve some external goal (for instance, chaining the 'lifting'-
scheme and the 'reaching'-scheme in lifting a cushion to reach for a partly 
hidden object). Developing distinction between means and goals (from ±9 
to ±12 months). 
Stage 5: Tertiary circular reactions. Repetitions of schemes with inten-
tional variation, either in order to 'experiment' (investigating the rela-
tionship between an action and its effect, as in repeatedly letting go of an 
object while varying the conditions of its fall), or in order to solve some 
external problem (for instance, applying the 'reaching'-scheme while 
using a stick instead of merely the hand) (from ±12 to ±18 months). 
Stage 6: Mental representation, (from ±18 months to ± 24 months). 
In her book 'Children's early thought', Sugarman (1983) reports on the way 
children spontaneously classify objects. She presented her subjects with sets of 8 
objects, drawn evenly from two classes differing in form, for instance, four 
columns and four cylinders. Some sets of objects were designed to encourage 
correspondence construction, by permitting the containment of one class by the 
other, for instance, dolls in rings and spoons in cups. Sugarman was not 
interested in whether children can organize objects in a particular way, but in 
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whether they will do so when left to their own devices. As a consequence, the 
children did not receive any specific instructions, and so their constructions can 
be characterized as entirely spontaneous. 
In Table 4 I present an example which I have constructed from Sugarman's 
data and discussions. The example concerns the development of spontaneously 
making objects contain other objects, in children from 18 months to 3 years. 
Table 4 Spontaneously making objects contain other objects 
Based on: Sugarman, S. (1983) 
1. At 18 months: Separate, repetitive schemes. (Sugarman: 'simple 
iteration') Children possess two schemes, a containing scheme and a 
grouping scheme. While applying the containing scheme the child may 
repeatedly put the same doll in the same ring, or successively put several 
dolls in the same ring. While applying the grouping scheme, the child may 
start placing a ring (or doll), then look for another ring (c.q. doll) and place 
it near the first one, and so on. Attention seems focussed on the action itself. 
Also, there is no obvious relationship between the two schemes. 
2. At 24 months: Chaining schemes. (Sugarman: 'successive iteration') The child 
first applies the containing scheme and then the grouping scheme, or vice versa 
(i.e. first putting each doll in a different ring and then moving these new units 
together, or first placing together all rings and subsequently putting in all dolls). 
Attention seems focussed on (re)producing a particular combination, but 
procedure is rigid. Schemes always are successive and cannot be applied flexibly. 
3. At 30-36 months: Varying schemes. (Sugarman: 'co-ordinated iteration') The 
child may alternately apply the two schemes, or may reverse a scheme (e.g. put a 
ring around a doll instead of a doll in a ring). For instance, first put doll 1 in ring 
1, then doll 2 in ring 2, then move these units together, then place rings 3 and 4 
near these units, then finally put in dolls 3 and 4. 
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At 18 months, children already have a 'containing' scheme. This simply means 
that they may spontaneously put things into other things, for instance, a doll into 
a ring. At this age, however, they seem to focus on the act of containing itself. 
For instance, the child does not put the four different dolls into the four different 
rings, but puts several dolls into the same ring subsequently. Or she repeatedly 
moves the same doll into and out of the same ring. Also at 18 months, children 
possess a second scheme which may be called a 'grouping' scheme. They may 
search repeatedly for something that is like something else. For instance, they 
may start placing a ring, then look for another ring and place it near the first one, 
and so on. At this age, however, there is no obvious relationship between the 
containing scheme on the one hand and the grouping scheme on the other. 
At 24 months, children start chaining the containment and grouping schemes. 
Also, the containment scheme itself has evolved; children now successively put 
different dolls in different rings, and so seem to focus on reproducing a 
particular effect rather than a particular action. But after doing this, children 
typically 'group' the doll-in-ring units by moving them together. The reverse 
order of schemes may also occur. The child may group together the four rings, 
for instance, and then put in the dolls one at a time. Characteristic for this phase, 
however, is that the two schemes always follow one another in time and cannot be 
applied in a flexible and adaptive way. 
At 30 to 36 months, children start varying schemes. This 'varying' may take 
two different forms: reversing a scheme, or alternately applying two schemes. 
Children sometimes now put a ring around a doll, instead of always putting a 
doll in a ring. And they may flexibly co-ordinate the containment and grouping 
schemes in various ways: for instance by first putting doll 1 in ring 1, then doll 2 
in ring 2, then moving these units together, then placing ring 3 and 4 near these 
units, then finally putting in doll 3 and 4. 
In this development of spontaneous classificatory behavior we see the 
characteristics of the basic cycle reappear: first there is independent production 
and repetition of different schemes, then the schemes are successively chained, 
and finally the schemes and their way of chaining are varied. But note that in this 
case the basic cycle extends well beyond the sensorimotor period. 
The basic cycle in language development: the emergence of three-
word sentences 
If the basic cycle is not restricted to the sensorimotor period and if it indeed plays 
a role in both cognitive and language development, then it should also be 
identifiable in the development of sentence production, which generally starts 
after the second birthday, i.e. after the sensorimotor period. Here I come to the 
main part of my paper, in which I will present some new data. These data are 
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taken from a diary-study of the sentence-development of my youngest son, Tim. 
I will present an overview of his earliest three-word sentences. 
Tim acquired his language, which is Dutch, in a slow but almost 'classical' way, 
moving slowly but steadily from single-word utterances, to two-word utterances, 
to three-word utterances, and so on. He imitated relatively little and also made 
relatively little use of rote expressions. The sentences to be presented were 
produced between the ages of 2 years, 3 months and 30 days and 2 years, 7 
months and 10 days. On this last day, his Mean Length of Utterance still was 
about 1.50, which means that he still was in Brown's Stage I (Brown 1973). 
I used to be near Tim for three whole days a week. On the other days I saw him 
at breakfast, dinner and bed-time. In my diary I not only noted each three-word 
utterance and its referential context, but also, if there had been any, the 
immediately preceding child-utterance. Completely imitative sentences and rote 
expressions were excluded from analysis. So the sentences to be presented are all 
more or less 'creative'. It should be kept in mind that the three-word sentences to 
be presented all represent exceptional occurrences, since at the end of the period 
there was still a predominance of single-word utterances. 
In classifying the data I distinguish between three main categories of three-
word sentences: Buildups, Substitutions, and Independent Sentences. 'Build-
ups' are three-word sentences that completely incorporate an immediately 
preceding child-utterance. For instance: Hat on/ Loekie hat on/. 'Substitutions' 
are three-word sentences that result from changing a word in an immediately 
preceding three-word sentence. For instance: Loekie hat on / Tim hat on/. 
'Independent sentences' are three-word sentences that are not preceded by some 
related child-utterance. 
With the basic cycle in mind we may expect the following developmental 
order. The first phase of the cycle would consist of producing two-word 
utterances and repeating them. The second phase would consist of producing 
three-word utterances through Buildups, since Buildups represent repetition 
with chaining. The third phase would consist of producing Substitutions, since 
Substitutions represent repetition with variation. 
This general expectation was bome out. Tim began producing two-word sen-
tences at age 2.1 and three-word sentences at age 2.4. In the three-word sentences 
Buildups appeared before Substitutions. However, the most remarkable thing 
was that this last order occurred twice, first for the sentence-initial and later for 
the sentence-final position. Therefore, I have divided the whole period in five 
rather than three (sub)periods. The first period starts with the occurrence of the 
first three-word sentence. The subsequent periods each start on the day that a new 
kind of operation occurs for the first time. The sentences, translated and 
chronologically numbered, are presented in the tables 5 to 9. 
Table 5, which presents the sentences of the first period (Period I), shows that 
the start of three-word sentences was very slow indeed. Period I is 55 days long, 
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but yields only 20 three-word sentences. Most of these are produced as Buildups. 
All these Buildups result from prefixing a repetition of the preceding utterance 
with a new word. Half of the sentences have, from the adult point of view, a 
similar surface-pattern: 'P + X + R'. Here 'P' stands for 'Person-name', 'X' is a 
variable that may be filled in by any type of word, and 'R' denotes a 'Relational 
word'. 'Relational words' are broadly defined as all those words that do not 
refer to objects in the world. In Tables 5 to 9, all sentences that manifest the 
pattern 'P + X + R ' are marked by an asterisk. 
In period I, there is no reason to assume that the pattern 'P + X + R' is in any 
way 'intended' by the child. Person-names may simply be highly accessible 
words and so may have a high probability of being used as prefixes in Buildups. 
Furthermore, in his two-word utterances the child had already demonstrated a 
strong tendency to put Relational words at the end of sentences. Thus, three-word 
sentences of the form 'P + X + R' may, in this period, be frequent Ъу accident' 
and not 'by rule'. As to the semantic roles performed by 'P' in this pattern, 
interpretive analysis reveals that they are rather variable in Period I. Sentence 2, 
'Piet Loekie to', was produced while the child was walking with his father. Piet, 
towards me. This sentence allows for at least two interpretations, either 'I'm 
going with Piet to Loekie', in which case 'P' is a Comitative, or 'Piet is going to 
Loekie', in which case 'P' refers to the Agent. Sentence 13, 'Piet hair brush', 
was produced while the child was brushing Piet's hair. In this case, 'P' refers to 
the Possessor of the object brushed. If, in Tables 5 to 9, the semantic role of 'P' 
is not explicitly indicated between brackets, it should be taken to be that of Agent 
or Experiencer. 
Table 5 Period 1; 2:3,30 — 2:5¿6 (55 days) 
Two categories: Independent sentences and Buildups prefix 
Independent sentences Buildups prefix 
1. Cold hand Loekie/ 4. Hat on/Loekie hat on/ * 
2. Piet Loekie to/ * (Ag./Com.) 5. Book read/ Fine book read/ 
3. Doortje and Thijsje/ 6. Porridge eat/ Come porridge 
eat/ 
13. Piet hair brush/* (Poss.) 7. Pacifier now?/ Also pacifier 
now?/ 
15. Loekie coat on/ * 8. Bread eat/Also bread eat/ 
9. Bread eat/ Loekie bread eat/* (?) 
10. Bus been/ Tim bus been/ * 
(continued) 
11. Tim garden/ Loekie Tim 
garden/ 
12. Pacifier/ Also Loekie pacifier/ 
20 sentences, 10 of which have the sur- 14. Thijsje been/ Adrian Thijsje 
face-appearance 'P+X+R' (*). In 5 of been/ * (Com.) 
these'P'functions as Agent/Experien- 16. Window/ Look then window/ 
cer, 1 is uninterpretable, 1 has two possi- 17. Can noXjAlso can not/ 
bilities, and in 3 'P' plays other roles 18. Coat on/ Tim coat on/ * 
(Possessor, Comitative). 19. Fire spray/ Tim fire spray/ * 
20. Train 'm/Loekie train in/ * 
(Com.) 
In summary: in the first period, three-word sentences are produced by building 
on two-word sentences. This takes the form of prefixing exclusively. The most 
frequent surface-pattern has the form 'P + X + R', but the child need not yet be 
aware of this pattern. In sentences of this type 'P' may perform a variety of 
semantic roles. 
Period Π (see Table 6) is taken to start on the day that a new category of three-
word sentences is produced for the first time. This new category involves 
substituting into the first word of three-word sentences, and therefore is called 
Substitutions Prefix. 
The very first Substitution is sentence 24. First the child produced the com­
pletely imitative utterance 'Piet floor sit', to which he added 'Tim floor sit'. 
Sentences 28 and 34 are substitutions into independently produced sentences. All 
substitutions involve the sentence-initial position. Period Π lasts 19 days and 
yields 16 three-word sentences. The remarkable thing about this period is that the 
child now seems to concentrate almost exclusively on the surface-pattern 'P + X 
+ R'. So the emergence of Substitutions Prefix seems to coincide with a 
temporary output-restriction at the surface-level. At the level of semantic roles, 
however, the variety is still pretty large. For instance, in sentence 33, 'Loekie lap 
sit', 'P' performs the role of Possessor, whereas in sentence 34, Tim lap sit', 'P' 
refers to the Agent. And sentence 26, 'Tim record play', was produced as a 
request to play a record for him, so here 'P' plays the Benefactive role. 
Table 6 Period II; 2:5,27— 2:6,15 (19 days) 
Three categories: Independent sentences. Buildups prefix, and 
Substitutions prefix 
New: Substitutions prefix Independent sentences 
(continued) 
24. 
(Piet floor sit) (Im.) 
Tim floor sit/ * 
27. Piet poo-poo done/ * (?) 
28. Loekie poo-poo done/ * (?) 
33. Loekie lap sit/* (Poss.) 
34. Tim lap sit/ * 
21. Tim car been/* 
25. Tim pee do/* 
29. Tim tosti make/* (Ben.) 
35. Do outside to/ 
36. Tim burp do/* 
Buildups prefix 
22. Cake eat/P/er cake eat/* 
(Ag./Com.) 
23. Violin play/Tim violin play/* 
(Ag./Ben.) 
26. Record play/Tim record play/ * 
(Ben.) 
30. Dicky Dick/Tïm Dicky Dick/ 
31. Door dost/Tim door close/ * 
32. Rush do/Tim flush do/ * 
16 sentences, 14 of which have the sur-
face-appearance 'P+X+R' (*). In 7 of 
these 'P' functions as Agent/Experien-
cer, 2 are uninterpretable, in 2 there are 
two possibilities, and in 3 'P' plays 
other roles (Possessor, Benefactive). 
So far it looks like we have been witnessing a first 'run' of the basic cycle, one 
that was completely concerned with the sentence-initial position. Now Period HI 
(see Table 7) starts with the production of a new kind of Buildup, namely Build-
up Suffix. Here, the child builds on a preceding two-word sentence, not by 
adding a first word, but by adding a last word. 
Table 7 Period III; 2:6,16— 2:7,2 (17 days) 
Four categories: Independent sentences. Buildups prefix, Substitutions 
prefix, and Buildups suffix 
New: Buildups suffix 
37. Boat play/Boat play later/ 
46. Can not/Can not open make/ 
49. Loekie paste/ Loekie paste do/ * 
58. Other record/ Other record play/ 
65. Other pacifier/ Other pacifier gone/ 
Independent sentences 
40. Tim t.v. watch/ * 
54. Tim yoghurt drink/ * 
61. Trudy house to/ * (Poss.) 
62. Tim lock by/* 
64. Tim bicycling done/* 
(continued) 
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68. That side/ That side door/ 67. Piet also dress/ * 
69. Bye fence/ Bye fence doorl 70. That book read/ 
73. Can not/ Can not together/ 71. Piet ladder in/ * (Obj.) 
74. Tim lock/ Tim lock fry/ * 72. Not poo-poo done/ 
75. Thomas bath/ Thomas bath in/* 76. Tim can not/* 
(Com.) 
77. Thomas doctor/ Thomas doctor naked belly/ 
Buildups prefix Substitutions prefix 
38. (Boat play later)/ Tim boat play/ * 41. Loekie lap sit/* (Poss.) 
39. Belly/ For me belly/ 42. Piet lap sit/ * (Poss.) 
43. Naked belly/ Tim naked belly/ 
44. Thijsje school/ Gone Thijsje school/ (Gone Thijsje school) 
46. Nice say/ Piet nice say/ * (?) 45. Not Thijsje school/ 
50. Hair dry/ Tim hair dry/ * 
55. Boat in/ 77m boat in/* (Piet nice say) 
57. House play/ Thomas house play/ * 47. Loeide nice say/ * (?) 
63. Broken/ Tim done broken/ * 48. Tim nice say/ * 
66. Kiss give/ P/ei kiss give/ * (I.O.D.) 
95. Doctor play/ Once more doctor play/ 51. Tim car to/ * 
52. Piet car to/* 
53. Loekie car to/ * 
59. Other record play/ 
60. Dance record play/. 
42 sentences, of which 25 have the surface-appearance 'P+X+R'. In 16 of these 'P' 
functions as Agent/Experiencer, 3 are uninterpretable, and in 6 P' plays other 
roles (Comitative, Indirect Object Dative, Possessor, Object). 
A further remarkable thing about this period is that there seems to be a general 
increase in the production of three-word sentences; 42 sentences are produced 
over 17 days, whereas in the preceding period there were 16 over 19 days. Apart 
from this, little seems to change; 'P + X + R' is still the dominant surface-pattem 
and the 'P' in this pattern may still take variable semantic roles. For instance, 
sentence 71, 'Piet ladder in' should be interpreted as 'Piet is a ladder which I'm 
climbing'. Here 'P' is an Object. And sentence 75, Thomas bath in', should be 
interpreted as 'I want to go into the bath with Thomas'. Here, 'P' is a Comi-
tative. Note, finally, that among the Buildup Suffix sentences there are three that 
conform to the pattern 'P + X + R'. These are sentences 49, 74, and 75. So the 
child now seems to be able to produce his dominant pattern while 'starting from a 
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different direction'. 
It will not come as a surprise that the next stage. Period Г , is heralded by the 
appearance of Substitutions Suffix, as is evident from Table 8. 
Table 8 Period IV; 2:7,3 — 2:7,6 (4 days) 
Four categories: Independent sentences. Buildups prefix, 
Buildups suffix, and Substitutions suffix 
New: Substitutions suffix 
82. Tim photo have/* 
83. Tim photo look! * 
84. Tim pacifier seek/ * 
85. Tim pacifier seek fetch/ * 
86. Tim pacifier fetch/ * 
Independent sentences 
78. Loekie book read/ * 
79. Tim book read/* 
88. Tim shirt fetch/* 
89. Loekie you fire/ 
91. Tim chocolate have/* 
92. Tim porridge eat/ * 
93. Tim icecream eaten/ * 
94. Together bath in/ 
Buildups prefix 
81. Naked belly/ Fat naked belly/ 
93. Eat/ Bert Ernie eat/* 
Buildups suffix 
80. Lap sit/ Lap sit readl 
87. Car see/ Car see gone/ 
90. Tim bicycle/ Tim bicycle outside! * 
18 sentences, of which 13 have the surface appearance of 'P+X+R'. In all 13 'P' 
functions as Agent/Experiencer. 
In sentences 82 and 83, 'Tim photo have' followed by 'Tim photo look', a 
sentence-final word is varied for the first time. Period Г is relatively short; only 
four days elapse between the appearance of Substitutions Suffix and the 
emergence of yet another new production-category. However, it may be noted 
that during this second 'run' of the basic cycle, which is concentrated on the 
sentence-/mo/ position, Substitutions again seem to coincide with a certain 
output-restriction, but this time at the level of semantic roles and not at that of 
surface-patterns. In period IV, the surface-pattern 'P + X + R' is still the 
dominant one, but now it is also the case that in all sentences conforming to this 
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pattern, 'Ρ' functions only as Agent/Experiencer. There are no more Comi-
tatives, Benefactives, etc. Also, it seems that i/the child wants to express other 
semantic roles he chooses different surface-patterns for doing so. For instance, 
sentence 94, 'Together bath in' expresses exactly the same wish as sentence 75, 
'Thomas bath in', from the preceding period, namely that he wanted to go into 
the bath with Thomas (Comitative). Only now the child apparently prefers not 
to use a Person-name in first position for expressing this wish. 
Four days after the first production of Substitutions Suffix a new kind of 
Buildup was produced. At the time, it took me by surprise, but, in retrospect, its 
appearance seems to be quite logical. The new type of Buildup consists of adding 
a prefix as well as a suffix. See for instance sentence 97, in Table 9, where the 
child first produces 'Small button' and then adds 'Also' as a prefix and 'that' as a 
suffix. 
This last period, like the preceding Period Г , presents the output of four days. 
We may note that during these last four days the predominant surface-pattern 
still remains 'P + X + R': 20 of the 36 sentences have this pattern. In all these 20 
sentences 'P' plays the semantic role of Agent/Experiencer, just as in the previous 
period. Moreover, when I checked the first hundred 'P + X + R' sentences that 
were produced during the following month, I noticed that in only one of them did 
'P' not perform this role. So the tendency to restrict 'P' to the role of 
Agent/Experiencer in this type of sentence seems to remain strong for quite some 
time. 
Table 9 Period V; 2:7,7 — 2:7,10 (4 days) 
Five categories: Independent sentences. Buildups prefix, 
Buildups suffix. Substitutions prefix, and 
Buildups pre- and suffix 
New: Buildups pre- and suffix 
97. Small button/ Also small button that/ 
99. Pistol/ Also pistol have/ 
Buildups prefix 
98. Me bread/ For me bread/ 
101 Doctor play/ Tim doctor play / * 
117. Chew swallow/ Loekie chew 
Independent sentences 
95. Piet grapejuice fetch/ * 
96. Not book read/ 
100. Tim large spoon/ 
103. Tim doctor been/ * 
105. Tim cake eaten/ * 
106. Piet naked belly/ 
107. Thomas doctor play/ * 
109. Tim also look?/* 
110. Tim also spray/ * 
(continued) 
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swallow/ * 
121. Hairdresser been/ Tim hairdresser 
been/* 
Buildups suffix 
104. Tim train/ Tim train been/ * 
108. Naked feet/ Naked feet outside/ 
111. Tim birthday/ Tim birthday had/ * 
121. Piet/ Piet here stay/ * 
124. Other poo-poo/ Other poo-poo done/ 
119. Ant/ Ant near the apple/ 
Substitutions prefix 
(Tim doctor play) 
102. Piet doctor play/* 
(Other poo-poo done). 
[M: 'Have you again poo-pooed?'] 
125. Again poo-poo done/ 
36 sentences, of which 20 have the surface-appearance 'P+X+R'. In all 20 'P' 
functions as Agent/Experiencer. 
Looking back at the five periods discussed, it seems that the child has applied 
the basic cycle twice, once to the sentence-initial position and once to the 
sentence-final position. Now, of course, the question arises: What exactly is the 
child learning from his own output in this way?'. Sceptics might remark that he 
seems to be learning nothing at all; the pattern 'P + X + R' that is dominant in the 
last period, already was so in the first period. And the Agent/Experiencer role 
performed by 'P' in this pattern is the most frequently performed role in every 
period. Still, I firmly believe that the remarkable developmental regularities that 
I have just reviewed are not there for nothing. I think they reflect the child's 
active reaching towards a progressively deeper and more abstract understanding 
of what he was already doing more or less accidentally. I think they reflect the 
gradual extraction of knowledge implicit in the output. Therefore, I will finally 
present a tentative interpretation of what might have been happening at the 
mental level during the two successive applications of the basic cycle. 
My starting point is that children's early mental representations are, what 
Katherine Nelson (1982, 1983, 1983a) calls, event representations. These are 
representations of complete events, including the persons, objects, and actions 
that play a role in them, and the relations existing between these. Thus, at a cog-
l i 2. Tim photo make/* 
113. Big chair Tim/ 
114. Tim bed to/* 
115 Tim hair comb/ * 
116. Tim hairdresser go/ * 
118. Not custard eat/ 
120. Not mouth clean/ 
122. Ria bus in/* 
123. Child Loekie to/* 
126. Loekie cat draw/ * 
127. Nice flower that/ 
128. Also tosti eat?/ 
129. Also park been/ 
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nitive level, the young child may possess categories like 'Person', 'Action', 
Object', and may also have knowledge of their relational roles, such as 'Agent', 
'Benefactive' and so on. However, there may be a considerable time lag between 
acquiring these notions at the cognitive level and acquiring knowledge of how 
they are linguistically expressed. Howe (1981:451) argues that 'children do not 
discover that language encodes semantic roles until some time after their first 
word combinations'. If she is right, then the period of the first three-word 
sentences might be a likely one for such a discovery-process to get started. 
I will now offer some speculations about what Tim might have been dis­
covering during the periods discussed. First, the child produces two-word 
utterances. At the mental level this means that he is expressing the fact that two 
parts of his 'event representation' are associated. The role character of this asso­
ciation may be clear to him, but he probably does not yet intend to differentiate 
roles linguistically. 
Second, the child expands his two-word sentences by prefixing them with a 
highly accessible word that names an as yet unnamed part of the event repre­
sentation. Since his own name and the names of family-members and friends 
happen to be highly accessible, the prefixed word often will be a Person-name. 
And since his two-word utterances are biased towards ending in a Relational 
word, a pattern emerges: Ρ + X + R. This pattern, however, need not yet be 
recognized as a pattern by the child. The sentences produced still may be isolated, 
individual occurrences. 
Third, the child may gradually note that there seems to be 'something similar' 
about the way these individual utterances begin. He starts varying the Person-
prefixes. In doing so, he abstracts the notion that there may be a slot for filling 
in Person-names, which is tied to the sentence-initial position. This results in a 
temporary concentration on producing sentences of this type. 
Fourth, the child then turns his attention to sentence-endings as well. He starts 
suffixing two-word sentences with words that, generally, fit some relational 
aspect of his event representations. Most of these words refer to actions or ex­
periences, but the child need not yet be explicitly aware of this. He may note, 
however, that among the three-word sentences that result from this new pro­
cedure, there are again some that have the Person-slot in the first position. 
Fifth, the child then starts varying the final words of sentences that have 
sentence-initial slots for Person-names. In doing so, he abstracts the notion that 
such sentences may also contain slots for filling in relational words that refer to 
some action or experience which is performed/experienced by the person filling 
the Person-slot. In this way, the sentence-initial slot for filling in Person-names 
gradually becomes associated with the semantic role of Agent/Experiencer. 
There is also another possibility. Maybe, now that the child begins to recognize 
the patterns in his own output, it may also become easier for him to recognize 
these patterns in the adult input and to notice that sentence-initial Person-names 
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tend to refer to Agents/Experiencers. 
According to linguists, Dutch is a SOV language. In the tentative analysis just 
presented, the child seems to be heading towards establishing this. However, at 
the end of the two cycles discussed, he still has a very long way to go. He does not 
yet seem to have developed syntactic categories like 'Subject' or 'Verb', but he 
does seem to have progressed towards the realization that language encodes 
semantic roles, and to have foimed some first ideas about how certain roles may 
be linguistically marked.2) 
On 'chaining' 
At this point we may well pause and ask what, in fact, is new about the Basic 
Operational Cycle. For it is a truism of developmental psychology that children 
move from the concrete to the abstract, from the particular to the general, from 
the isolated to the integrated, and so on. In a sense, the 'varying' phase of the 
basic cycle may be considered to represent 'generalization', which is a con-
ventional and classic (albeit rather vague) notion in psychology. However, what 
has not been conventionally noticed is the fact that 'generalization' often seems to 
be preceded by 'serialization' (or 'chaining', 'sequencing', 'concatenation' or 
whatever term is preferred). So I think an important innovative aspect of the 
basic cycle is the claim that children, in spontaneously passing from the 
particular to the general, move through a phase of 'chaining the particulars'. 
Why this should be so is a question that cannot be satisfactorily dealt with in the 
present paper.3) Here, I concentrate on further demonstrating the ubiquity of 
'chaining' by reviewing some additional studies which show that this process 
occurs spontaneously in various areas of linguistic development. I will briefly 
consider the development of reference, that of producing single-word utterances, 
that of analyzing holistic expressions or 'formulas' (in first as well as second 
language learning), and, last but not least, that of language evolution itself. 
As to the development of reference, Bates (1979) has shown that children 
initially tend to produce a word as a procedure, or as part of a routine or game. 
In the end, they are capable of using these words to categorize new persons, 
objects or events. In between, however, they pass through a stage of 'temporal 
decontextualization', during which they use a word 'to anticipate or remember 
the scheme with which it is typically associated' (Bates 1979: 175/176). For 
instance, a child may produce the word 'bye', no longer only as a component of 
a telephoning game, but also before starting to play with the telephone or after 
having done so. In this way, the word and its associated actions are temporally 
chained. This typically occurs before the word is generalized to other contexts. 
Bloom (1973) studied her daughter Allison's period of producing single-word 
utterances. At first, 'single words occurred in speech events that, for the most 
part, included only a single utterance that was often repeated several times' (op. 
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cit. 39). Later, the child began producing different single-word utterances within 
the same event. 'Essentially, such successive single-word utterances represented a 
'chaining' of utterances, each of which was somehow occasioned by a shift in 
context, as Allison noticed, remembered or did something 'new'. Such utterances 
were temporally chained and were related to one another' (op. cit. 48). An 
example is (op. cit. 47): 
(A reaching under chair, cow/cow/cow/ 
picking up cow) 
(A trying to put cow on chair/chair/ 
chair on hind legs) 
What's that? 
(A giving cow to M to help) Mama/ 
It is striking that in Allison's later speech samples (especially in the third, 'pre-
syntax' sample) chainings such as these no longer occur mainly over the 
component actions of an event, but also frequently occur within a component 
action itself, for instance (op. cit. 210): 
(A reaching for a diaper) clean/dirty/diaper/ 
When the child has arrived at this stage of development, it seems to become a 
matter of taste whether one should speak of 'chained' or of 'varied' successive 
single-word utterances. 
Johnson (1983) investigated the development of 'what'-questions. She found 
that children initially produce holistic, unanalyzed 'formulas' such as 'What's 
this?' and 'What's that?'. Finally, children analyze these formulas and succeed in 
differentiating the question-word itself. In between, however, they typically 
produce chainings of a formula and some other word(s), for instance 'What's that 
one here?', 'What's this thing?', 'What's that called?' etc. The same phenomenon 
has been noticed for second-language learning by Wong Fillmore (1979, as cited 
in Peters 1983). One of her subjects, the girl Nora, had acquired the unanalyzed 
unit 'How-do-you-do-these?'. After a few months the girl began chaining this 
unit with a noun phrase or prepositional phrase, producing, for example, 'How 
do you do these in English?'. It was only after this chaining phase that she began 
segmenting the formula, finally producing sentences like 'How do cut is?' and 
'How will take off paste?'.4) 
Up till now the 'chaining' examples were from different areas of language 
acquisition. I will finish with presenting an example from language evolution. 
In his fascinating book 'Roots of Language', Bickerton (1981) argues that it is a 
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mistake to believe that all existing languages are at the same level of de-
velopment. Some languages, i.e. creóles 5), may be considered to be in an 'early' 
stage of development. In evolution, language did not 'spring up' but evolved in 
steps, and creole languages probably reflect characteristics of the earlier 
evolutionary steps. Now a characteristic that is mostly absent in 'full-grown' 
languages, but is often found in creóles, is that of verb serialization. 'Verb 
serialization' refers to the phenomenon that case roles are not marked 
grammatically, for instance through prepositions (as in 'John gave the book to 
Harry'), but by serializing verbs. For example, in Sranan one has the sentence 
'Meri tek watra gi den plantjes' (Mary takes water give the plants), and in (old) 
Hawaiian creole 'Dei wan get naif pok yu' (They want get knife stab you, i.e. 
'They want to stab you with a knife'). In such sentences a 'two case roles per 
verb' restriction is preserved, but more than two case roles are expressed 
through the chaining of the verbs. Bickerton argues that '(..) verb serialization 
(..) represents the only plausible means by which early language could have 
broken out of single-clause structure' (op. cit. 274), in making available 'struc-
tures more complex than had existed hitherto — structures that added the 
possibility of NVNVN to the previous NV and NVN structures' (op. cit. 277). In 
Sranan there apparently is a development 'from an original state in which 
presumably all serial verbs were full verbs in tensed sentences, to a stage in 
which these verbs are beginning to be reduced to mere prepositions' (op. cit. 
130). Bickerton illustrates this by showing that for some Sranan speakers 'gi' in 
'Meri tek watra gi den plantjes' still seems to function as a full verb, whereas for 
others it already seems to function as a preposition. Observations and conjectures 
such as these add support to the contention that 'chaining' constitutes an im-
portant kind of transitional phase in both phylogenesis and ontogenesis of 
language. 
Discussion 
Now, finally, I return to the general concept of the Basic Operational Cycle. I 
have argued for its existence in sentence development, where its primary func-
tion seems to be that of actively deriving abstract categories from one's own 
output repertoire. I have argued that it seems to be a quite general cycle that 
may be found in cognitive development as well as in language development. I 
have also argued that there is no reason to believe that the basic cycle is 
restricted to certain age periods only, and I have hinted at several areas of langu-
age development where (parts of) the basic cycle can be recognized. However, I 
am deeply aware that what I have presented is suggestive rather than conclusive. 
But I think it is suggestive in a non-trivial way. 
Developmental psycholinguistics has progressed from being almost completely 
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syntax-oriented towards including semantic and pragmatic orientations as well. 
Still, the categories used for classifying children's language output have always 
remained primarily linguistic. They are categories for characterizing compe-
tence, not performance. The basic cycle now, may provide for true perfor-
mance categories. Thus, it adds to the contribution that psychology, as a science 
of behavior, can make to developmental psycholinguistics. This might prove to 
be helpful in solving some long-standing problems. 
I will conclude with some final suggestions about the kind of long-standing 
problems in which a consideration of the basic cycle might be useful. There is, 
for instance, the problem of developing an appropriate framework for inte-
grating the many and various factors that play a role in language acquisition. 
Although the general paradigm of 'the active, hypotheses-testing child' is 
dominant in the field, this paradigm has never been satisfactorily implemented. 
In fact, most effort seems to have gone into elaborating the 'passive' rather than 
the active aspects of language development, for instance: 'innate' linguistic 
knowledge (Chomsky 1965, 1972, 1975), the typical structure of the linguistic 
input to the child (Snow and Ferguson 1977), and the role of social context 
(Bruner 1975, Ninio and Bruner 1978). However, these 'passive' aspects can 
only be brought to bear on each other in an interesting way if we also have some 
view on their 'meeting point', i.e. on the child and its own active contribution to 
the general processes of acquiring knowledge. The basic cycle represents at least 
the beginning of such a view. Thus, it provides for the possibility of asking the 
questions of linguistic 'nature and nurture' in a more differentiated way, i.e. for 
each phase of the cycle, for each domain where it can be shown to be operating. 
For example, it has always remained a mystery why children sometimes 
stubbornly refuse to correct their own 'errors', whereas at other times they do 
correct them spontaneously. Now, in sentence 125, in Table 9, it can be seen that 
the child corrects part of his utterance, while not correcting some other part. The 
child first says 'Other poo-poo done'. The mother then exclaims 'Have you 
again poo-pooed?', after which the child says 'Again poo-poo done'. So he 
changes 'Other' but he does not change 'done'. I think this may be because, in the 
course of applying the basic cycle, the child has already trained himself in 
substituting words into his own output, but has not yet trained himself in 
substituting syntactic morphemes. This suggests that the basic cycle interacts with 
'nurture' in that it plays a role in determining what children will select or ignore 
when they imitate adult input. Conceivably, interactions with 'nature' (i.e. 
'innate' constraints, whether specifically linguistic or of a general cognitive cha-
racter) can, in principle, also be identified. 
Another kind of long-standing problem is that of 'impaired' or 'disordered' 
development. There are children whose cognitive development is more or less 
normal, but who are specifically impaired in their language development. The 
reverse phenomenon also exists. As Cromer (1987) shows, there also exist 
children whose language development is more or less normal, but who are 
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severely impaired in their cognitive development. This raises the question of 
whether children might be selectively disturbed in their application of their basic 
cycle; some children having difficulty applying it to linguistic material, others in 
applying it to non-linguistic material. Also, it is still a point of debate whether the 
language that is produced by children with specific language impairment should 
be characterized as mainly 'delayed' or rather as truly 'different in kind'. This 
raises the question of whether we might also distinguish between a merely 'de­
layed' and a truly 'different' way of applying the basic cycle. 
These would certainly be interesting possibilities to explore. However, in order 
to do this we need some kind of norms. We know by now what the typical 
linguistic structures are for a child of a given age. But we do not yet know, for a 
child of a given age, what typical actions to expect on these structures in per­
formance. 
So this paper ends in a rather conventional way; with the general conclusion 
that there is still a lot to be done. If, in the years to come, we start paying more 
attention to the operations which are implied by the way child-utterances are 
related in actual performance, then, I think, we will not only become more and 
more convinced that children 'actively create' their own language development, 
but we will also leam more and more about how they do this. 
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Notes 
1) Several programs of research investigate the relations between achievements in language 
development and achievements in (Piagetian) sensorimotor development (Bates 1979, Corrigan 
1979, McCune-Nicolich 1981). In these studies, however, researchers are looking for the 
cognitive correlates of or prerequisites for language development, i.e. they are looking for 
similarities of structure or content rather than process or mechanism. In the present paper the 
emphasis is on process analogies. 
2. In the preceding analysis, interpretations were based on the order of appearance of Buildups 
and Substitutions in three-word sentences. Frequency of occurrence was not taken into account, 
nor was attention paid to Buildups and Substitutions in the other sentences of that same period. 
Kuczaj (1983) provides, among other things, data on the overall frequency of Buildups and 
Substitutions in children's bed-time monologues ('crib speech'). If one looks at the data of 
Kuczaj's subjects C, Η, К and N (who were sampled over at least five months), one may note 
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that Buildups reach their highest relative frequencies in earlier speech samples than do 
Substitutions. 
3. In the Introduction I suggested that 'chaining' represents the beginning of a process of 
'comparing'. Children have to develop their 'timeless' concepts on the basis of 
actions/experiences that do occur in real time. So eventually they have to 'get rid' of the 
temporal element. Apparently, this cannot be done in one step, but requires a transitional phase 
during which the temporal element is more or less intentionally 'controlled'. A thorough 
discussion of this would seem to imply considering such topics as the role of 'contiguity' 
versus 'similarity' in development, the development of 'syntagmatic' versus 'paradigmatic' 
relations, 'analytic' versus 'synthetic' processing, 'levels of awareness', etc. 
4) Peters (1983:111) remarks that 'we need to do more psycholinguistic research to determine 
at what point in its learning a unit is most segmentable'. The answer suggested by the basic 
cycle would be: 'After it has been used in chaining'. 
5) Creoles are languages that are developed by the children of parents who speak a 'pidgin'. A 
pidgin is an auxiliary contact-language which is evolved by speakers of different native tongues 
in order to be able to communicate with each other. According to Bickerton 'the term 'creole' is 
used to refer to any language which was once a pidgin and which subsequently became a native 
language' (Bickerton 1981:2). 
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ABSTRACT 
Language has two mechanisms for creating new names from old words ; 
combining morphemes and changing word meaning. Word compounds 
are clear cases of 'combining', metaphors of 'changing'. A categorial 
framework for relating compounds and metaphors is presented and used 
in discussing aspects of their development, COMPELLED and PREFERRED 
compounds and metaphors are distinguished. Preferred compounds 
tend to serve the function of being conceptually precise, whereas 
preferred metaphors tend to serve 'suggestive' functions. Metaphoric 
compounds, which may integrate both functions, seem to be charac-
teristic of middle childhood. Metaphors then may also acquire a 
language-learning function. It is suggested that the so-called literal stage 
does not exist, but that the forms and functions of metaphor change in 
the course of development. 
INTRODUCTION 
'The usual method of creating a new name is to use words or morphemes 
already in the language; either by expanding the semantic range of some 
word or by recombining morphemes' (Brown 1958: 139). This quotation 
from Brown leads directly to the general question addressed by the present 
article: if there are two essentially different ways of creating novel word 
meanings, do they show an interrelated development, and if so, in what way? 
Some answers to this question will be suggested by considering what seem to 
be the clearest cases of expanding (i.e. changing) word meaning and 
recombining morphemes in development: children's novel metaphors and 
[*] I am grateful to Willem Levelt for his stimulating comments, and to my colleagues in the 
department for their discussion of a previous version of this paper. My special thanks go 
to let van Bekkum for her help, first in (metaphorically) tearing the paper apart, later in 
(literally) putting the pieces together, and to Frank Wijnen for his help in sharpening the 
Introduction Address for correspondence: Loekie Eibers, Rijksuniversiteit Utrecht, 
Vakgroep Psychonomie, Postbus 80-140, 3508 TC Utrecht, The Netherlands. 
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novel compounds. When a word is used metaphorically, one or more of its 
defining semantic features are changed. For example, when Romeo describes 
Juliet as 'the sun', he is expanding this word's referential domain by 
changing its defining feature ' —human '. In a compound however, there is no 
changing of features, but a combining of lexical morphemes (for instance: 
tea-strainer, bodyguard). 
Since children's metaphors and compounds have typically been in-
vestigated independently, some interesting related aspects of both seem to 
have been missed. These aspects will be illustrated and discussed, using 
observations of spontaneously produced child compounds and metaphors as 
a starting point. However, before stating the purposes of the paper in greater 
detail an appropriate, integrated perspective has to be established. Therefore, 
the general relations between the mechanisms of COMBINING and CHANGING 
will first be considered, first with respect to language, then with respect to 
mental functioning. 
The combining aspects of language (syntax and morphology) have been 
traditionally studied by linguists, the changing aspects (metaphors) by 
philosophers. In philosophy, many different characterizations of metaphor 
have been offered, from Aristotle's sober 'Metaphor consists in giving the 
thing a name that belongs to something else' (as cited in Winner 1979: 472), 
to the elaborate definition of 'simple' metaphor by Ross (1981: 113): 'A 
meaning-related, equivocal occurrence of a word in an environment that 
excludes a certain intra-scheme contrast (or its presupposition) that (in some 
given or canonical context) implies a contrast relationship (or presupposition) 
that the metaphorical context mandates.' Interesting and readable collections 
of papers may be found in Ortony (1979a) and Sacks (1979). 
Since psychology typically takes its cues from linguistics, combining and 
its development have been intensively studied, whereas changing has been 
somewhat neglected (for example, in one of the most comprehensive 
textbooks on psycholinguistics by Clark and Clark (1977), 'metaphor' does 
not appear in the index). Since Chomsky (1957, 1965), the creativeness of 
(child) speakers is taken to reside in their knowledge of syntax/morphology, 
not in their ability to stretch the conventional boundaries of word meaning. 
Also, there seems to be a tacit prejudgement that metaphors are so ex-
ceptional as to be of marginal significance. Recently however, there has been 
growing doubt about the correctness of this viewpoint. Mac Cormac (1985 : 
32) for instance, remarks: 'Metaphor appears so usually and so regularly a 
part of ordinary language that instead of contending that metaphor deviates 
from a normative grammar one might better consider that any grammar 
which cannot account for metaphor is too limited in comprehension to be 
useful. ' If metaphor were a marginal phenomenon, language would be like 
chess : new combinations of elements might be produced in great numbers, 
but only a very few conventional metaphors would be allowed (cf. changing 
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a pawn into a queen when it has crossed the board). As it is however, 
language seems to be swarming with conventional metaphors. Jespersen 
(1922: 432) presents the following sentence as an example: 'He came to look 
upon the low ebb of morals as an outcome of bad taste. ' Conventional 
(also called 'frozen' or 'dead') metaphors would not be so numerous if 
novel metaphors were impossible, incomprehensible, unnecessary or highly 
unusual. 
In dying and becoming conventionalized, metaphors also become pro-
ductive, i.e. subject to the combinatory rules of language (e.g. HEAD-master, 
HEAD-line, arrow-HEAD). Thus, diachronically, the combining mechanism of 
language feeds upon the products of the changing mechanism. Syn-
chronically, however, novel metaphors often are distasteful to the combining 
mechanism, since they tend to violate its constraints (for instance, 'Juliet is 
the sun' is literally an anomalous sentence). So, within language, the 
relationship between combining and changing seems to be the rather strained 
one of reluctant acceptance. 
This article will discuss the developmental relation between metaphors 
and word compounds in a framework emphasizing their cognitive, conceptual 
aspects. What happens, conceptually, when we link two words in a metaphor, 
e.g. brain and computer ? In the first place, a new superordinate category 
(from now on : SUPERCATEGORY) is formed that includes both the concepts of 
'brain' and 'computer' as elements. This supercategory is itself nameless 
(see Brown 1958: 140, who remarks that 'metaphor differs from other 
superordinate-subordinate relations in that the superordinate is not given a 
name of its own '). However, if there were a word for the supercategory of 
'brain' and 'computer', its meaning description would be unspecified as to 
the feature [±animate], [ +animate] being defining for 'brain', [ — animate] 
for 'computer'). 
In the second place, it is analytically stated that one of the two concepts so 
combined is in fact a subcategory of this newly synthesized supercategory. In 
stating that brains are computers, we are not claiming that brains are 
included in the class of computers, but that they are a subcategory of the 
nameless new supercategory. In stating that computers are brains, we are 
doing the same thing with regard to computers. Thus the expression of a 
novel metaphor may be seen to imply a new supercategorization as well as a 
(necessarily new) subcategorization. Two antagonistic forms of categor-
ization are expressed simultaneously.1 
[1] Language simply does not seem to have means for DIRECTLY expressing novel super-
categonzations. According to Clark & Clark (1977), language knows three different ways 
of relating meanings to one another. co-ordination (coupling), relativization (qualifying) 
and complementation (filling in). Note that relativization and complementation both 
result in subordination ('gold-fish' is a subcategorization through relativization, 'gold-
fisher' is a subcategorization through complementation). We are then left with co-
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In the production of a novel compound things are rather different. Novel 
compounds also are new subcategorizations, but of EXISTING supercategories. 
No synthesis, only analysis is required. For example, soup-sieves are a new 
subcategory of sieves, school-guards are included in the supercategory of 
guards. 
Within this categorial framework, two distinctions in the production of 
novel metaphors and word compounds will be discussed which have not yet 
received attention in the literature on the development of metaphor nor in 
that on children's lexical innovations. These are the distinctions between 
COMPELLED and PREFERRED production on the one hand, and between 
INDEPENDENT and INTEGRATED production on the other. When no adequate 
syntax and/or no appropriate lexical items are available, speakers may feel 
compelled to resort to innovative constructions (either metaphors, word 
compounds, or other kinds of innovations). Children's linguistic novelties are 
often explained in this way. For instance, Hakes (1982: 196) states that ' the 
linguistic creativity of younger children results from their not knowing 
enough NOT to be creative'. Clark (1982: 390) holds that children 'create new 
words to fill GAPS in their lexicon, to express meanings for which they have 
NO READY-MADE WORDS' (capitals mine). Still, it would seem prudent to allow 
for the possibility that even young children need not always be deficiency-
driven, but may at times actively prefer to use innovative forms, even though 
established alternatives are available to them. In that case it would be 
interesting to compare the functions of preferred metaphors to those of 
preferred compounds. 
Whether by force or by preference, speakers may produce a novel word 
compound or metaphoric comparison INDEPENDENTLY (either the one or the 
other), or they may INTEGRATE them in a metaphoric compound. For 
instance, if a child produces the innovative form moon-nuts in order to refer 
to cashew-nuts, he or she is simultaneously producing a novel compound as 
well as a novel metaphoric comparison (cf. ' those nuts are like moons ', under 
METHOD below). T h e advantage of producing metaphoric compounds is 
ordination and subordination as the most basic ways of relating meanings in language. 
Therefore, novel supercategories cannot be formulated but can only be suggested, either 
through subordination (as in metaphors like 'Brains are computers', which have the 
character of overstatements) or through co-ordination (as in sentences like ' Brains and 
computers are similar', which have the character of understatements). Pure, immediate 
superordination only seems to be possible in thought itself. Thus, when Clark & Clark 
(1977. 14) remark that co-ordination, relativization and complementation 'seem to 
exhaust the basic ways people have for THINKING of one idea in relation to another' 
[capitals mine], they seem to assume too great a correspondence between the mechanisms 
of language and those of thought Intuitive thinking may very well be interpreted as the 
creating of novel supercategories that have not yet found their fitting, subordinating 
metaphors in language. 
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clear; in this way, a metaphoric comparison is incorporated as a constituent 
into a larger (literal) sentence. 
In this article I argue that combining and changing (i.e. compounding and 
metaphorizing), after first developing independently, gradually become more 
and more integrated. Arguments, based in part on a consideration of the 
functions of preferred metaphors and compounds, are presented which 
suggest that integrated metaphoric compounds are especially likely to be 
produced during the elementary school years. This period has traditionally 
been designated as a ' literal ' stage, during which children eschew producing 
metaphors (Gardner, Winner, Bechhofer & Wolf 1978, Winner 1979, Hakes 
1982). I will present observations and discussions that suggest a different 
view. 
First, a general overview is given of what is known about the development 
of compounding and metaphorizing. Then there is a short section on the 
criteria used in the selection of the child compounds and metaphors to be 
presented. Subsequently, observations of spontaneous compounds and 
metaphors (compelled as well as preferred) are presented and discussed, 
followed by a presentation and discussion of integrated metaphoric com­
pounds, and of another type of metaphor that seems to be typical for the 
'literal' stage. Finally, in the last section a summary is presented and 
suggestions for future research are made. 
Development 
Between 1 ;o and г;о, children start producing their first words. These words 
are not yet combined but are produced as single-word utterances (see Barrett 
1985). They may be used either to name categories in the real world (the 
immediate context) or in a pretended world (the imagined context). For 
instance, a child may call his doll doll, but, while engaged in pretend-play, 
may also call a spoon a doll (Gardner et al. 1978). In other words, almost from 
the beginning children not only talk about the here and now but also about 
the 'not actually now here'. This would seem to be an important prerequisite 
for metaphor production. However, in this stage we cannot yet speak of 
metaphor. The renamings produced during pretend-actions are, within the 
boundaries of the pretended world, literal names (in the same way, an adult 
actor, playing Romeo, cannot be said to be metaphorically renaming his 
leading lady as Juliet). Real and imagined world do not yet seem to be 
simultaneously present in the child's mind; though pretend-play may be 
triggered by perceptual similarities between objects (for instance, the human 
shape of a spoon), the renamings typically have to be supported by action, i.e. 
they are accompaniments to TREATING an object as if it were something else 
(Gardner et al. 1978, Winner 1979). 
From about 2 ; o, children show a growing ability to hold in mind more than 
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one thing at a time (Sugarman 1983). They start combining words to produce 
sentences and also produce compounds (like plate egg for fried egg and cup 
egg for boiled egg; see Clark 1987). At the same time, their renamings 
manifest a developing capability to simultaneously consider real and im­
aginary worlds, and acquire the character of (implicit) metaphoric com­
parisons. As an example, I present the first four of such renamings that were 
produced by my youngest son, Tim, at age 2 : 3 : cheesel (this was said 
laughingly, while pointing at my bright yellow socks), flower (while eating a 
half-peeled banana, the peels of which were standing out like the petals of a 
flower), car that (while pointing at a crust of bread that was somewhat car-
shaped), and candle (while pointing at his pacifier, which was lying on his bed 
pointing upwards). In these cases, the child was not engaged in make-
believe (he made no attempt at eating my socks), nor did he seem to be simply 
overextending word meaning (he knew quite well what were the literal names 
for the objects renamed ; he also knew the literal referents for the renamings 
used; and, finally, the individual renamings were incidental occurrences, 
never to be repeated). Apparently, the child was commenting on perceived 
similarities. This would mean that he was capable of doing one thing (i.e. 
eating a banana) while thinking and talking of something different yet related 
(flowers). In Gardner et al. (1978) other examples of such perceptually based 
object renamings may be found. 
Thus, between the ages of 2;o and з ; о ( we see the rudiments of both 
combining and changing emerge. However, the literature on this period 
contains no indications that children may already use combining for the 
purpose of EXPLICITLY subcategorizing novel supercategories (see Winner 
1979, Hudson and Nelson 1984). The four first metaphors produced by Tim 
may again serve as an example. In none of these utterances is the literal name 
of the renamed object explicitly mentioned (no sock cheese, for instance). Yet 
at this time the child was producing many two-word utterances (such as bottle 
water and tosti bread); so the lack of explicit subcategorization would not 
seem to be due to any LINGUISTIC insufficiency. 
It may also be difficult in this period to distinguish between compounds 
and sentences. For instance, when Tim (again at age 2 ; 3) pointed at a toasted 
sandwich (which he knew was called tosti) and said tosti bread, it was not clear 
whether this two-word utterance should be interpreted as a (subordinating) 
word compound (as in ' That is a tosti-bread), or as a (co-ordinating) sentence 
(such as 'That is a tosti and it is also bread'). Subordination, co-ordination 
and superordination all seem to occur between two and three, but they may 
not be easily distinguishable. 
This changes during the next year. From about age 3 ;o, children begin to 
truly grasp the modifier-head structure of compounds (Clark, Gelman and 
Lane, 1985). Also, children begin to explicitly formulate metaphoric com­
parisons of the form: 'That X is/looks (like) a Y', e.g. That pencil looks like 
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a rocket-ship' (Gardner et al. 1978). There even tends to be an abundant 
flowering of this kind of comparison between three and four. Gardner & Wolf 
(1983: 29) remark : ' If one takes a trip through a forest with a child of three, 
one may well find that the child will look at different branches and declare 
" O , that one looks like an airplane", "There's the letter W", "Look at that 
rifle over there." Sometimes it is difficult to stop this Gestalt-ferreting 
process from occurring. ' 
If we summarize development from 1 ;o to about 4;o, we see a progression 
of integrative processes, first within combining and changing, later between 
them. In their second year, children develop names but do not yet combine 
them. Also, they change reality in their play, but do not yet combine real and 
imaginary worlds in an act of comparative naming. In the third year, names 
are combined and renamings begin to reflect comparisons, but still, it seems, 
in a rather independent way. In the fourth year, however, the growing 
capacity for combining words may be used for more or less explicitly 
expressing complete metaphoric comparisons. 
The logical next step would seem to be that metaphoric comparisons are 
no longer merely expressed THROUGH combining, but may themselves 
become elements FOR combining, i.e. may become words (or phrases) that 
can be combined with other words to form a larger (literal) message. This 
would be the developmental counterpart of what happens in the evolution of 
language when metaphors become 'food for combining'. However, at this 
point the literature starts to let us down. As for compounds, very little is 
known about the spontaneous novel compounds produced by somewhat 
older children (though there is research on elicited innovations, see for 
instance Berko 1958, Clark & Berman 1984, Clark et al. 1985). Also, no 
attention whatsoever has been paid to the possible metaphoric aspects of 
such novel compounds. As to metaphors, it is generally believed that after the 
stage of explicitly expressing metaphoric comparisons (between three and 
four), children actually stop producing metaphors instead of moving further 
on the path of integrating combining and changing. Children are supposed 
to enter a ' literal ' stage, which lasts until around age ten (Gardner et al. 1978 : 
іЗ, 20, Gardner & Winner 1979). Winner says that metaphors go 'un­
derground' (Winner 1979: 489), Hakes remarks that 'older children can 
produce figurative language but prefer not to ' (Hakes 1982: 196), and 
Gardner et al. suggest that older children are 'consolidating the literal 
meanings of words and the community definitions of categories ' (Gardner 
et al. 1978: 13). However, if we take a closer look at some of the studies quoted 
in favour of the ' literal ' stage concept, the evidence turns out to be rather 
weak. 
Billow (1981) studied the spontaneous metaphors of children between 2;7 
and 6;o. The following example is from a child aged 3 ; 5 : It's going for a walk 
in the forest (taking a little animal and gliding it around observer's back) and 
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tt's going to eat some grass (animal reaches observer's hair) (Billow 1981: 435). 
Metaphor production peaked between ages 2,7 and 3,6, and declined 
afterwards Nearly all Billow's examples represent metaphors produced 
during pretend play. Since these are not distinguished from metaphors 
produced in other contexts, the observed decline after 3 ; 6 may simply be 
related to a decline in the frequency of pretend-play, not to a growing 
reluctance to metaphonze per se. Pollio and Pollio (1974) found a low 
incidence of novel metaphors as well as a decreasing incidence of figurative 
speech in general, in the written compositions of third-, fourth- and fifth-
graders. The authors themselves suggest that these results may represent an 
artefact They remark that the written composition task ' seems to be one in 
which a school child is very concerned about getting a good grade, and is 
reluctant to take chances with either spelling, grammar or word choice. In 
short, a child asked to write a composition is unlikely to 'rock the boat" 
(Pollio & Pollio 1974· 198). Gardner, Kircher, Winner & Perkins (1975) 
presented children with incomplete vignettes and asked them to provide 
suitable endings. The incomplete parts called for the construction of an 
explicit comparison, for instance 'Things don't have to be huge in size to 
look that way. Look at that boy standing over there He looks as gigantic 
as.. ' Pre-schoolers produced the highest number of metaphoric endings 
(appropriate as well as inappropriate), whereas elementary school children 
tended to produce literal endings (e.g. ai gigantic as the most gigantic person 
in the whole world) These findings would seem to support the concept of a 
literal stage However, the possibility that schoolchildren were experiencing 
this task as a test and therefore were playing it safe cannot be excluded In 
addition, the task asked for merely thinking up comparisons, not for putting 
them to some specific use 'Gestalt-ferreting' 3 to 4 year olds might enjoy 
such an assignment, but older children might be more inclined to make 
comparisons serve some specific communicative or conceptual purpose This 
still has to be investigated. 
Little is known about the development of metaphor in the spontaneous 
speech of schoolchildren We do know however, that schoolchildren's lan-
guage itself apparently is a very rich dialect with a strong penchant for 
metaphor (Opie & Opie 1959). For instance, in schoolchildren's language a 
'gigantic' child may be called Lofty, Long John Silver, Everest, Flagpole, 
Gulliver, Skyscraper, Snowy (Brush the snow off your head), Stilty [Get down 
off your stilts), or Tower of London (p 169). Redheads may hear themselves 
addressed as. Beetroot, Blood nut, Carrots, Copper crust, Fire head, Flame, 
Fury, Ginger, Glow-worm, Red kipper, Rusty, and so on (p. 170). The 
function of such renammgs apparently is to jeer and torment. But school-
children's language is by no means restricted to name-calling, there are 
also more or less metaphoric expressions for pronouncing approval-dis-
approval, for sending away unpopular children, for getting the last word, 
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making and breaking friendships, gaining possession, claiming precedence, 
and obtaining respite. It does not seem likely that much evidence for a 
' literal ' stage will be found in the language schoolchildren use AMONG 
THEMSELVES. As the Opies remark : 'Tongue-tied though a child may be when 
made to use adult words, his vocabulary can be extensive when speaking his 
own language' (p. 154). 
It is not the primary purpose of this article to argue against the existence 
of the literal stage, but to illustrate, discuss and interrelate some little-noticed 
developmental aspects of children's compounds and metaphors. In doing so 
however, we repeatedly bump into the literal-stage concept. In reviewing the 
general development of combining and changing this happens when we hit 
upon the developmental implausibility that the progressive integration 
between combining and changing would stop rather than progress further. In 
the following it will happen again when we start considering the special 
functions that compounds and metaphors may have for children. 
M E T H O D 
In the subsequent sections, observations of spontaneously produced novel 
child compounds and metaphors are presented and discussed. Some ob-
servations were reported to me by friends, but many were made by myself and 
concern utterances produced by my eldest son, Thomas. Many are also taken 
from the collection of child language observations that was published in 1916 
by the Dutch linguist de Vooys, and some are based on a few other authors. 
All utterances were produced by Dutch-speaking children. Though in all 
cases information on referential context is available, information on discourse 
context is generally lacking. However, since I will not concentrate on the 
discourse functions of utterances but rather on the functions of compounds 
and metaphors within the context constituted by the utterances themselves, 
plausible interpretations may nevertheless be developed. 
A word will be considered a novel compound when it contains a new 
combination of at least two lexical morphemes. A thornier issue of course is 
how to identify metaphors. According to Black (1979: 36) 'every criterion for 
a metaphor's presence, however plausible, is defeasible in special cir-
cumstances'. Also, some authors claim that the difference between literal and 
figurative language is a matter of degree rather than kind (see for instance 
Ortony 1979O: 194). Nevertheless, within the categorial framework presented 
in the Introduction, a reasonable criterion for identifying metaphors would 
be the deliberate changing of a word's defining features, where defining 
features are taken to correspond to the necessary conditions on the word's 
nearest supercategory. For instance, for something to be categorized as a 
vegetable it is necessary that it should be non-human. Thus, 'His face was 
like a beet' is a non-literal metaphoric comparison (the defining feature 
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[ — human] is changed), but 'Potatoes are like beets ' is a literal comparison 
(no defining features are changed; see Ortony 1979ft for a similar, though 
differently-phrased view). 
The child metaphors to be presented were selected according to the 
following three criteria : (a) a defining feature of a word should be changed 
(for instance, the feature [ — Human] belonging to ' beet ' in ' His face became 
a beet ') ; (¿) a clear similarity between metaphoric and literal referent of the 
word should be identifiable (for instance, ' redness ' in the case of ' face ' and 
' bee t ' ) ; (c) considering the child's age it should seem probable that she/he 
knew the defining character of the feature(s) changed, i.e. knew what 
conventional restrictions exist on the literal use of the metaphoric name (for 
instance, when a 4-year-old girl talks about the ' h a n d s ' of a parakeet, we 
credit her with the knowledge that birds do not literally have hands). 
When, in a compound, at least one lexical morpheme is used meta-
phorically, we will speak of a metaphoric compound (cf. moon-nuts for 
cashew nuts or car-milk for gasoline). When this occurs in a phrase, we will 
speak of a metaphoric phrase (cf. 'moon-like nu t s ' or 'milk for the car ' ) . A 
novel compound or metaphor will be considered COMPELLED when, taking 
account of both the child's age and the content she/he wants to express, it 
seems reasonable to assume that the child did not (yet) have sufficient lexical 
knowledge or sufficient command of syntax to express this content through 
established forms. A novel compound or metaphor will be considered 
PREFERRED when, again taking account of age and content, non-innovative 
alternatives can be pointed out that should reasonably be regarded as 
available to the child. 
R E S U L T S 
Compelled and preferred compounds and metaphors 
In this section the emphasis will be on preferred compounds and metaphors 
since their functions are more interesting than those of compelled forms. 
However, in order to make the distinction clear I will start by presenting a 
few observations of apparently compelled novel compounds and metaphors. 
Table 1 contains examples of compounds. 
In utterances (1) to (3) the novel compounds enable the child to produce 
one-clause sentences instead of sentences consisting of two or more clauses 
(which, probably would be beyond his syntactic competence). In utterance 
(4) the novel compound fills a lexical gap (see Clark 1981, 1982, 1983, Clark 
and Hecht 1982, Clark 1987), i.e. it names a concept for which the child does 
not have a ready-made word. 
Table 2 contains some examples of compelled child metaphors. As to 
metaphors, it has often been noticed that (adult) speakers tend to fall back on 
them when trying to express specific sensations or feelings that have no 
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T A B L E i. Compelled word compounds' 
(i) Boy (5,5) Zijn dat jagет-lange geweren' [Are those hunter-long rifles'], meaning 'Are 
those rifles as long as the rifles used by hunters ' ' 
(2) Boy (5,7) Nee, het is geen tel-leer-school [No, it is not a count-learn-schooi], meaning 
' It is not a school where you learn how to count ' This was produced in 
answer to a question whether he was learning to count at school 
(3) Boy (4,7) Ina heeft zo'n hele leuke mooie verrassing-gezicht [Ina has such a very nice 
beautiful surprtse-face ] This was said about an adult friend Meaning ' Ina 
has such a very nice and beautiful face when she looks surprised ' 
(4) Boy (4,3) The child did not like beards, so the prospect of eventually growing a beard 
did not appeal to him He therefore announced that he wanted to become a 
woman and not a man When it was pointed out to him that this would not 
be possible, his reaction was ' Nou, dan moet ik naar de vrouwen-maker ' 
[Well, then I'll have to go to the women-maker ] 
* Observations (1) to (4) are from Thomas (Contrary to what might be suggested by 
neologisms like these, Dutch is not a language with a strong tendency for stringing together 
words (as, for instance, German is) ) 
TABLE 2 Compelled metaphors' 
(5) Boy (4,11) Mijn handen zijn zo kronkelig, ik heb zulke kronkels in mijn handen [My 
hands are so crinkly, I have such crinkles m my hands ] Said after making 
snowballs with his bare hands 
(6) Boy (4,1) Ja, anders krijg ik glas in mijn oog Ja, de zon heeft glas [Yes, otherwise I 
will get glass in my eye Yes, the sun has glass ] Said while he was shading 
his eyes with his hand in order to look at a plane, and was commenting 
upon this gesture 
(7) Boy (3,6) Jouw buik is aan het dollen^ [Your belly is romping*] Said laughingly, 
while he was listening to the rumbling of his mother's intestines, his ear 
pressed against her belly 
(8) Boy (3,9) When the child was sitting on the toilet in the bathroom and was asked 
how long it would take him to be finished, he indicated a distance to the 
bathtub and said Tot aan het bad duurt het nog [To the bath-tub, it will 
take ] 
(9) Boy (4,7) Wolfen is honderd-duizend sterk, Laurens is maar honderd-veertig sterk 
[Wolfert is hundred-thousand strong, Laurens is only hundred and forty 
strong ] Said while talking about schoolfriends 
* Observation (5) is from de Vooys (1916), (6) is from Kaper (1985), (7) was reported to me 
by Doortje Wijnands, (8) is from Schaerlaekens (1977) and (9) is from Thomas de Vooys 
(1916) also presents the following observation Die gember maakt zo'n ruzie in mijn mondje 
(That ginger quarrels in my mouth ) He offers no information on age and sex of the child 
in this case 
known, unique name in the language, or when trying to explain and 
familiarize difficult or unfamiliar ideas (Skinner 1957, Billow 1977, Petrie 
1979, Lehrer 1982, Mac Cormac 1985, Marschark & Nail 1985). Both the 
aspects of expressing inexpressible sensations and familiarizing difficult ideas 
are presented in Table 2. 
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Utterances (5) to (7) represent instances of expressing inexpressible 
sensations; the special sensation of tingling with cold in (5), the piercing 
sharpness of sun-light in one's eyes in (6), the strange, bouncing sounds of 
a rumbling belly in (7). Utterances (8) and (9) are instances of expressing an 
(as yet) too complex notion by means of familiar analogies. In (8) the child 
wants to express a temporal relationship but probably does not yet have 
command of temporal terms. His solution is to produce a spatial metaphor. 
In (9) the difficult relationship has to do with relative bodily strength. Thi s 
utterance needs some additional comment in order to be fully appreciated. In 
the months preceding this utterance, the child had developed a habit of using 
' hundred ' as some sort of intensifier. Honderd ver (hundred far) meant ' very 
far ', een honderd-wind (a hundred-wind) was a very strong wind, een honderd­
knal (a hundred-bang) was a very loud bang and ah je honderd drukt... (if you 
push hundred(ly). . .) meant 'if you push very h a r d . . . ' . If we know that 
'hundred strong' would have meant 'very strong', then utterance (9) should 
be interpreted as ' Wolfert and Laurens are both very strong, but still Wolfert 
is much stronger than Laurens is '. Global differences between numbers are 
used here to metaphorically express differences in bodily strength. 
T h e compounds and metaphors in Tables 1 and 2 all seem to have been 
produced because the child wanted to communicate something that would 
have been difficult to communicate otherwise. This is not the case with the 
T A B L E 3. Preferred word compounds* 
(10) Boy ( 4 ; з ) Dat is een zakdoek-boek. [That is a handkerchief-book.] Said while pointing 
at a book with a handkerchief lying between the pages. 
(11) Boy (4; 4) Dit is een pijltjes-waterpistool. [This is an arrow-waterpistol.] Said when he 
got a waterpistol that could also shoot little arrows. 
(12) Boy ( 4 : 7 ) Is dit een herfst-appelì [Is this an autumn-apple}] Said while pointing at an 
apple that was red as well as yellow, like autumn-leaves. 
(13) Boy (4; 5) Dit is de remmer-sturing-ophijser. [This is the braker-driving-lifter.] Said 
while pointing at a toy-driver in a toy-tractor. When M asked him what he 
meant he answered: 'That's the man who brakes and drives and lifts 
things. ' 
(14) Boy ( з ; і о ) Trekharmonica-met-een-piano. [Accordion-with-a-piano.] T h e child's name 
for his toy-accordion, that had a key-board. 
(15) Boy (4; 4) Ik heb een steek-mond. [I have a stab-mouth.] Said while making the long 
end of a spoon protrude from his mouth. 
(16) Boy (519) Hier is het watervliegtuig-veld. [Here is the waterplane-port.] Said while 
looking at a picture of a waterplane about to land. 
(17) Boy ( 5 ; з ) Dit is mijn toet-holder. [This is my dessert-holder.] Said after making a 
bag from his napkin and putting his fruit in it. From age 4 ; 9 to 5 : 4 the 
child lived in the United States ; ' toet(je) ' is the Dutch word for 
'dessert', but 'holder' is an English word. 
* Observations (10) to (17) are from Thomas. 
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apparently preferred compounds and metaphors that are presented in Table 
3 and Table 4 respectively. 
According to Clark (1982), children's lexical innovations are motivated by 
communicative purposes. However, the novel compounds in Table 3 do not 
seem to be communication-driven but rather to be conceptually motivated. 
In utterances (10) to (17) there is no apparent communicative reason for 
producing novel compounds instead of either sentences (cf. Here is a book 
with a handkerchief; I can stab with my mouth; This is the man that brakes 
and drives and lifts things; Here is a red and yellow apple; This is a bag for 
my dessert), or established simpler words (cf. 'accordion' instead of 
'accordion-with-a-piano', 'driver' instead of 'breaker-driving-lifter', 
'pistol' instead of 'arrow-water-pistol', 'airport' instead of 'water-
plane-port '). These alternative sentences and words are simple enough to be 
considered available to a child this age. Therefore, the compounds in Table 
3 strike one as being either failed sentences or referentially overspecific 
names. Their primary motivation seems to have been some internal urge to 
catch a new concept the moment it presented itself, and to pin it down by 
giving it a name ('chasing mental butterflies' might be an appropriate 
characterization). Thus, an important function of preferred novel compounds 
might be that of expressing oneself in a conceptually precise way, whether 
this be communicatively useful or not. This function is speaker-oriented 
rather than listener-oriented. 
In Table 3 the clearest example of a failed sentence is the compound 
'handkerchiefbook' (10). Words generally name typical and recurrent cat­
egories of experience. Atypical and transient categories are generally spelled 
out by means of a sentence. Obviously, the child was not honouring this 
typicality constraint on word formation when producing ' handkerchiefbook ', 
which names a quite atypical and transitory state of affairs. Possibly, children 
have a tendency to indicate a Gestalt in perception (handkerchief and book 
forming ONE perceptual Gestalt), by means of a 'Gestalt' in language, i.e. by 
means of ONE word.2 An experiment by Deutsch & Braun (unpublished) may 
illuminate the question whether such a tendency would be communicatively 
or conceptually motivated. Deutsch & Braun presented German 6 year olds 
with collections of objects representing typical and atypical container/ 
contained relations, for instance a glass containing water (typical) as well as 
a balloon (atypical). The children frequently produced atypical word com­
pounds like Luftballon-Wasserglas (balloon-waterglass) in describing these 
collections. As an explanation Deutsch & Braun suggest that children of this 
age apparently have not yet learned the typicality constraint on word 
formation. This suggestion is somewhat surprising for in the very same paper 
they also show that the atypical compounds were produced mainly if the glass 
[2] I am grateful to Frank Wijnen for suggesting this to me. See also Deutsch (1976). 
C H I L D L A N G U A G E 117 
was visible to both experimenter and child. When the children had to 
describe what they saw to someone who could NOT see the glass, they 
produced very few compounds and if so, only with typical, not atypical, 
container/contained relations. This would mean that the children were quite 
able to observe the typicality constraint when the situation really asked for it, 
i.e. when they had to be maximally communication-oriented. So a better 
explanation would seem to be that in the first situation children felt more free 
not to observe the constraint and to produce atypical compounds because 
they did NOT have to be maximally communication- and listener-oriented. 
In Table 3 the clearest example of a referentially overspecific compound is 
the frozen phrase ' accordion-with-a-piano' (16), which the child habitually 
used for referring to his toy accordion. Since at the time there were no other 
accordions around, he might as well have dropped the ' p i ano ' part of this 
compound. Why then did he persist in using the full phrase ? I think it was 
in order to contrast, in his own mind, this particular accordion with his 
previous one which did NOT have a 'p iano ' (keyboard). But this would mean 
that he wanted to honour a certain conceptual contrast, even though it was 
not communicatively necessary to do so. 
Research indicates that overspecific reference increases with age and may, 
at times, be quite frequent (see for instance Hermann & Deutsch 1976, 
Deutsch & Pechmann 1982). KarmilofF-Smith (19790,6) describes some 
striking instances of overspecificity in the syntactic development of French 
children. Speakers do not have to be forced to be overspecific. On the 
contrary, Deutsch (1976) found that speakers have problems with not being 
overspecific, i.e. with restricting themselves to what is sufficient for successful 
reference (see Pechmann 1984 for a discussion). Finally, recent research into 
children's symbolic development suggests that a quite general inclination 
towards precision emerges after the fourth year. According to Gardner & 
Wolf (1983) 4-year-olds begin to show a tendency towards 'quantitative 
mapping ' , which is ' the ability to realize the exact number of entities in a 
collection ' (p. 30). The core area of this tendency is the number system, but 
the tendency may flow over into other developing symbol systems as well, 
such as drawing (for instance, putting in the exact number of fingers and toes 
when drawing a person) and music (for instance, the ability to maintain a 
rhythm). In language development, quantitative mapping might conceivably 
translate into a tendency towards (over)specific reference and description, 
from about age four onwards. 
The observations and discussions presented above suggest that being 
precise is a developing tendency that may be largely speaker-oriented. They 
also suggest that preferring novel compounds over established alternative 
forms may originate in this developing tendency. T h e need for being precise 
here should be interpreted as a need for obtaining a maximum fit between 
conceptual or perceptual representation and linguistic expression, whether 
118 C H I L D R E N ' S M E T A P H O R S A N D WORD C O M P O U N D S 
T A B L E 4. Preferred metaphors* 
(18) Boy (3,8) De honger is boodschappen doen, die is naar het werk [The hunger has 
gone shopping, it's gone to its work ] Said in answer to a question whether 
he was not hungry any more. 
(19) Boy (2; 10) Maar het is regen uit mijn mond' [But it's [only] rain from my mouth1] 
Said when his mother told him not to spit 
(20) Boy (8;з) Het is een bactertetje van jou, want JIJ hebt er een gulden van betaald [It 
is for a bacteria [1 e for a very small part] yours, for you paid one guilder 
of it ] Said when he had spent all his savings in buying a record Since 
the price of this record exceeded his savings by one guilder, M had 
supplied the missing amount 
(21) Boy (3:2) Poep heeft een banaantje geschilderd] [Poo-poo has painted a banana'] 
Said while observing the contents of his potty, which had a remarkably 
banana-like shape 
(22) Girl (4,10) Marleen kan schommelen met losse handjes* [Marleen can swing unth loose 
hands*] Said when the child's parakeet, named Marleen, was swinging in 
its cage 
(23) Boy (6;5) Hij braakt* [It's tiomifin^1] Said after squeezing a gooseberry until it burst 
(24) Boy (3,2) Nou is de aardbei in mijn grote vuilnis-auto [Now the strawberry is in 
my big garbage-truck ] Said after having eaten a large strawberry 
(25) Boy (8,6) Nu is het de hele week zaterdag, zondag en woensdagmiddag [Now it is 
Saturday, Sunday, and Wednesday afternoon all week long ] Said at the 
start of a holiday from school (there is never any school in the afternoon 
on Wednesdays) 
(26) Girl (6,5) Die [bloem] mag ook wel eens pap eten. Zijn kameraadje heb ik maar 
weggegooid [That one [flower] should eat porridge I threw away its 
friend ] Said while talking about some withered flowers 
* Observations (18), (20), (21), (24) and (25) are from Thomas. Observation (19) was reported 
to me by Doortje Wijnands and (22) by Anita van Loon, (23) and (26) are from de Vooys 
(1916). 
this be communicatively useful or not. This would fit in well with recent 
proposals that children may go beyond successful communication in ana­
lysing their language and reorganizing their language knowledge (Bowerman 
1982, 1983, 1985). 
Table 4 presents examples of preferred metaphors. The content of the 
utterances in Table 4 might easily have been phrased by the children in a 
non-metaphoric way. In (18) the child might have said 'the hunger is gone' 
or 'I 'm not hungry', in (19) he might have used the word 'water' instead of 
'rain', in (20) 'a little bit' instead of 'bacteria', m (21) 'poo-poo is LIKE a 
banana' instead of 'has PAINTED a banana', and so on. This raises the 
question of why the children nevertheless preferred to express themselves 
metaphorically. I think three different functions of preferred metaphors can 
be distinguished in Table 4 (of course, I do not mean to imply that these 
three would exhaust all the different possibilities). In (18) to (20) the children 
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seem to be defending their own behaviour and/or possessions. In (20) the 
child apparently uses the word ' bacteria ' for highlighting the negligibility of 
his mother's possible claim on his possession, in (18) and (19) the children 
seem to defend their right not to eat any more and to spit, respectively. 
Preschoolers sometimes use their pretend-capacities for defensive purposes, 
for instance when safely acting out certain prohibited behaviours in pretend-
play (see Piaget 1962: 133), or when putting the blame for some misdemeanor 
on an imaginary companion (see Fraiberg 1959). Early metaphoric utterances 
like (18) and (19) can be interpreted as the verbal variants of such defence 
through fantasy. This, however, does not make these utterances less 
metaphoric in character or less defensive in their intent. In utterance (20) 
(produced by a much older child) the defence is more adult-like in that the 
metaphor seems to reflect exaggeration rather than pretence. 
In (21) to (23) the children seem to aim at conveying their surprise at a 
remarkable event. In (21) the unnecessary addition of the word 'painted' 
adds a sense of wonder to what, in itself, would have been a perfectly 
appropriate metaphoric comparison (i.e. 'Poo-poo is like a banana'). In (22) 
the child could have observed that the parakeet was swinging 'on its legs 
only'. 'With loose hands', however, aptly conveys the admirability of this 
fact. In (23) the child could have remarked that the gooseberry had burst. In 
using the word 'vomiting', however, he adequately communicates his 
surprise at the suddenness of the gooseberry's insides coming out. (It may be 
difficult to distinguish preferred metaphors expressing surprise from com-
pelled metaphors expressing inexpressible sensations (see Table 2) since both 
result in the suggesting of certain subjective states. Still, when taking into 
account the options open to the child, it should in principle be possible to 
make at least a distinction of degree.) 
Finally, the metaphors in utterances (24) to (26) all seem to have been 
produced for the simple pleasure of using an implicit metaphoric comparison 
in order to say things differently. Here, the metaphors seem to be ends in 
themselves and so they acquire the character of jokes, i.e. funny implicit 
comparisons. 
The three functions of preferred metaphors identified so far (defending, 
communicating surprise, and joking) all seem to be closely tied to the general 
communicative function of language, i.e. they seem to be listener-rather than 
speaker-oriented. Apparently the primary purpose of these metaphors is to 
suggest and connote certain attitudes of the speaker to the listener. 
If an important function of (preferred) compounds is to be conceptually 
precise and if an important function of (preferred) metaphors is to suggest and 
connote, then both functions might be served at the same time by the 
production of a metaphoric compound or phrase. In the section on 
Development I concluded that the progressive developmental integration 
between the two mechanisms of combining and changing suggests that the 
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capacity for producing metaphoric compounds and phrases would emerge 
after age four, during the elementary school years. In the present section I 
have indicated what might urge children to make use of such an emerging 
capacity; the possibility of connoting something and/or expressing some-
thing difficult in a way that is nevertheless conceptually precise. I will 
elaborate on this point in the next section, in which instances of children's 
metaphoric compounds and phrases are presented and discussed. 
Metaphoric compounds and phrases 
Sentences that contain a metaphorically used word tend to be either 
ambiguous (e.g. ' Now the strawberry is in my big garbage truck ') or 
anomalous (e.g. 'The hunger has gone shopping'). Metaphoric compounds 
and phrases, however, often do not strike us as ambiguous or anomalous 
since they usually contain clues that may help in the reconstruction of the 
metaphoric comparison. For instance, 'Now the strawberry is in my garbage 
truck-belly ' is not ambiguous. Likewise, referring to gasoline as ' milk for the 
car' seems to be less anomalous than referring to it simply as 'milk'. This is 
why a metaphoric compound or phrase may simultaneously serve the 
T A B L E s. Metaphoric compounds and phrases (ƒ)" 
(27) Girl (5;o) Brofr-paardje [4roi/ier-horse] ; a horse with a short-cut mane, like her 
brother's hair. 
(28) Girl (6; 4) Wmfer-juffrouwtje [remier-miss], a girl in a white coat. 
(29) Girl (9,10) V/ater-sehaduvi [water-iAodow] ; a reflection in a pond. 
(30) Boy (7; 10) Oog-pitten [eye-ptps]; pupils. 
(31) Girl (io;8) Kams-nagels (сотЪ-natL·); the teeth of a comb. 
(32) Boy (4;8) Maan-nootjes [moon-nuts], cashew-nuts. 
(33) Boy (5 ; s) M-boterham [M-slice of bread] ; a slice of bread looking like the letter M. 
(34) Girl (6,0) Een druppeltje pijn [a drop of pain]; very litte pain. 
(35) Girl (4,6) Een hele mterehoop van muggen [a whole ant-hill of mosquitoes]; a swarm 
of mosquitoes. 
(36) Boy (6; 11) Geel bloed [yellow blood]; resin. 
(37) Boy (4,1) Een E met een kokhokje [an E with a kokkokje]; an È 'Kokkokje' was the 
child's self-invented name for the contraptions on top of streetcars and 
trains. 
(38) Girl (4;6) Een streepje met een heleboel poten [a strtpe with many legs]; a large 
mosquitoe. 
(39) Boy (8;8) Kampvuurtje in je mond? [camping-fire in your mouth?]; question to 
someone who was trying hard not to spit out a too hot bite of food 
* Observations (27) to (31) and (34) to (36) are from de Vooys (1916); (32) and (39) are from 
Thomas; (33) and (37) are from Kaper (1959); and (38) was reported to me by Anita van 
Loon. 
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function of being precise as well as connoting something ; the vagueness or 
incorrectness usually associated with metaphor is cancelled while its sug-
gestive power remains intact In Table 5, examples are presented of 
metaphonc compounds and phrases produced by Dutch children Sentence 
context is lacking here since the sources from which the examples are taken 
do not offer this information What is clear however, is that all examples are 
from children over age four. 
In Table 6 examples are presented of metaphonc compounds and phrases 
for which sentential context is available. 
TABLE 6 Metaphonc compounds and phrases ( / / )* 
(40) Boy (4,7) Ik ben siip-koud, ik voel overal stippen op mijn lijf [I'm dor-cold, I feel 
dots everywhere on my body ] Said when shivering with cold 
(41) Boy (4,8) Die kalkoen had een waaier-staart en een flap-neus [That turkey had a 
fan-tail and a flap-nose ] Said while telling about a visit to a farm 
(42) Boy (5,8) Mijn achter-borstje moet nog gewassen worden [My behiná-breast still has 
to be washed ] Meaning ' my back ' 
(43) Girl (9,3) Mijn voet spelde-krompt [My foot pin-bends ] Said when her foot was 
asleep It should probably be paraphrased as 'My foot feels as if bent by 
pin-pricks' 
(44) Girl (s, 2) Waarom maak je [een wegje in je hoofd] ' [Why do you make [a little road 
in your head '] ] Meaning 'a parting' 
(45) Boy (4,7) Ik heb zo'n pijn in mijn buik1 [Een hele reep pijn], net of er een armband 
om geslagen is [I have such pain in my belly' [A whole strip of pain], like 
a bracelet ] 
(46) Boy (8,9) Mooie kleuren heeft die olie, he' Het lijkt net [een regenboog op de straat] 
[Nice colours that oil has, hasn't it ' It's just like [a rainbow on the street] ] 
Said while pointing at a large oil-stain on the road 
(47) Boy (3,8) Benzine, dat is [melk voor de auto], he' [Gasoline, that's [müh for the car], 
isn't it '] Said while sitting in a car that was passing a gas station 
(48) Boy (4,8) Sterretjes, dat zijn [zonnen die leven in de nacht] [Stars, that are [suns that 
live in the night] ] This observation came a few minutes after it had been 
explained to him that the sun is a kind of star 
(49) Boy (4,1) When he was asked 'What is a daddy'', the child answered Dat is [een 
mamma die een meneer is] [That's [a mommy who is a man] ] 
a
 Observations (40) and (42) to (45) are from de Vooys (1916), observations (41) and (46) to 
(49) are from Thomas Metaphonc phrases are between square brackets 
The utterances in Table 6 also are mainly from children older than four. 
Of course this, in itself, does not prove that children of elementary school age 
produce more metaphonc compounds and phrases than do younger children 
But at least it proves that older children do produce them, which, considering 
the present state of research, certainly is a non-trivial thing to point out 
In Table 6 utterances (47) to (49) are especially remarkable. These 
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utterances have the character of definitions, but they are not definitions in the 
traditional sense. In a true definition a concept is defined in terms of its 
superordinate plus some characteristic features (for instance, 'a beet is a 
vegetable that is red'). In (47) to (49) however, a concept is defined by 
changing a defining feature of a word on the same level (for instance, the 
defining feature [ + female] belonging to ' mommy ' in ' a daddy is a mommy 
who is a man'). This aspect of 'changing defining features' confers on 
utterances (47) to (49) their metaphoric flavour. Still, within our framework 
for approaching metaphor (see Introduction and Method) comparisons such 
as 'mommies are like daddies' would not be classified as metaphoric, since 
the concepts compared share the same supercategory (i.e. 'parent'). The 
apparent problem may be solved if we realize that, though comparisons such 
as 'mommies are like daddies' or 'suns are like stars' are literal comparisons 
for adults, they need not be so for children. When, for instance, a child has 
not yet developed the supercategory 'celestial body', then for her/him the 
categories 'sun' and 'star' might be almost as separate as 'sun' and 'Juliet' 
are for an adult. 
In definitions like 'a daddy is a mommy who is a man' the changed 
defining feature ([ +female] becomes [ — female]) is treated AS IF it were a 
non-defining, characteristic feature of a superordinate, i.e. 'mommy' is used 
AS IF it were a name for the supercategory 'parent'. We may expect children 
to use this kind of metaphoric defining whenever they are in the process of 
developing a novel supercategory but do not yet know it's appropriate 
name. 
Metaphoric defining implies that a similarity is expressed as well as a 
crucial difference. This may be seen to occur in observations (29), (30), (31), 
(36), (37), (38), (39), (42), (44), and (46) (in addition to the already mentioned 
(47) to (49)). The difference between a metaphoric compound like 'moon-
nuts' (observation (32)) and a 'definitional' one like, for instance, 'behind-
breast ' (observation (42)) is that in ' moon-nuts ' only a similarity is expressed 
(cf. 'those nuts are like moons'), whereas in 'behind-breast' not only a 
similarity is indicated but also an important difference (cf. 'a back is like a 
breast but it is on your hindside'). In this way, definitional metaphoric 
compounds and phrases are instances par excellence of innovative forms that 
may serve the function of being precise. If it is true that from about age four 
onward, children develop a general tendency towards precision, we might not 
only expect a general increase of metaphoric compounds and phrases after 
this age, but also a preference for compounds and phrases of the definitional 
kind. 
I will conclude this section on the integration of compounding and 
metaphorizing with an example from schoolchildren's language. When 
Thomas was 7;2 it was 'marble-time' at his school. I was struck by the 
curious names of the marbles and I asked Thomas to empty his marble-bag 
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TABLE 7. A taxonomy of marbles* 
Een olie [an oil] 
Een ohe-bam [an oil-bam] 
Een komngs-olie [a kings-oil] 
Een melkie [a milky] 
Een melk-bam [a milk-bam] 
[Een konings-melk [a kings-milk]] 
Een smurf [a smurf] 
Een smurf-bam [a smurf-bam] 
[Een konings-smurf [a kings-smurf]] 
Een doorzichtigje [a transparent] 
[Een doorzichtig-bam [a transparent-bam]] 
Een konings-doorzichtigje [a kings-transparent] 
Een eentje [a one] 
Een tien-bam [a ten-bam] 
[Een konings-tien [a kings-ten]] 
Een parel [a pearl] 
Een parels-bam [a pearls-bam] 
[Een komngs-parel [a kings-pearl]] 
Een piraat [a pirate] 
Een piraaten-bam [a pirates-bam] 
[Een konings-piraat [a kings-pirate]] 
Small 'oily' marble 
Larger 'oily' marble 
Largest 'oily' marble 
Small white marble 
Larger white marble 
Largest white marble 
Small blue and white marble 
Larger blue and white marble 
Largest blue and white marble 
Small transparent marble 
Larger transparent marble 
Largest transparent marble 
Small multicoloured marble 
Larger multicoloured marble 
Largest multicoloured marble 
Small 'pearly' marble 
Larger ' pearly ' marble 
Largest 'pearly' marble 
Small black marble 
Larger black marble 
Largest black marble 
Marbles that were not 'in the bag' but that are predicted by the system are between square 
brackets These are 'king-size' marbles predominantly. According to Thomas, 'kings' do 
not exist for all subcategories of marbles, but 'bams' do Also, in the names for kings the 
morpheme 'bam' may be optionally present (for instance, 'kings-oil-bam', 'kings-ten-
bam', etc.). 
for me and tell me the names of all the marbles it contained. The names are 
presented in Table 7. The taxonomy of marbles in this table has no pretence 
of being complete. It simply reflects what kinds of marbles were in the bag. 
Still, it nicely illustrates in what way marbles are categorized and named by 
schoolchildren. There seem to be several species of marbles. Seven species 
appear in Table 7 (i.e. oil, milk, smurf, transparent, one, pearl, pirate). Six 
of these seven have a name that reflects a salient perceptual characteristic (oil, 
milk, smurf, transparent, pearl, pirate). The only non-perceptual name (one) 
derives from the fact that the value of a marble tends to be expressed in the 
number of ' one' 's it is worth (for instance, a ' pearl ' may be worth four 
'ones', and a 'ten-bam' is worth ten 'ones'). Of the six species that have a 
perception-based name five have a metaphoric name (oil, milk, smurf, pearl, 
pirate) and one has a literal name (transparent). It should be noted that, 
though some metaphoric names seem to be compelled (oil, pearl), others 
seem to be preferred ('milkie' might also have been 'whitie', 'smurf' might 
as well have been 'blue-white', 'pirate' might have been 'blackie'). Across 
species there are recurrent relationships of size (small, larger, largest). These 
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are expressed through compounding, i.e. through combining the name of a 
species with a morpheme indicating relative size (oil-bam, kings-transparent, 
etc.). Thus, in this taxonomy, metaphors are used for characterizing what is 
unique about a marble, whereas compounding is used for specifying a 
marble's position on a general dimension. In this way, the integration of 
compounding and metaphorizing results in a quite precise and effective 
system of naming. 
Of course, these are examples from child culture. This means that the 
original creators of the metaphoric compounds remain anonymous. However, 
the probability that they were elementary schoolchildren is very high. 
Therefore, the observations presented in Table 7 add support to my general 
contention that, after age four, children begin to be apt at integrating 
compounding and metaphorizing. 
Language-based metaphors 
In the preceding section I have argued that children who have supposedly 
entered the 'literal' stage, nevertheless do produce metaphors and may be 
particularly inclined to produce metaphoric compounds and phrases. This 
might be because metaphoric compounds and phrases can easily be in-
corporated into larger (literal) utterances, and, especially when of the 
definitional kind, may serve the function of being conceptually precise in 
communicating something difficult. However, this should not be taken to 
mean that being precise would exhaust the functions of metaphor in this 
period. At least one other function can be identiñed. This is the function of 
assimilating frozen adult metaphors through re-creating them. Table 8 
contains some relevant observations. All utterances in this table were 
produced by Thomas between the ages of 7; 11 and 8;6 (i.e. right in the 
middle of the ' literal ' stage). 
The most striking characteristic of the metaphors in Table 8 is that they 
tend to use a frozen adult metaphor for a starting point. In (50) the child 
apparently ponders the meaning of the frozen metaphor 'the roots of a 
tooth', and concludes that teeth are a kind of 'plants that grow in your 
mouth'. This is a metaphoric definition (see the preceding section) that is 
triggered by language itself. In (51) the child takes the frozen expression 
' stick-old ' (meaning ' very old ') and derives the novel metaphoric form ' very 
old sticks'. In (52), he first uses the idiom 'keep it beautiful' in the normal 
way. Then he produces a novel metaphor in filling in a possible literal 
meaning for this idiom. Something similar seems to be happening in utter-
ances (53), (54) and (55). Here, too, the literal source of frozen metaphors 
is acknowledged by thinking up possible literal applications (that turn into 
metaphors because they do not literally apply to the context of utterance). 
For the adult listener, the effect is a refreshing or recreating of dead and dull 
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TABLE 8 Language-based metaphors* 
(5°) (?• ι ' ) Tanden zijn een soort plantjes die in je mond groeien, he> Want tanden 
hebben toch ook WORTELS ' [Teeth are a kind of plants that grow in your 
mouth, aren't they ' For teeth do also have HOOTS ' ] 
(51) (8,0) Nou, dan zíjn die mensen nu wel heel oude stokjes geworden1 [Well, then 
those people have become very old sticks now ·] Said while studying a 50-
year-old photograph of a group of people T h e metaphor is apparently derived 
from the frozen adult expression ' STOK-oud ' (sTiCK-old) 
(52) (8 ,2) Ik HOUD НЕТ met MOOI ' De tekening zit vol krassen en strepen · [I won't KEEP IT 
BEAUTIFUL1 The drawing is f uil of streaks and scratches1] Said in answer to M's 
request to 'KEEP IT BEAUTIFUL' (an idiom meaning something like 'don ' t 
overdo it'), when he was bicycling in a dangerous manner 
(53) (8,3) Je TRAPTE ER IN1 In de hondepoep* [You WALKED INTO IT 1 [an idiom meaning 
something like 'You fell for i t 1 ' ] In [to] the dog-shtt\], when he had made a 
joke that had been taken seriously by M 
(54) (8,3) When M said 'Je bent een SCHATJE' [You are a little TREASURE] to his baby 
brother, the child began talking to him like this 'Je mond zit vol parels, je 
oren zitten vol edelstenen, je neus is van goud', etc [Your mouth is full of 
pearls, your ears are full of gems, your nose is golden, etc ] 
(55) (8,4) HÍJ IS GETIKT Met een hamer op zijn kop getikt [He is TAPPED [an idiom mean-
ing something like 'crack-brained'] Tapped with a hammer on hts head ] 
(56) (8 ,4) Hier is een koeien-VLA Nee, het is een koeien-cAoco/a¿e-VLA [Here is a cows-
CUSTARD [idiom for 'cow-pat'] No , it's a cows-cAoco/ate-cusTARD ] Said while 
pointing at a cow-pat in the road When M asked him why he called it thus he 
answered 'Because it's brown, not yellow like vanilla-custard ' 
(57) (8 ,6) At dinner, M mentioned that the apple-sauce served was fresh, since she had 
made it herself A few minutes later the child produced the following 
comment on the babbling of his baby-brother ' Dat zijn zelfgemaakte 
woordjes' [Those are words he made himself), to which he added, laughingly, 
' Verse woordjes ' [Fresh words ] 
a
 Capitals indicate frozen adult metaphors Italics indicate the novel metaphors produced by 
the child After both (53) and (55) I asked the child whether this was something he had 
o\erheard at school, which in both cases he denied T h e reason for my question was that 
some local child language metaphors appeared to be used in his class For instance, ' to put 
someone into the marinade ' meant 'to throw someone into the sandbox and cover him with 
sand' 
figures of speech, comparable to the dusting-off treatment that is sometimes 
given by adults to dead metaphors (for example, in 'The minutes went by on 
tiptoe, with their fingers to their lips'3, the novel metaphor 'on tiptoe', etc. 
originates in taking the dead metaphor ' time goes by ' LITERALLY) However, 
since schoolchildren are still in the process of acquiring their second lexicon 
(1 e the idioms and stock phrases of their mother-tongue), and so probably 
do not yet distinguish between novel and dead metaphors, a dusting-off 
interpretation may be excluded in their case Rather, the function of 
utterances like (52) to (55) seems to be that of assimilating new idioms by 
[3] This sentence is from Raymond Chandler's The Lady m the Lake 
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means of (re)constructing their possible literal meanings. In this (re) 
construction process the child must call upon his capacity for metaphorizing. 
In (56) we once again see a metaphoric compound serving the function of 
being precise. But this time the compound is based on a frozen adult 
metaphor ('cows-custard'). The child improves on it by adding 'chocolate' 
which specifies that the cow-pat does not look like vanilla-custard but like 
chocolate-custard. 
Utterance (57) is not based on a frozen adult metaphor, yet it resembles the 
preceding examples in that, again, the source of the metaphor (' fresh words ') 
is to be found in language itself. There certainly is no perceptual or 
functional similarity between apple sauce and infant babble. However, since 
home-made apple sauce may be linguistically characterized as 'fresh', 
babbles, being home-made words, may also be so described. The driving 
force behind utterance (57) (and, probably, behind (53), (54) and (55) as well) 
seems to be humour. According to Wolfenstein (1954: 94) the characteristic 
joke form of middle childhood is the joking riddle. Among these riddles, the 
implicit reclassifications predominate (Sutton-Smith 1976). An example of 
an implicit reclassification is 'Why did the dog go out into the sun? He 
wanted to be a hot dog. ' One can see how such riddles, apart from satisfying 
a need for jesting, may at the same time constitute a training in meta-
phorizing. At pre-school age, child metaphors are perception- and/or 
action-based. Later, it seems that metaphors become language-based as well 
and so may become an important tool for further language acquisition and 
concept development. 
D I S C U S S I O N 
Since the preceding sections already contain so much discussion as to make 
a final general discussion somewhat redundant, I will restrict myself in this 
last section to summarizing the arguments presented and suggesting some 
possible strategies for future research. 
Language knows two mechanisms for creating new names from old words ; 
combining morphemes and changing word meaning. Word compounds may 
be considered as clear cases of the combining mechanism and metaphors as 
clear cases of the changing mechanism. The general question addressed in 
this article was how compounds and metaphors relate in development. In the 
Introduction a global categorial framework for relating metaphors and word 
compounds was sketched. Metaphors were interpreted as (explicit or 
implicit) subcategorizations of (nameless) NEW superordinate categories, 
whereas (novel) word compounds were interpreted as new subcategorizations 
of EXISTING superordinate categories. 
In the subsequent sections two developmental aspects of combining and 
changing were discussed : (a) the development of the capacity for combining 
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(compounding) and of that for changing (metaphorizing) ; and (¿>) the 
functions of child compounds and metaphors. It was concluded that 
combining and changing seem to develop independently at first but to become 
gradually integrated until, from age three onward, children may use their 
capacity for combining in producing sentences that are explicit metaphoric 
comparisons. It was suggested that the logical next step would be that these 
metaphoric comparisons might themselves become elements for further 
combining, through being compressed into metaphoric word compounds or 
phrases. They might then be incorporated as constituents into larger (literal) 
utterances. As for the functions of child compounds and metaphors, it was 
concluded that both may serve an important but rather trivial resource-
function. When using established syntax would result in over-complex 
constructions, or when no appropriate lexical items are available, children (as 
well as adults) may resort to producing novel compounds or metaphors. In 
this article such compounds and metaphors were called compelled. However, 
it was also concluded that children may produce preferred forms, i.e. novel 
compounds and metaphors for which established alternatives should be 
considered available to them. In such preferred cases, the functions of 
compounds and metaphors may be rather different. Preferred compounds 
seem to be primarily speaker-oriented. They tend to be produced in order to 
be precise and complete in linguistically representing concepts, whether this 
be communicatively necessary or not. Preferred metaphors, however, seem 
to be primarily listener-oriented. They tend to be produced for influencing 
the listener in a certain way and/or for indirectly conveying certain attitudes 
of the speaker. This suggests that the integration of combining (com-
pounding) and changing (metaphorizing) in a metaphoric compound or 
phrase might simultaneously serve a speaker- as well as a listener-oriented 
function. In children, the speaker-oriented function of being precise in 
linguistic representation apparently is associated with a general tendency 
towards precision that pervades children's symbolic development after age 4. 
Therefore, when somewhat older children produce metaphors (whether 
preferred or compelled), they might preferably do so by means of metaphoric 
compounds or phrases, since these forms tend to cancel the impreciseness 
that generally adheres to metaphor. 
Thus, considering both the progressive developmental integration of the 
capacities for combining and changing, and the apparent purposes served by 
children's novel compounds and metaphors, we might predict that, after the 
age of four, children will seriously begin producing metaphoric compounds 
and phrases. It was shown that, in fact, older children do produce such 
forms. Moreover, many of these forms seem to have a definitional character, 
i.e. they simultaneously express a similarity as well as an important 
difference. This adds to their function of making precise. Also, it was shown 
that the language schoolchildren use among themselves contains many 
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instances of metaphoric word use and many metaphoric compounds. Finally, 
it was argued that at school age, metaphors may be elicited by language itself 
(instead of being exclusively perception- or action-based), and that they may 
begin to serve a quite new function, i.e. that of assimilating the idioms of 
adult speech through recreating them. 
Taken together, the observations and discussions presented in this article 
do not suggest that children stop producing metaphors at elementary school 
age. On the contrary, they suggest that metaphors may take on new forms 
and acquire new functions in this period. This conclusion is in conflict with 
the generally held belief that schoolchildren enter a ' literal ' stage, during 
which they avoid producing metaphors. In this article several investigations 
suggestive of such a ' literal ' stage have been reviewed and found wanting. 
The general problem with research into metaphoric development (and, to a 
lesser extent, into the development of compounds) seems to be its pre-
dominantly experimental orientation and its neglect of the question of 
function (see for a recent review of research into metaphoric development 
Marschark & Nail 1985). What I hope this article has made clear is that: (a) 
children's spontaneous metaphoric utterances deserve closer scrutiny than 
they have received so far; (6) that in interpreting these utterances special 
attention should be paid to function, since function may change in the course 
of development; (c) that a fruitful approach would be not to consider 
metaphoric development in isolation but to study its relation to other 
linguistic developments; and, finally, (d) that the language and speech which 
children use and produce among themselves may prove to be a rich source of 
data. 
Of course, waiting for spontaneous metaphors to happen is a rather time-
consuming research strategy. I think, however, that we need not sit back and 
restrict ourselves to this approach exclusively. As soon as we have some idea 
about the different possible 'disguises' of metaphor (for instance in this 
article: sentences that are metaphoric comparisons, metaphoric word com-
pounds and phrases, metaphoric definitions), and the different possible 
functions served by these forms (for instance in this article: suggesting/ 
connoting attitudes, defending one's behaviour/possessions, joking, being 
precise in linguistically representing difficult ideas, assimilating frozen adult 
metaphors), we may develop experimental tasks that concentrate on one or 
more of these forms and functions. For instance, we might ask children to 
describe sensations and feelings, or to explain various difficult notions. We 
might ask them to define concepts for which we suspect they do not yet know 
the appropriate superordinate category names. We might ask them to play 
the role of someone who is defending his/her own behaviour or possessions, 
or of someone who wants to show how surprised she is. We might try 
teaching children to produce metaphoric compounds, and so on. I think that, 
in the end, we will find that some kinds of metaphor (for instance, gratuitous 
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metaphonc comparisons) decline with age, whereas others (for instance, 
metaphonc compounds) increase. But I do not think we will find that 
metaphor ever ' leaves' children. 
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Sex roles and phonetic factors in parent reference* 
LOEKIE ELBERS 
Rijksuniversiteit Utrecht 
(Received 4 October 1985) 
Locke (1985) notes that there is a higher percentage of non-nasal consonants 
in father names (e.g. papa, daddy) than in mother names. Mother names tend 
to comprise nasal consonants (e.g. mama, nana). He also notes that there is 
a preponderance of NON-nasal consonants in children's babbling. His 
concluding remarks are: 'It is evident that father names correspond more 
closely in structure to the phonetic patterns of infants than do maternal terms. 
If language history could only be reconstructed, it would be interesting to 
know why it was the child's FATHER that was given these more producible 
names' (Locke 1985: 219). 
A plausible answer to Locke's last question may be suggested, provided 
the question's focus is shifted from FATHER reference to MOTHER reference. 
Why is there a higher percentage of nasal consonants in mother names? 
Literature on babbling hints that there is a certain context in which nasal 
sounds are not at all infrequent and appear to be quite 'producible'. This 
is the context of crying, whining, whimpering; in short, fussing. The 
following quote from a case study on early babbling may serve to illustrate 
this: 
The nasal babbles mama and nene were highly context dependent. They 
were produced almost exclusively at moments in which the child felt some 
sort of distress, e.g. hunger, thirst, or need for attention. So they were 
mostly to be heard in combination with crying and whimpering. This often 
resulted in a convincing picture of a child calling for his mother. However, 
it seems clear that the mama and nene sequences had no meaning, but 
resulted from a transfer of the nasal sounds of whimpering to babbling 
(Eibers 1980: 18). 
Also relevant is Bates' observation that children often use the form mama as 
'a lament or a general request' (Bates 1979: 157) BEFORE they use it in a 
referential way. 
' Fussing' on the part of the child generally evokes 'mothering' behaviour 
[·] Address for correspondence: Rijksuniversiteit Utrecht, Faculteit der Sociale Weten-
schappen, Vakgroep Psychonomie, Heidelberglaan i, 3584 CS Utrecht, The Nether-
lands. 
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in the caregiver So fussing and mothering go together, constituting a 
meaningful context for interpretation. And we know that caregivers · (a) do 
in fact tend to interpret, ι e. 'read meaning into', their infants' behaviours 
(for example, see Schaffer 1977, Snow 1977, Harding 1983); and (b) choose 
names in accordance with local, context-bound frequencies, not general 
frequencies (Brown 1958) If, in the dawn of language, society took the 
MOTHER to be the primary (if not the sole) caregiver, then probably the ' sad ' 
nasal babbles were interpreted as a call for the MOTHER and were coined as 
a name for her (or for some important aspect of her, as for instance the breast 
in the latin form mamma). In other words, mothers, thinking that they were 
being named by their children, subsequently proceeded to 'teach'1 them this 
very name. 
The implication would be that in the history of parent reference there has 
been an interaction of phonetic factors and sex-role stereotyping It would 
be interesting to know whether (a sufficient number of) societies can be found 
in which the FATHERS do or used to do the mothering, and to determine the 
nasality ratio of their parent names. 
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CHAPTER 8. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
A collection of studies on children's language development is presented· 
The studies differ considerably in their linguistic subject matter, but 
they all focus on essentially the same psychological phenomenon, i.e. , 
on children's active cognitive involvement in their own language 
learning. In the Introduction (chapter 1) this phenomenon is labelled 
the 'cognitive effort' of language acquisition. The subsequent studies 
(chapters 2 to 6) are concerned with demonstrating 'cognitive effort', 
with uncovering its mechanisms of development, and with examining some 
of its specific functions. In a way however, the concept of 'cognitive 
effort', as it is expounded in the Introduction, should itself be 
regarded as the main 'conclusion' from the collection of studies 
presented in the subsequent chapters. For these separate studies did not 
derive from the concept, but rather caused it to be identified and 
explicated. Therefore, chapter 1 should be read both as an interpretive 
discussion of the different papers and as a theoretical introduction to 
their implicit, underlying theme. 
In the first part of chapter 1 the concept of 'cognitive effort', 
as the not specifically linguistic, general-cognitive and 
learning-oriented component of children's linguistic activeness, is 
introduced in an evocative way and its general theoretical position 
within the field of developmental psychollngulstlcs is discussed. It is 
argued that children's cognitive effort should be viewed as another 
important determinant of language development, in addition to input and 
linguistic endowment. In the second part of chapter 1 the concept is 
elaborated in more detail. Three kinds of children's cognitive 
involvement with language are distinguished: metalinguistic awareness, 
language play, and cognitive effort in ordinary language production. As 
to the third kind, it is argued that cognitive effort will reflect 
itself most clearly in those child productions that are communicatively 
superfluous and/or unnecessarily complex with respect to the child's 
current level of functioning. Subsequently, the separate studies are 
introduced and discussed one by one. 
Chapter 2 presents an intensive, longitudinal case study which 
focusses on the developmental mechanisms of prelinguistic babbling 
between the ages of 6 and 12 months. It is argued that the development 
of prelinguistic babbling is neither primarily determined by the 
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character of the child's input, nor by some innate predisposition to 
'randomly' produce sounds. The main conclusion of the study is that 
babbling can be interpreted as a spontaneous, yet structured process of 
exploration, during which the child is actively, systematically and 
continuously working on constructing his own 'springboard' to speech. In 
this construction process the child makes use of two principles of 
cognitive effort (called 'operating principles' in the paper): 
'combination' and 'variation'. 'Combination' refers to the combining of 
articulatory acts which previously were exercised separately, 
'variation' refers to trying out the same type of articulatory act in 
different articulatory contexts. Four stages are distinguished. In the 
first stage no combinations occur and production mainly consists of 
'single-consonant' babbles. In the second stage, combination mainly 
takes the form of repetition. In the third stage, it takes the form of 
concatenating different babbling types as well. In the fourth stage the 
concatenations grow more varied and less repetitive in character. The 
child in this case study apparently focussed his cognitive effort on 
certain global distinctions in manner of articulation (continuant sounds 
versus non-continuant sounds) and in place of articulation (back, front 
and centre of the mouth). Conceivably, other children might focus on 
other distinctions, but one would expect the general mechanisms of 
effort (combining and varying) to remain the same across children. 
Chapter 3 presents another case study of babbling. Here, the 
research focus is on the functions of babbling during a short but 
crucial period in the development of speech, i.e. , the period of the 
'very first' words. Analyzed are the solitary babbling monologues 
produced by one child during the six weeks following acquisition of the 
first word. The production of word-related forms during solitary 
babbling can, in this period, be taken as an indication of cognitive 
effort. In the paper, this effort is investigated by studying the 
relationship between word acquisition (as noted down in the mother's 
diary) and concurrent changes in the forms of solitary babbling. It is 
concluded that there is a continuous, bidirectional interplay between 
these two aspects of speech development: newly acquired words may 
influence the character and course of babbling, whereas babbling in turn 
may 'prepare the ground' for the selection of other new words, i.e., may 
give rise to so-called 'phonological preferences'. It is shown that in 
the babbling of the first words period, cognitive effort is not only 
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focussed on practising the forms of newly acquired words, but also on 
practising salient form characteristics that differentiate between these 
words ('differentiating features'). An important function of this 
cognitive effort is the development of 'preparatory forms' for words 
that have as yet to be acquired. 
In chapter 4 the research focus is neither primarily on the 
developmental mechanisms of cognitive effort nor on its functions, but 
on identifying and demonstrating two little-researched manifestations of 
the phenomenon. An analysis is presented of a word-finding problem, 
manifested by a two-year old child during a particular conversation. The 
child repeatedly attempted to retrieve and produce a specific, recently 
acquired word (of which he knew the meaning), but again and again ended 
up producing another, previously learned word (the referential meaning 
of which was not yet clear to him). It is shown that the child behaves 
in a similar way as adults do when they are in a so-called 
'tip-of-the-tongue' state. Thus, it is demonstrated that young children 
can already engage in the effortful process of consciously searching for 
a particular, temporarily 'lost' word. It is also shown that children 
take note of, and actually store, linguistic forms that are as yet 
referentially meaningless to them. This can be interpreted as another 
manifestation of cognitive effort. 
In chapter 5 the focus is again on the developmental mechanisms of 
cognitive effort. In chapter 2, 'combination' and 'variation' were 
identified as developmental mechanisms in prelinguistic babbling. Now it 
is argued that they can be interpreted as general principles of 
cognitive effort, in that they neither seem to be specific for language 
acquisition nor for a particular age period. Four areas of development 
are discussed, two from language acquistion and two from general 
cognitive development. It is argued that the same three-phase cycle of 
cognitive operations (called 'the basic operational cycle') can be 
recognized in all four areas. The three phases of this basic cycle 
consist of, respectively: repeating the same action, chaining 
(combining) different actions, and varying these chainings of actions. 
As to cognitive development, it is argued that this basic cycle can be 
recognized in the behavioral characteristics of the Piagetian 
sensorimotor stages, and in the developmental progression of spontaneous 
object classification. As to language development, it is argued that 
this basic cycle can be recognized in the development of prelinguistic 
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babbling and in the way in which three-word sentences emerge in sentence 
development. It is also suggested that aspects of the basic cycle may be 
recognized in several other areas of language development. The section 
on the development of three-word sentences presents new data, which are 
based on a diary study. In this section it is argued that the child 
develops a particular syntactic notion ('Person names in 
sentence-initial position should refer to Agents/Experiencers') in twice 
applying the basic cycle of cognitive operations to his own 
output-repertoire. This adds support to the contention that 'analyzing 
one's own output' may be no less Important for syntax acquisition than 
is 'analyzing the input'. In the concluding section of chapter 5 it is 
argued that the 'basic cycle' may prove to be a useful intermediary 
concept for integrating the respective roles of input and endowment in 
language acquisition. 
In chapter 6, as in chapter 3, the primary focus is on the 
functions of cognitive effort. This time aspects of lexical/semantic 
development are investigated. Two different kinds of lexical innovation 
are discussed; novel word compounds and metaphors. Word compounds are 
clear cases of combining lexical meanings (for instance, 'sun-shine'), 
metaphors are clear cases of varying lexical meanings (for instance, 
'Juliet is the sun'). Novel word compounds are interpreted as new 
subcategorlzatlons of existing superordinate categories, novel metaphors 
are Interpreted as (necessarily) new subcategorlzatlons of new 
(nameless) superordinate categories. The development of the capacities 
for compounding and metaphorizing is described, and the functions that 
compounds and metaphors may have for children are analyzed. This 
analysis Is based on observations of spontaneously produced child 
utterances and on data from schoolchildren's language. Instances of 
'unnecessary' novel word compounds and metaphors (instead of which 
children might have produced old, established forms, but apparently 
preferred not to) can be considered the result of cognitive effort. It 
is argued that such 'preferred' compounds tend to serve the 
speaker-oriented, cognitive function of 'being conceptually precise', 
whereas 'preferred' metaphors tend to serve more listener-oriented, 
communicative functions. It is further argued that middle childhood 
seems to be a period of producing 'metaphoric compounds'. These are 
forms in which compounding and metaphorizing are fully integrated, and 
in which both conceptual and communicative functions may be served at 
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the same time. Finally, it Is shown that during middle childhood 
'preferred' metaphors may also acquire the new and learning-oriented 
function of 're-creating adult idioms'. These observations are in 
conflict with the generally held belief that middle childhood is a 
'literal stage', during which children avoid producing metaphors. It is 
concluded that metaphors do not seem to disappear in this period but to 
change in their forms and functions. 
Chapter 7 does not present a 'true' paper but a short note, which 
is about the efforts of mothers rather than of children. It is argued 
that the (almost universal) word 'mama' was created by mothers who 
imputed meaning to the 'sad' babbles of their babies. 
As to the five main studies, reported in chapters 2 to 6, the 
summary presented above makes clear that their conclusions are of 
different kinds. Firstly, there are conclusions that are mainly relevant 
for the particular linguistic content area which is studied. For 
instance, the conclusion that there is no such thing as a 'literal 
stage' (chapter 6) is mainly relevant for the area of metaphoric 
development proper, and the conclusion that the forms of early words may 
influence the forms of babble (chapter 3) is mainly relevant for the 
area of phonetic/phonological development. Secondly, there are 
conclusions that can either be phrased in the terms of the linguistic 
area investigated, or in terms of an over-arching 'cognitive effort' 
approach. For instance, from chapter 3 we can either conclude that 
'phonological preferences may be rooted in babbling' or that 'cognitive 
effort spent on babbling can make certain types of words easier to 
acquire'. Thirdly, there are conclusions which can best be phrased 
within a framework of 'cognitive effort'. These are the most central to 
this dissertation. These conclusions are that 'combination' and 
'variation' seem to be two fundamental, potentially innovative 
principles of cognitive effort (chapter 2); that combination and 
variation may, in development, arrange themselves (together with 
'repetition') into a basic cycle of cognitive operations which seems to 
be a general learning-mechanism in that it is neither restricted to 
language development nor to a particular age period (chapter 5); that in 
language development this basic cycle of cognitive operations can be 
recognized in the development of prelingulstic babbling and in the 
emergence of three-word sentences, but probably also in several other 
areas (chapter 5); that children can indeed pay attention to language 
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for cognitive rather than communicative reasons (chapter 3, chapter 4, 
chapter 6); that one such reason is 'achieving precision in 
linguistically representing concepts' (chapter 6), and that some 
specific learning- functions of spontaneous cognitive effort are 
'learning something about (meta)phonological parameters' (chapter 2), 
'learning something about word forms' (chapter 3, chapter 4), 'learning 
something about sentence structure' (chapter 5), and 'learning something 
about adult Idioms' (chapter 6). 
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SAMENVATTING EN CONCLUSIES 
Deze dissertatie bestaat uit een verzameling artikelen over primaire 
taalontwikkeling. De artikelen verschillen onderling aanzienlijk in hun 
linguistisch thema, maar concentreren zich alle op hetzelfde 
psychologische fenomeen: de actieve cognitieve betrokkenheid van kinderen 
bij het leren van hun eerste taal. In de Inleiding (hoofdstuk 1) wordt dit 
fenomeen aangeduid met de term 'cognitieve inspanning' (cognitive effort). 
De daarop volgende artikelen (hoofdstukken 2 tot en met 6) zijn gericht op 
het aantonen van 'cognitieve inspanning', op het achterhalen van de 
ontwikkelingsmechanismen ervan, en op het verhelderen van de specifieke 
functies die het opbrengen van deze inspanning kan hebben voor kinderen. 
In zekere zin echter moet het begrip 'cognitieve inspanning', zoals dat 
wordt uiteengezet in de Inleiding, zelf worden gezien als de belangrijkste 
'conclusie' van de verzamelde studies. Immers, de gerapporteerde 
onderzoekingen werden niet in eerste instantie uit dit begrip afgeleid, 
maar hebben er veeleer toe geleid dat het geïdentificeerd en 
geëxpliciteerd kon worden. De Inleiding (hoofdstuk 1) moet daarom niet 
alleen gelezen worden als een theoretische introductie tot het impliciete 
gemeenschappelijke thema van de verschillende artikelen, maar ook als een 
interpreterende bespreking achteraf van hun samenhang. 
In het eerste deel van hoofdstuk 1 wordt het begrip 'cognitieve 
inspanning' geïntroduceerd als de niet specifiek linguïstische, 
algemeen-cognitieve en op het leren zelf gerichte component van de talige 
activiteit van kinderen. Vervolgens wordt de theoretische positie van dit 
begrip binnen het veld besproken. Betoogd wordt dat 'cognitieve 
inspanning' gezien moet worden als een belangrijke determinant van 
taalontwikkeling, naast linguistische aanleg en taalaanbod. In het tweede 
deel van hoofdstuk 1 wordt het begrip in meer detail uitgewerkt. Drie 
vormen van cognitieve betrokkenheid bij taal worden onderscheiden: 
metalinguistisch gedrag, taalspel, en cognitieve inspanning bij 'gewone' 
taaiproductie. De laatstgenoemde vorra zal het duidelijkst tot uiting komen 
in die kinderproducties die 'communicatief overbodig' zijn en/of Onnodig 
complex' (ten opzichte van het gebruikelijke niveau van functioneren van 
het kind) zijn. Tenslotte worden de Individuele artikelen één voor één 
ingeleid en besproken. 
Hoofdstuk 2 presenteert een intensieve, longitudinale gevalsstudie 
van de ontwikkeling van het voortalig brabbelen in de tweede helft van het 
eerste levensjaar. Betoogd wordt dat het brabbelen in deze periode niet in 
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de eerste plaats bepaald wordt door de vorm van het taalaanbod, maar ook 
niet primair berust op een aangeboren nelging om 'In het wilde weg' 
klanken te produceren. De belangrijkste conclusie van het onderzoek Is dat 
brabbelen geïnterpreteerd kan worden als een proces van spontane maar 
gestructureerde exploratie, waarbij kinderen actief en systematisch bezig 
zijn hun eigen 'springplank naar de spraak' te construeren. In dit 
constructieproces wordt gebruik gemaakt van twee principes van cognitieve 
inspanning (in het artikel aangeduid als 'operating principles'): 
'combinatie' en 'variatie'. 'Combinatie' komt tot uitdrukking in het 
samenvoegen van articulatorische handelingen die eerder apart werden 
geoefend, 'variatie' uit zich in het uitproberen van eenzelfde soort 
articulatorische handeling in verschillende articulatorische contexten. 
Vier stadia in de ontwikkeling van het brabbelen worden onderscheiden. In 
het eerste stadium komen combinaties nog nauwelijks voor en bestaat de 
productie vooral uit enkelvoudige brabbels (met niet meer dan één 
'consonant-achtige' component). In het tweede stadium neemt combinatie 
hoofdzakelijk de vorm aan van repetitie. In het derde stadium verschijnen 
er ook aaneenschakelingen van verschillende soorten brabbels en in het 
vierde stadium worden deze aaneenschakelingen gevarieerder en minder 
repetitief van karakter. Het kind in deze gevalsstudie lijkt zijn 
cognitieve inspanning vooral te richten op bepaalde globale opposities in 
articulatiewijze ('durende' consonanten versus 'nlet-durende' consonanten) 
en articulatieplaats (achterin, voorin, en in het midden van de mond). 
Mogelijk zullen andere kinderen zich op andere onderscheidingen 
concentreren, maar men kan verwachten dat de algemene mechanismen van 
cognitieve inspanning (combinatie en variatie) hetzelfde zullen blijven. 
In hoofdstuk 3 wordt wederom een gevalsstudie van brabbelen 
gepresenteerd. Nu gaat het vooral om de functies van 'laat' brabbelen, 
d.w.z., het brabbelen dat plaats vindt in de periode waarin de eerste 
woorden hun Intrede doen. Van een kind dat in zijn eentje in de box 
speelt, worden de brabbelmonologen geanalyseerd die hij produceert 
gedurende de eerste zes weken na het verschijnen van het eerste woord. De 
productie van met woordvormen samenhangende brabbels kan, in deze periode 
en In deze context, beschouwd worden als een vorra van cognitieve 
inspanning. Deze inspanning wordt bestudeerd door de relatie te 
onderzoeken tussen de verwerving van nieuwe woorden (zoals bijgehouden 
door de moeder in een dagboek) en gelijktijdig plaats vindende 
veranderingen in de vorm van het 'eenzame' brabbelen. De conclusie is dat 
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er een continue wisselwerking kan zijn tussen woordverwerving en 
brabbelontwikkeling: nieuw verworven woorden kunnen karakter en verloop 
van het brabbelen beïnvloeden, terwijl het brabbelen, op zijn beurt, een 
rol kan spelen in het ontstaan van zogenaamde 'fonologische voorkeuren' 
(phonological preferences) en dus de selectie van nieuwe woorden mede kan 
bepalen. In de periode van de eerste woorden worden bij het brabbelen niet 
alleen nieuw verworven woordvormen als zodanig geoefend, maar ook meer 
algemene vormkenmerken die onderscheiden tussen deze woordvormen 
(differentiating features). Een belangrijke functie van cognitieve 
inspanning in deze periode is het ontwikkelen van 'voorbereidende vormen' 
(preparatory forms) voor woorden die pas later als nieuwe aanwinst in de 
productie verschijnen. 
Het onderzoek dat gerapporteerd wordt in hoofdstuk 4 is noch primair 
op de ontwikkelingsmechanismen van cognitieve inspanning gericht, noch op 
de functies ervan, maar op het identificeren en demonstreren van twee, nog 
weinig onderzochte, manifestaties van het fenomeen. Het hoofdstuk 
presenteert een analyse van enige spontaan optredende 
woordvindings-moeilijkheden bij een twee jaar oud kind. In een gesprek met 
zijn moeder probeert het kind herhaaldelijk een bepaald, recent geleerd 
woord (waar hij de betekenis van kent) te produceren, maar komt steeds 
weer terecht bij een ander, eerder geleerd woord (waarvan de betekenis hem 
nog niet geheel duidelijk is). De analyse laat zien dat het kind zich op 
een soortgelijke wijze gedraagt als een volwassene die zich in een 
zogenaamde 'Tip-of-the-tongue' toestand bevindt. Dit demonstreert dat ook 
zeer jonge kinderen al de Inspanning kunnen opbrengen van het bewust in 
het geheugen zoeken naar het 'juiste', maar tijdelijk 'zoek geraakte', 
woord. Tevens laat de analyse zien dat kinderen notitie nemen van 
linguistische vormen die nog geen duidelijke betekenis hebben, en 
dergelijke vormen zelfs in het geheugen opslaan. Ook dit kan 
geïnterpreteerd worden als een manifestatie van cognitieve inspanning. 
In hoofdstuk 5 is de aandacht, zoals eerder in hoofdstuk 2, primair 
gericht op de ontwikkelingsmechanismen van cognitieve inspanning. In 
hoofdstuk 2 werden 'combinatie' en 'variatie' geïdentificeerd als 
ontwikkelingsmechanismen in het voortalige brabbelen. Nu wordt betoogd dat 
ze kunnen worden opgevat als algemene principes van cognitieve inspanning 
omdat ze noch specifiek voor de taalontwikkeling, noch specifiek voor een 
bepaalde leeftijdsperiode lijken te zijn. Vier ontwikkelingsterreinen 
worden besproken, twee uit de taalontwikkeling en twee uit de meer 
144 
algemeen-cognitieve ontwikkeling. In alle vier kan eenzelfde, uit drie 
fasen bestaande, cyclus van cognitieve operaties worden waargenomen 
(genaamd 'de basis-cyclus'). De drie fasen van deze basis-cyclus worden 
gevormd door, respectievelijk: het herhalen van handelingen (repetitie), 
het aaneenschakelen (combineren) van verschillende soorten handelingen, en 
het veranderen van kenmerken van deze aaneenschakelingen (variatie). 
Binnen de algemeen-cognitieve ontwikkeling kan deze basis-cyclus 
waargenomen worden in de gedragskenmerken van de Piagetiaanse 
sensori-motorische stadia, en in het ontwikkelingsverloop van het spontaan 
classificeren van objecten. Ten aanzien van de taalontwikkeling wordt 
betoogd dat de basis-cyclus herkend kan worden in de ontwikkeling van het 
voortalig brabbelen, en in de wijze waarop drie-woord zinnen verschijnen 
in de ontwikkeling van de zinsbouw. Ook wordt aangegeven dat aspecten van 
de basis-cyclus binnen diverse andere terreinen van taalontwikkeling 
aangetroffen kunnen worden. In het gedeelte van hoofdstuk 5 dat gaat over 
de ontwikkeling van drie-woord zinnen worden nieuwe gegevens gepresenteerd 
die gebaseerd zijn op een dagboek-studie van de zinsproductie van één 
kind. Op basis van deze gegevens wordt betoogd dat het kind een bepaalde 
syntactische notie ontwikkelt (Namen van personen, die aan het begin van 
een zin staan, verwijzen naar 'Agents/Experiencers' ) door de basis-cyclus 
van cognitieve operaties twee keer toe te passen op zijn eigen repertoire 
van uitingen. Dit geeft steun aan het idee dat het manipuleren en 
analyseren van de eigen producten ten minste even belangrijk kan zijn voor 
de syntactische ontwikkeling als het analyseren van het taalaanbod. In het 
laatste deel van hoofdstuk 5 wordt gesuggereerd dat het concept van de 
'basis-cyclus' de bemiddelende functie van 'tussenschakel' kan vervullen 
bij het op elkaar betrekken van de rollen die, respectievelijk, 
linguistische aanleg en taalaanbod in de taalontwikkeling spelen. 
In hoofdstuk 6 valt, net zoals in hoofdstuk 3, het accent op de 
functies van cognitieve inspanning. Aspecten van lexicaal/semantische 
ontwikkeling worden onderzocht. Twee verschillende soorten lexicale 
innovatie worden besproken: nieuwe woord-samenstellingen en metaforen. 
Woord-samenstellingen zijn duidelijke voorbeelden van het combineren van 
lexicale betekenissen (bijvoorbeeld 'zonneschijn'), metaforen zijn 
duidelijke instanties van het variëren van een lexicale betekenis 
(bijvoorbeeld 'Julia is de zon'). Nieuwe woord-samenstellingen worden 
opgevat als nieuwe subcategorisaties van bestaande bovengeordende 
categorieën, nieuwe metaforen worden opgevat als (noodzakelijk) nieuwe 
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subcategorisaties van nieuwe (naamloze) bovengeordende categorieën. De 
ontwikkeling van het vermogen om samenstellingen en metaforen te maken 
wordt beschreven, en de functies die samenstellingen en metaforen voor 
kinderen kunnen vervullen worden geanalyseerd. Deze analyse is gebaseerd 
op spontane kinderultingen en op gegevens uit het taalgebruik van 
schoolkinderen. 'Geprefereerde' (i.e., 'onnodige') nieuwe samenstellingen 
en metaforen (in plaats waarvan kinderen bekende, reeds bestaande vormen 
hadden kunnen gebruiken maar het kennelijk prefereerden om dat niet te 
doen) kunnen worden beschouwd als instanties van cognitieve inspanning. 
Betoogd wordt dat geprefereerde samenstellingen in het algemeen de 
cognitieve, op de spreker zelf georiënteerde functie vervullen van zich 
'conceptueel precies' uit te drukken. Geprefereerde metaforen daarentegen 
lijken overwegend communicatieve, op de luisteraar ingestelde functies te 
hebben. Voorts wordt aannemelijk gemaakt dat de lagere-school tijd (middle 
childhood) een periode is waarin kinderen 'metaforische 
woordsamenstellingen' gaan produceren. In deze vormen zijn het 
'samenstellingen maken' en het 'metaforen produceren' volledig 
geintegreerd. Met behulp van deze vormen kunnen conceptuele en 
communicatieve functies tegelijkertijd worden gediend. Tenslotte wordt 
aangetoond dat gedurende de lagere-school periode metaforen ook de nieuwe, 
op het leren van taal gerichte functie kunnen krijgen van het 
'herscheppen' van volwassen Idiomen. Deze gegevens en interpretaties zijn 
in strijd met de algemene opvatting dat kinderen van lagere -school 
leeftijd een zogenaamde 'letterlijke periode' (literal stage) doormaken, 
waarin zij het vermijden om metaforen te produceren. De conclusie is dat 
metaforen in deze periode niet verdwijnen maar dat hun vormen en functies 
veranderen. 
Hoofdstuk 7 presenteert een korte notitie, die eerder over de 
Inspanningen van moeders gaat dan over die van kinderen. Betoogd wordt dat 
het (bijna universele) woord 'mama' gemaakt is door moeders die een 
referentiè'le betekenis toekenden aan de 'droevige' brabbels van hun 
babies. 
De hierboven gepresenteerde samenvatting maakt duidelijk dat de 
conclusies van de vijf belangrijkste artikelen (hoofdstukken 2 tot en met 
6) veelsoortig zijn. Ten eerste zijn er conclusies die hoofdzakelijk 
relevant zijn voor het specifieke linguistische subterrein van onderzoek. 
Bijvoorbeeld, de conclusie dat de zogenaamde 'letterlijke periode' niet 
bestaat (hoofdstuk 6) is hoofdzakelijk relevant voor het terrein van de 
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metaforische ontwikkeling. Evenzo is de conclusie dat vroege woordvormen 
van invloed kunnen zijn op vorm en verloop van het brabbelen (hoofdstuk 3) 
hoofdzakelijk relevant voor het terrein van de fonetisch/fonologische 
ontwikkeling. Ten tweede zijn er conclusies die zowel geformuleerd kunnen 
worden in de termen van het onderzochte linguistische subterrein, alsook 
in termen van een meer overkoepelende benadering gericht op 'cognitieve 
inspanning'. Bijvoorbeeld, uit hoofdstuk 3 kunnen we zowel concluderen dat 
'fonologische voorkeuren geworteld zijn in het brabbelen' alsook dat 'de 
cognitieve inspanning besteed aan brabbelen het makkelijker maakt om 
bepaalde nieuwe woorden te verwerven'. Ten derde zijn er conclusies die 
het beste geformuleerd kunnen worden binnen het raamwerk van het begrip 
'cognitieve inspanning'. Deze conclusies zijn voor deze dissertatie het 
meest centraal. De conclusies zijn dat 'combinatie' en 'variatie' twee 
fundamentele, potentieel vernieuwende mechanismen van cognitieve 
inspanning zijn (hoofdstuk 2, hoofdstuk 6); dat deze mechanismen zich in 
de ontwikkeling in een bepaalde volgorde kunnen arrangeren en zo (samen 
met 'repetitie') een basis-cyclus van cognitieve operaties kunnen vormen 
die zowel in de taalontwikkeling als in de algemeen-cognitieve 
ontwikkeling en zowel bij jonge als oudere kinderen aangetroffen kan 
worden (hoofdstuk 5); dat deze basis-cyclus zich in de taalontwikkeling 
kan manifesteren in het verloop van het voortalige brabbelen en in het 
ontstaan van drie-woord zinnen, maar waarschijnlijk ook in diverse andere 
ontwikkelingsgebieden (hoofdstuk 5); dat kinderen niet alleen 
communicatieve maar ook cognitieve redenen hebben om aandacht te besteden 
aan taal (hoofdstukken 3, 4, en 6); dat één zo'n cognitieve reden is het 
voor zichzelf zo 'precies' mogelijk representeren van concepten (hoofdstuk 
6); en dat specifieke leer-functies van spontane cognitieve inspanning 
kunnen zijn: iets leren over (meta)fonologische parameters (hoofdstuk 2), 
iets leren over woordvormen (hoofdstuk 3, hoofdstuk 4), iets leren over 
zinsstructuur (hoofdstuk 5), en iets leren over volwassen Idiomen 
(hoofdstuk 6). 
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APPENDIX 
From 'A language of three words'*, by Nicolaas Matsier. 
Translated by Penny Sandford. 
Ah, how quickly did they pass, all those charming stages: sitting and 
roaring with laughter, crawling and babbling, walking and pointing. R. 
now definitively has access to the field of language. Now that I can 
still keep track of the development - the score is three words - the 
time has come to record its history. 
R's first word was instilled by my wife through a simple game. It 
is called 'Where is daddy?' and is played by three people. My wife says: 
'Where's daddy?' (Daddy is present, although hidden from view). R. 
watches expectantly. The question is repeated a few times, followed by 
the yearning cry: 'Daddy! Daddy!'. As to someone you are looking for or 
miss very much. Then, making my appearance, I: 'Over here!'. Whereupon 
my wife, delighted: 'Daddy's over there!'. General enthusiasm in the 
reunited family. 
This must have started R. saying 'Daddy' ' all by herself. 
Initially without any particular intention, rather for euphonic reasons. 
The present meanings are: (1) Daddy, that is me, (2) Mummy, in 
particular when absent; uttered at the sound of a key or door, (3) the 
absentee in general; poem, prayer. 
The second word arrived without any deliberate manipulation. It is 
true that I occasionally say 'yum!', but then I'm always saying things; 
I rather used to do this in order to articulate feeding events. From 
this word R. has coined the verb and/or noun 'yumyum' or even 'yummy'. ' 
Established meanings: (1) eating, (2) drinking, (3) an unspecified 
longing for something. Sometimes I have the impression it is being 
chanted all day long, like a kind of recitative: yumyum-yumyum-yumyum... 
Not just preceding, but also directly following a meal. She says it 
softly, and restrained, with precision and with a gentle urge, without 
the slightest hint of a command or demand. It is mysterious and clear. 
The third word was added a few days ago. It may be the number three 
which presses me to make haste. Three is a series, whichever way you 
look at it. Again, the acquisition was the result of a game. A game for 
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two players and a toy monkey, which, when R. is already in bed, is 
suddenly found missing. Tension is increased by the question, spoken 
with mounting anxiety and then almost as a matter of life and death, 
'Where is monkey-monks?'. Then: 'There is monkey-monks' (who is produced 
simultaneously) - cheering, reunion of R. and monkey-monks for the 
length of the night and at the same time an opportunity for the parent 
in charge to sneak away. 
This then, has become 'monkey' ', a kind of god of sleep in the 
cot, who, lately, is actively looked for and invoked. For some reason 
the afternoon nap is beyond his competence. In the daytime he Joins in 
with everything, but incognito. 
Daddy, yummy, monkey: one, two, three - many. The rest is bound to 
follow. But in the meantime, what has been going on inside that little 
head? Or is that the wrong question to begin with and should I speak of 
larynx? I don't know. Now and again I make an effort to imagine 
wordlessness as a... As a... There you are; try as I may, I am left with 
nothing but absurd comparisons in which light-explosions take place 
inside something that is pitch-dark. 
1) original Dutch child form: /papa/ 
2) original Dutch child forms: /hapa/, /hapi/ 
3) original Dutch child form: /api/ 
Translation of 'Een taal van drie woorden', which appeared in NRC 
Handelsblad (16 - 1 - 1981) and in Matsier, N.. Een gebreid echtpaartje, 
Querido Amsterdam, 1985. 
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Stellingen behorende bij het proefschrift 'The cognitive effort of 
developing a first language', Loekie Eibers, 15 februari 1989. 
1. 'Mama' is een soort geuzennaam (dit proefschrift, hfst. 7). 
2. De gedachte dat primaire taalverwerving op een moeiteloze en snelle 
manier plaatsvindt zal, indien de ontwikkeling van het taalgedrag 
even microscopisch onderzocht wordt als de structuur van de taal, 
net zo absurd blijken te zijn als de gedachte dat taal een 
eenvoudige en doorzichtige structuur zou hebben (dit proefschrift). 
3. De aard van de 'basiscyclus van cognitieve operaties' (dit 
proefschrift, hfst. 5) maakt het onwaarschijnlijk dat een 
soortgelijke vorm van spontaan leergedrag ook bij dieren 
aangetroffen zou kunnen worden. 
4. De op zich terechte constatering dat 'imitatie' als verklarend 
mechanisme voor taalontwikkeling ontoereikend is, heeft helaas het 
onderzoek van imitatie als belangrijk taalontwikkelingsfenomeen 
waarvan de mechanismen zelf nog grotendeels duister zijn, in de weg 
gestaan. 
5. Met de mogelijkheid dat kinderen ook wel eens min of meer 
'opzettelijk' fouten tegen de grammatica zouden kunnen maken (dit 
proefschrift, hfst. 6) wordt in discussies in de literatuur te 
weinig rekening gehouden. 
6. Van een verschijnsel als 'metaforische definitie' (dit proefschrift, 
hfst. 6) wordt in de literatuur over de ontwikkeling van het 
definiëren verbazingwekkend weinig melding gemaakt. 
7. Een goede metafoor is een ei van Columbus dat gaat functioneren als 
een paard van Troje. 
8. Dat er ook zoiets als een 'indirekte metafoor' kan bestaan, blijkt 
uit de bij sommige tankstations gestelde gewetensvraag:'Of tankt u 
liever bij een konijn?' 
9. In zijn beschouwingen over de relatie tussen taal en geest maakt 
Chomsky gebruik van twee verschillende metaforen: taal als 'spiegel' 
van de geest (mirror of mind) en taal als 'orgaan' van de geest 
(mental organ). Voor wie vooral geïnteresseerd is in de algemeen 
cognitieve principes die in taal tot uitdrukking komen, is de 
splegel-metafoor echter te sterk en de orgaan-metafoor te zwak. 
10. Het intrigerende 'De mens als metafoor' is, als titel voor een boek 
dat grotendeels gaat over opvattingen van de mens als machine, in 
zijn twee meest letterlijke interpretaties respectievelijk niet van 
toepassing en anomaal, en in zijn twee minst letterlijke 
interpretaties respectievelijk niet van toepassing en 
ongrammaticaal. 
Pie ter Vroon en Douwe Draaisma, De mens als metafoor. 
Over vergelijkingen van mens en machine in filosofie 
en psychologie. Ambo Baarn, 1985. 
11. Bij het lezen van zinsneden als 'het expliciet afvragen van 
intuities van kinderen over taal' en 'distinctieve foneemkenmerken 
kunnen worden afgevraagd' (Extra en Verhoeven 1987: 25), vraagt men 
zich af of deze nu als 'niet welgevormd' of eerder als 'niet-wèl 
makend' moeten worden beschouwd. Het verdient aanbeveling dergelijke 
constructies eens systematisch af te vragen. 
Guus Extra en Ludo Verhoeven, Primaire taalverwerving; 
schets van een onderzoekterrein. Toegepaste 
Taalwetenschap in Artikelen, nr. 3, 1987. 
12. Zij die het verwerpelijk vinden dat ouders het gedrag van hun 
kinderen wetenschappelijk onderzoeken, gaan uit van de onjuiste 
vooronderstelling dat wetenschap een zuiver rationele en ouderschap 
een zuiver emotionele aangelegenheid zou zijn. 
13. De feministische overtuiging dat in de taal mechanismen werkzaam 
zijn waardoor vrouwen ofwel 'onzichtbaar' gemaakt worden ofwel op 
een 'onderdrukkende' wijze worden gestereotypeerd, vindt steun in de 
observatie dat het woord 'thuisbevaller' een specifiek vrouwelijke 
bezigheid behandelt als in principe sexe-neutraal, terwijl het woord 
'huishoudster' een in principe sexe-neutrale bezigheid behandelt als 
specifiek vrouwelijk. 
